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Abstract           
Saudi Arabia has a unique environment in terms of its political, economic, legal and 
judicial aspects which have some anomalous characteristics that create challenges for 
corporate governance. Further challenges are presented by the current structure of listed 
companies and by Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030.1 This environment significantly 
influences the role of the board of directors in listed companies and increases its role in 
safeguarding the interests of different shareholders and stakeholders.  This thesis 
reviews the new legislation relating to corporate governance in Saudi Arabia in relation 
to the board of directors in listed companies and the extent to which such legislation 
affects its relationships with the main parties in the company. It defines the major 
features of the new Saudi Law of Companies, issued in 2015, and the new Corporate 
Governance Regulation, issued in 2017. The thesis deals with all of the relevant changes 
in the new law and regulations. It also clarifies the extent of the improvement in 
corporate governance resulting from the new legislation and those aspects related to the 
thesis that require further reform by suggesting more details, flexibility or enforcement 
to meet the standards of corporate governance. It uses a comparative study with both 
English law and global standards and assesses the compatibility of Saudi legislation 
with them in this respect in a manner that suits the particularities of the legal and 
economic environment in Saudi Arabia. 
The thesis explores the main theories and the most prominent models of corporate 
governance that affect the role of the board of directors. It discusses the composition of 
the board of directors, including the diversity of board membership, structure and 
models as well as the provisions for shadow directors. It also covers the relationship of 
the board of directors with the AGM, board meetings, company committees, company 
auditors, stakeholders and - in particular - employees. 
 
  
                                                          
1 See the official website of Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030, at 45, available at: 
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1.1   Preamble 
The past two decades have seen some major corporations (Enron, World Telecom, etc.) 
fall into insolvency, and the current financial crises in many parts of the world have 
placed the issue of corporate governance as a priority in the agenda of meetings of 
world leaders, business people and international financial institutions. Analysts have 
attributed the main reason for the failure of such companies to a lack of proper rules for 
management, the easy manipulation of accounts, fraud, taking flawed/bad decisions and 
the lack of supervision and follow-up by shareholders and stakeholders.2 Such failures 
have led international financial institutions to lay down a list of rules and criteria that 
guarantee good performance and provide strong control under the title “corporate 
governance”. The mechanisms of corporate governance provide a better way to manage 
corporations in a manner that protects the money of investors and creditors and 
safeguards the rights of all stakeholders, thus providing promising opportunities for 
corporations to be successful.3  
Saudi Arabia, where the export and manufacture of oil products dominate the economy, 
is considered to have one of the strongest economies in the world. This enables it to be 
a member of the Group of Twenty (G-20) which comprises the 20 major economies.4 
However, Saudi Arabia has sought to diversify its income sources as well as build and 
attract investments simultaneously with developing its laws and legal environment to 
create an atmosphere of confidence and stability for investors, shareholders and 
stakeholders. 
A comprehensive review should be made of the legislation relating to corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. This may significantly enhance the effectiveness of 
internal control systems in a manner that matches the particularity, nature and size of 
Saudi listed companies. Furthermore, assisting the external oversight entities and 
raising awareness of investors and shareholders as to the necessity of playing an active 
role in enforcement of internal control systems should be considered as well. This 
research seeks to deal with a part of these needs that relates to the board of directors in 
                                                          
2 Lückerath-Rovers, M. and Bos, A. (2011), Code of Conduct for Non-Executive and Supervisory 
Directors, Journal of Business Ethics, 100, at 465.  
3 Tricker, B. (2015). Corporate governance Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd ed). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 4. 
4 See the official G-20 website. available at http://www.g20.org/English, accessed on 20/3/2016.  
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listed firms, improve the relevant legislation and find some solutions for their problems. 
Thus, in achieving the research aims, it will use a comparative study with English law 
to try to measure to what extent Saudi legislation is compatible with global standards 
in this respect. 
It is hoped that corporate governance concepts, rules and culture, when successfully 
applied at a public corporate level, can contribute to spreading concepts and the culture 
of participation, transparency and accountability in all spheres of Saudi society, thus 
playing an important role in developing the private and public sector in Saudi Arabia, 






1.2   The Importance of the Research 
Corporate governance is in its infancy in many developing countries, including Saudi 
Arabia. As a result, it suffers from inadequate legislative, judicial, investment and 
supervisory regimes. Moreover, there is a lack of independent media, strategies for 
combating corruption, civil institutions and democratic principles that successful 
corporate governance depends on. All of these factors give the internal entities of 
corporate governance a pivotal role in the Saudi context and point to the importance of 
the board of directors in order to safeguard the interests of different shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
The new trend in the Saudi Vision for 2030 issued in 20165  is another factor that refers 
to the importance of studying the role of the board of directors in corporate governance 
in the Saudi context. The Saudi Vision for 2030 can be considered a major turning point 
that could have a substantial impact on the diversification of the economy, the culture 
of work and corporate governance practices. It aims to maximise the role of the private 
sector, increase economic liberalisation and create a comprehensive privatisation 
programme.6  Such trend need to be considered in light of the essential characteristics 
of the current economy and corporate sector to deal with challenges that may arise from 
this trend. 
It should be noted that on the 4th of December 2015, when this thesis was well 
underway, the new Company Law was published in Saudi Arabia and superseded the 
previous law issued in 1965.7 This new law is designed to meet the contemporary needs 
of the company sector and create a motivating environment for them to increase their 
contribution to the national economy. It also tackles the shortcomings of the obsolete 
law and the dispersed decrees that tried to amend it. This thesis seeks to be one of the 
earliest studies to review the relevant Saudi rules in the new law that are related to the 
board of directors in the light of those in England and global standards of corporate 
governance.  
                                                          
5 See the official website of Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030, at 45, available at: 
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node, accessed on 18/8/2016. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Article 226 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
14 
 
Moreover, on the 13th of February 2017, when this thesis was in its final stages, a new 
version of the Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) was introduced in Saudi 
Arabia. The new regulation has 56 pages with 98 articles, as opposed to the massively 
lower figure of 19 pages with 19 articles in the previous one. The new regulation has 
changed many provisions, and has impacted on numerous points that had been 
discussed by this thesis. Several rules had been criticised and some amendments and 
solutions had been suggested in this thesis which were subsequently tackled by the new 
CGR. However, the thesis deals with all relevant changes and the shortcomings 
addressed by the new regulation. It also clarifies the extent of the improvement in 
corporate governance that could result from the new regulation and those aspects 
related to the thesis that require further reform. 
In response to these important factors, this research will provide options for reforming 
Saudi legislation in order to balance and fill the gap between the deficiency of 
democratic principles and the need to enhance the pivotal role of boards of directors in 
this kind of environment. This will be achieved by discussing the corporate governance 
theories and models, and the preferable composition of the board of directors. 
Moreover, the legal rules that regulate the relationship and role of the board of directors 
with main actors will be considered. Taking all of these points together may assist Saudi 





1.3   Objectives and Questions of the Research  
The main question of this research is: "To what extent is it possible to reform the 
legislation related to the board of directors in listed companies in Saudi Arabia in 
the light of English law and global standards, taking into account the local 
political, economic and legal environments which significantly impact the board 
of directors?". 
The research seeks to study the Saudi law related to the board of directors of listed8 
companies and its role and relationships under corporate governance, while comparing 
the same with the prevailing laws in England and global standards. This research 
intends to critique Saudi laws and see whether they are capable of achieving the 
objectives of corporate governance (i.e. whether they are mandatory, adequate, clear 
and applicable), and in so doing whether they protect the interests of shareholders and 
other stakeholders. 
The objective of this research is to identify loopholes and flaws in Saudi law in this 
regard. Then, the intention is to make recommendations and suggest some solutions 
that would contribute to enriching the respective laws by providing more detail, 
flexibility or enforceability, thus reforming and developing them. 
To deal with the main question, the research aims to answer the sub-questions 
below:  
• What are the concepts and principles of corporate governance that affect the board 
of directors? What are the theories and models that explain the relationship between 
the board of directors and the company? To what extent are these theories and 
models compatible with those in Saudi Arabia and able to achieve the objectives of 
corporate governance in the Saudi context? 
• To what extent are Saudi political, legal and economic environments compatible 
with the requirements that affect the role of boards of directors in discharging their 
                                                          
8 It is worth noting that this thesis will deal with only listed companies which have shares that can be 
publicly traded on a stock exchange. All listed companies will necessarily be joint stock companies but 
the reverse is not true as the shares of public company can be traded between its members. Also, many 
companies which de-list from a stock exchange continue to be public limited companies. However, in 
Saudi context, the expression of "public companies" to refer to joint stock companies is unusual. 
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duties and the success of corporate governance in light of English law and global 
standards? 
• To what extent are the composition of the board of directors in Saudi Arabia and its 
types of membership compatible with English law and global standards of corporate 
governance? Which international experiences in this regard are more appropriate to 
the Saudi context and capable of achieving the objectives of corporate governance 
in it? 
• How can Saudi law be reformed in terms of the roles and relationships of the board 
of directors with the main actors in light of corporate governance in English law 
and global standards? 
It should be noted here that it is impossible for this research to cover all aspects of the 
board of directors and its role and relationships. Therefore, it will focus on the main 
responsibilities and roles of the board of directors that are linked with the main question 
of this research and will not discuss the detailed duties of the board of directors.9 Hence, 
the research will discuss the vital aspects that can be found in English law and global 
standards which may influence the board of directors in the Saudi context and assist in 
achieving the goals of corporate governance in such an environment.  
 
  
                                                          
9 The research, for example, will not discuss the relationship of the board of directors with the CEO and 
the relationship with profitable and non-profitable entities, supporting institutions and international 
observing bodies of corporate governance. As well as, measures that ensure the quality of law 
enforcement and provisions related to breaches of corporate governance rules, negligence and abuse. 
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1.4   Methodology of this Research and its Scope 
In answering the research questions, the study uses doctrinal, comparative and critical 
analytical methods to deal with legislation relating to the board of directors of listed 
companies under corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. The research will compare said 
legislation to similar legislation in England and global standards. Materials will be 
collected through primary sources such as pieces of legislation and case law and 
through secondary sources such as government papers and academic publications. An 
analysis and an evaluation of these materials are indispensable for the interpretations, 
applications and reforms of the current laws. This will illuminate the similarities and 
differences between the ways comparable problems are resolved by different nations 
using different legislation. 
This research adopts a limited method of comparative study which concentrates on 
reforming Saudi law. Its aim, therefore, is to use comparative law to discuss and 
evaluate rules in Saudi law which are not appropriate for the Saudi context. Likewise, 
it tries also to find some solutions to domestic problems from English law and global 
standards which are appropriate to the Saudi circumstances. Hence, the research will 
not seek to critique English law or provide any suggestions for reform, except in the 
case of evaluating the validity of specific ideas to be used in Saudi Arabia.  
My university in Saudi Arabia granted me a scholarship to do a comparative study with 
English law because it has a prestigious and respectable reputation in my country. 
Moreover, England is one of the foremost countries that has issued rules that organise 
operations of firms and serve to develop corporate governance. The UK generally has 
shown a great deal of stability in the face of the financial crisis of 2008. The Companies 
Act 2006 emerged as a result of a long term cumulative experience. It regulates the 
company sector, codifies directors' duties and clarifies shareholders' rights and the 
administrative procedures required.10 Furthermore, the corporate governance model in 
Saudi Arabia is much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model in the UK as they both adopted 
the unitary board of directors and do not support the bank-oriented system or any form 
of employee representation. Therefore, using such a law comparatively will help 
attempts to reform company law in the Saudi context. However, this will not prevent 
                                                          
10 See the description of the UK Companies Act 2006, the National Archives of the UK government, 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes), accessed on 10/3/2015. 
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me from mining global standards and useful practices in other countries when they 






1.5   Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation    
This research is concerned with corporate governance in listed companies in Saudi 
Arabia.11 This stock market, like other markets across the world, aims to maximise its 
value and receive more liquidity by encouraging foreign investors to invest in it. 
Therefore, looking at the worldwide successful experiences and measuring the 
compatibility between Saudi legislation and good global standards in this regard will 
highly affect in both developing corporate governance and improving the Saudi stock 
market.  
Understanding the nature of law and knowing the ways and the sources of legal 
development are the prime merits of comparative law. This provides a valuable 
opportunity to get a fuller insight into the variety of facts that shape the legal rules along 
with improving academic and practical fields in this context, which can be very useful 
in legal reform.12   
In our uninsulated world, it is important for everyone, whether an advocate or a resistor 
of state legal change through international and transnational law, to recognise the 
factors and implications that enhance or impede these induced legal changes. It is 
important to consider the dynamic interaction between transnational law and its 
opportunities, limits and impacts in light of their particular contexts and local 
institutions and national law.13   
Through comparative law, those people concerned with legal reform would be able to 
see their tasks more clearly. They would be eligible to decide when and how to borrow 
from other systems as well as evaluating the authenticity and validity of foreign 
solutions and to what extent the modification is required.14 However, to obtain genuine 
advantages from comparative law, the people concerned with law reform should have 
the capability to distinguish and isolate the major factors that caused the success in a 
                                                          
11 For further information about the Saudi stock market, see chapter three, section entitled “The Public 
Joint Stock Companies in Saudi Arabia”.   
12 Watson, A. (1974). Legal transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1st ed.) Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, at 16,17. 
13 Gregory, S. (2012). Transnational Legal Process and State Change. Law and Social Inquiry: Journal 
of the American Bar Foundation, 37, at 45. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901952, 
accessed on 20/3/2016. 
14 Watson, A. (1974). Legal transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1st ed.). Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, at 16. 
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particular society. They should also be aware of the circumstances which support or 
hamper legal development in both compared societies.15 
 
1.5.1   The Concept of "Legal Transplantation"  
Legal transfers have been common since the earliest recorded history and brought about 
the development of legal systems around the world.16 The term ‘legal transplant’ was 
created in the 1970s by Alan Watson who defined it as "the moving of a rule or a system 
of law from one country to another, or from one people to another".17  
Watson argues that legal transplantation of limited or large parts of legislation is the 
most fertile source of their development from early times to the present day and it is 
responsible for most legal changes. He also argues that legislation represents the fruit 
of human experience like useful technology which can be created in a certain region 
and then become widespread depending on its value and the needs of other nations.18 
Thus, countries that are less advanced materially or culturally are more likely to receive 
foreign legal rules. This claim is borne out by a great deal of historical evidence, such 
as Germany in the fifth century and the Wild West.19  
Legal transplantation is a useful way for the domestic legal model to develop its society 
and enact new legislation. Moreover, it can deliver advanced solutions to their problems 
that may not be available in their original legal framework. However, this can only be 
done as long as the process of legal transplant takes into account ambitions and interests 
of the local society and its initial conditions and domestic legal practice.20 
Transnational legal rules can assist legislators to perceive, weigh up and shape both the 
appropriate enactments and institutional arrangements which guarantee good 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 
16 Gillespie, J. (2006). Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a 'rule of Law' in Vietnam. 
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., at 3. 
17 Watson, A. (1974). Legal transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1st ed.). Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, at 21.    
18 Ibid, at 95,100.  
19 Ibid, at 99.   
20 Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., and Richard, J. (2003). Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant 
Effect. European Economic Review, 47(1), at 174. 
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application and enforcement of law. Comparative law and legal transplantation, 
therefore, makes it possible to take advantage of legal norms, processes, institutional 
organisation and practices within states.21  
 
1.5.2   Forms and Causes of Legal Transplantation 
Valderrama gives the main qualities that qualify laws for legal transplant: "(i) authority, 
(ii) prestige and imposition, (iii) chance and necessity, (iv) expected efficacy of the law, 
and (v) political, economic and reputational incentives from the countries and third 
parties".22 Regardless the reasons that legal transplantation takes place, there have been 
numerous forms of law transplantation and institutional structures over time and 
location whether through geopolitical or cultural borders. These different shapes 
significantly affect the acceptance of the transplant process and the extent of its 
success.23 Legal transplant forms can be divided, in general, into two major styles; 
externally imposed and internal voluntary.24   
The first are compulsory legal transplants which come about due to colonisation and 
military expansion. This form was the fundamental way to legally transplant through 
superpower hegemony into many host developing countries.25 It should be noted that 
this compulsory transplantation did not end with the end of the colonial era. Legal 
transplant continued to play a role as a weapon in the ‘Cold War’ between the USSR 
and the United States when they were competing for political and military supremacy.26 
Beyond that, it can be said that imposed legal transfers still exist in the soft form of 
some globalisation agreements and international legal harmonisation projects which 
                                                          
21 Gregory, S. (2012). Transnational Legal Process and State Change. Law and Social Inquiry: Journal 
of the American Bar Foundation, 37, at 15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901952, 
accessed on 20/3/2016. 
22 Valderrama, I. (2004). Legal Transplants and Comparative Law. International Law Journal, 1(2), at 
265. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017940, accessed on 20/3/2016. 
23 Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., and Richard, J. (2003). Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant 
Effect. European Economic Review, 47(1), at 174. 
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serve and are governed by large trading nations according to Western culture and its 
liberal democracy.27   
The second are voluntary legal transplants which can be seen as a positive legal transfer. 
This form is common today and it is responsible for most legal transfers as a result of 
internationalisation and globalisation. This situation is a logical consequence, 
particularly in the commercial and economic sectors where there is an increasing 
demand for communication technologies and international trade and investment,28 as 
well as global economic integration and the standardisation of global models.29 
Globalisation, however, takes place in this form also; it is the pivotal factor in 
increasing the demand for comparative law and spreading legal transplantation.30 At 
the legal level, as with other interactive spheres, there is a search for new solutions for 
unsolved problems regardless of geographical borders. 
Conveying legal norms can be voluntary done through several concerned people and 
institutions such as public officials, business actors and representatives, independent 
activists, civil society and professionals.31 Moreover, they may receive further support 
from transnational organisations and networks, as well as international treaties and 
global, multilateral, regional and bilateral norms that are approved by their country.32 
 
1.5.3   Some Important Standards for Legal Borrowing 
It is important to bear in mind that legal transplant is not a simple copy-paste act. Hence, 
a legal rule cannot be separated from its cultural, political, social and economic contexts 
and may not serve the same extent as elsewhere. Careful consideration is in fact 
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required on the extent to which foreign legal rules are appropriate for the final 
consumers and the domestic demand for the new law. Starting from this objective, 
legislators should increase their familiarity with legal borrowing and ensure that new 
rules are eligible to be used in practice in relation to the local legal culture and 
conditions. These rules should also be applicable by law enforcers and show promise 
as far as fostering development is concerned.33  
Moreover, the legal environment in a recipient country needs to be taken into account. 
Owing to the fact that ''the transplantation process may vary based on social, legal 
economic, fiscal, financial and technical circumstances prevailing in each country’s 
“legal culture” and legal system".34 Along similar lines, before the borrowing process 
begins, the environment in the country of origin should also be understood. The 
different regional circumstances of such legal rules may result in transplantation having 
a negative influence and the opposite consequences.35 
Watson draws attention to the important role of authority in terms of whether legal 
transplants and law as a whole. He argues that: "Transplants in fact offer an insight into 
the overwhelming importance of the part played by authority in law".36 However, the 
way of enforcing the borrowed rules is another issue that needs to be taken into account. 
There are several legal mediators and configurations of power who are involved in 
enforcing the process of the law such as judges, lawyers, legal academics and corporate 
legal officers. The enforceability of foreign legal rules relies on the cooperation of these 
legal actors and their capability to work side by side toward improving the quality of 
their national law regardless of the agenda or interests of certain groups.37 Moreover, 
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national legal norms and institutions should be resilient and play a mediating role with 
them.38  
The vital role of globalisation in legal transplants was mentioned above as it enhances 
the transmission of legislation and legal knowledge. Nevertheless, it can also be one of 
the serious challenges to successful legal transplants when it uses double standards and 
serves a select group of developed nations at the expense of developing ones. Hence, 
global economic integration should be more clear, transparent and beneficial for all 
parties as all have a similar authority to protect and lead their economies.39   
 
1.5.4   Legal Transplants in Saudi Arabia     
Within its current borders, Saudi Arabia has never been occupied by any other country 
with a different culture or religion. Moreover, no foreign laws have ever been imposed 
upon it. Furthermore, it has unique legislations based on Islamic law in different spheres 
especially in the area of personal status law and the civil judicial system.40 In addition, 
Saudi Arabia is a young country which has been growing fast and it has built strong 
connections with leading countries and international organisations. This situation has 
pushed law-makers in Saudi Arabia towards further openness in borrowing and 
transferring some beneficial legislation from either similar regional countries or 
worldwide. In order to harmonise their laws to address people’s needs and 
developmental demands, Saudi Arabia has voluntarily adopted several transnational 
legal rules, particularly in commercial, banking, economic and company laws.  
An example of this situation can be found in the explanatory note of the initial Saudi 
Law of Companies issued in 1965. It mentioned that the rapid growth of large trade 
projects increased the number of companies dramatically, while there were insufficient 
regulations to deal with the variety of needs and the complicated issues they faced. This 
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drove those firms to borrow a number of rules that had already been applied in other 
countries, which made their affairs even more complicated and the task state 
supervision more difficult.41  Another example comes from the Saudi Commercial Law 
issued in 1931 and which was extracted from the Ottoman Trade Act, which was also 
derived from the French commercial code.42 
The challenge in this research is how to distinguish between, on one hand, the 
particularities of the local Saudi setting and the nature of the current economy which 
need to be considered and, on the other hand, negative aspects of the local setting that 
need to be changed by repealing some obsolete rules and borrowing some beneficial 
rules from other legal systems to respond the demands of business development. 
These factors need to be considered when enacting laws and cannot be served by 
cloning the experiences of other nations, as this may create additional obstacles for the 
corporate sector. There is a need to benefit from the relevant useful experiences of the 
different legislative frameworks and to enact more legislations that could suit developed 
countries. 
 
1.6   Conclusion    
The internal corporate structure of a company, including its board of directors, is one 
of the central aspects that needs to be considered when reviewing the corporate 
governance system in the Saudi context. The board of directors is the most important 
internal corporate institution for representing shareholders and coordinating the 
interactions within company boundaries, for regulating the relationships between the 
different constituencies and for enacting bylaws and corporate policies. Therefore, it is 
of utmost importance to consider the composition, roles and key relationships of the 
board of directors carefully when reviewing corporate governance legislation.   
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This research aims to review the legislation relating to the board of directors in listed 
companies under the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia and the extent to 
which such legislation affects its composition and relationships with the main parties 
in the company. In seeking to achieve the stated research aims, this thesis uses a 
comparative study of both English law and global standards. This is to assess their 
compatibility with Saudi legislation in this respect and to suggest some reforms to it. 
This will be conducted in a manner that matches the particularity of the legal and 
economic environment and the nature of listed companies in Saudi Arabia.  
Looking at the successful global experiences and measuring the compatibility between 
Saudi legislation and good global standards in this regard will greatly affect the 
development of corporate governance. However, the nature of law and knowing the 
ways and the sources of legal development should be considered. This should enable 
people concerned with legal reform to see their tasks more clearly in deciding when 
and how to borrow from other systems as well as to evaluate the authenticity and 
validity of foreign solutions and to what extent the modification is required.   
 
In the next chapter, the research will try to discuss the key concepts and principles of 
corporate governance and the major corporate governance theories and models. This is 
important to understand the particular nature of a joint stock company and to clarify the 
most significant duties and roles of the board of directors and the boundaries of the 
relationships between various groups in a firm, as well as the importance of finding a 
comprehensive balance between liability, control and ownership. Understanding the 
overlapping factors in this regard may positively affect the legal reform of corporate 
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2.1   The Definition of Corporate Governance and its Importance 
2.1.1   The Definition of Corporate Governance  
Effective corporate governance is an ideal way to protect the rights of shareholders and 
other stakeholders as well as to maximise company profits. Due to this, many countries 
have sought to raise standards of corporate governance and improve the corporate 
governance system through their legislation. This has especially been the case in the 
last decade during which many countries across the world have been beset by financial 
crises. Essentially, all entities need governance regardless of type or the sector they 
belong to, whether profit-oriented or non-profit organisations, public or private 
companies. This is to ensure that they are run well and their managers are responsible 
and accountable.43    
In general, corporate governance concerns itself with ‘the appropriate board structures, 
processes and values to cope with the rapidly changing demands of both shareholders 
and stakeholders in and around their enterprises’.44 Irrespective of the particular 
definition used, corporate governance is based on two types of mechanisms: the first 
one is internal to the company which seeks to give shareholders some way of 
influencing the board of directors; the second one is external to the company, it exists 
in the regulatory environment and it depends on state agencies for the detection of 
corruption.45  
Originally, the term ‘governance’ comes from the Greek word “kubernetes” which 
means the steersman who guides the ship safely.46 It found its way into English from 
Latin via Old French to express effective values such as accountability, probity and 
transparency of the governing context.47 It should be noted that there is no word in 
Arabic with the same meaning without qualifying it with an explanation. As such, this 
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issue has been the subject of considerable debate among Arabic language scholars and 
institutions as they strive to find an equivalent phrase for corporate governance. Some 
scholars have agreed on the phrase “Hawkamah” or “Hawkamat Asharikat” to express 
the term, and this is now in regular use.48 Nevertheless, the meaning of this translated 
phrase is still unclear to non-specialists. This has, therefore, necessitated adding a clear 
definition or explanation of the meaning of corporate governance in Saudi regulations, 
as in the UK code, that deal with this phrase. The absence of a proper definition of 
corporate governance has been remedied in the new Saudi CGR issued on 13th February 
2017, which provides a comprehensive description that covers its meaning, targets and 
the principal parties involved.49  
It is difficult to accurately define the phrase ‘corporate governance’ as there are many 
different definitions. Therefore, looking at multiple definitions is helpful to understand 
the boundaries, levels and processes of corporate governance.50 In this regard, it is 
helpful to explore some short definitions as given below:    
- A "system of legal or other mechanisms which ensures that the interests of the 
managers of the company are aligned with those of the shareholders".51  
- A "set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
against expropriation by the insiders".52  
- A "system of laws, rules and factors that control operations at a company".53  
Some researchers have adopted the broader definitions of what constitutes corporate 
governance which cover multiple governance mechanisms and their interactions. This 
may be more suitable for corporate governance research development.54 Cornelius and 
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Kogut, for example, favour one of these broader definitions. They see corporate 
governance as a system that consists of:  
"Those formal and informal institutions, laws, values, and rules that generate 
the menu of legal and organisational forms available in a country and which in 
turn determine the distribution of power; how ownership is assigned, 
managerial decisions are made and monitored, information is audited and 
released, and profits and benefits allocated and distributed".55 
Whilst the above definition emphasises the role of laws, rules and institutions, some 
researchers look at corporate governance from the inverse angle. They define it as:  
"The ability of organisations in the private, public and non-profit sectors to 
achieve their purpose in the most efficacious manner while minimising the need 
for laws, regulations, regulators, courts or codes of so called “best practices” to 
protect and further the interests of their stakeholders and society".56   
This definition is potentially more suitable for developing countries where the roles of 
laws, regulations, regulators and courts do not guarantee good practices of corporate 
governance.   
 
2.1.2   Cadbury Definition 
The UK Code57 still uses the classic definition of corporate governance that was 
produced in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee. It stipulates that:  
"Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure 
is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. 
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The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in 
general meeting".58  
Despite the fact that the Cadbury definition was the starting point for most other reviews 
of governance, over the passage of time some shortcomings have become apparent. For 
example, the Cadbury report gives the directors a pivotal position and ignores several 
activities which have a substantial impact on the success of the business and managing 
a company.59 Some researchers have noted other shortcomings. They argue that the 
Cadbury definition limits the interplay of corporate governance between only three 
groups of actors; directors, shareholders and auditors. In addition, the definition limits 
the roles of shareholders on setting up board structures without referring to continuing 
oversight or how governance should be developed. This makes the Cadbury definition 
more suited to business corporations acting for profit than public sector organisations.60  
Bloomfield states that the definition of corporate governance should contain a specific 
reference to four forms of governance: procedural, behavioural, structural and systemic. 
Moreover, it should consider the differences between private and public sectors in the 
materials and context of governance. He provides two alternative definitions of 
corporate governance.61 The first definition is for the private sector:  
"Corporate governance is the governing structure and processes in an 
organisation that exist to oversee the means by which limited resources are 
efficiently directed to competing purposes for the use of the organisation and its 
stakeholders; including the maintenance of the organisation and its long-run 
sustainability, set and measured against a framework of ethics and backed by 
regulation and laws".62  
The second definition is for the public and non-profit sector: 
"A series of principles, which are usually embodied in formal controls,  in 
agencies which seek to redress market imperfections by acting for, on behalf of 
and with the express approval of the State, through all or some of the activities 
of policy-making, management, and regulation;  mostly using resources without 
the intention of generating a profit and providing more or less appropriately-
transparent information about the means of arriving at the allocation of 
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resources in the absence of a set of rational economic methods of achieving 
those ends".63  
In conclusion, the debate above indicates that there is no definition of corporate 
governance that can cover all its different aspects. However, whatever the definition 
used it should contain some specific reference to a number of important factors such as 
legal, regulatory and institutional environment. Moreover, it should include some 
substantial concepts such as business ethics and societal interests which have an impact 
on a firm’s reputation and its long-term success.64  
In this regard, Tricker65 argues that there are five different perspectives on definitions 
of corporate governance. The first is an operational perspective which is based on the 
interactions between the shareholders, the board and the management as they are the 
basis for much work on corporate governance. Second, a relationship perspective which 
focuses on various participants including the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders such as employees. Such a perspective tends to distribute rights, 
responsibilities and different activities among the different participants in decision-
making and to determine the direction and performance of corporations. The corporate 
charter, formal policy and rule of law should regulate this relationship.  
Third, a stakeholder perspective which takes a wider view of how those groups are 
involved in and affected by corporate governance. It is more of a response to the rights 
and wishes of stakeholders. Fourth, a financial economics perspective which sees 
corporate governance from a different angle of the suppliers and creditors. They seek 
to get an abundant return from their investment and worry about the legal protection 
available to them, especially over ownership concentration in corporate governance 
systems.  
Finally, the perspective that tends to see corporate governance through the eyes of non-
contractual stakeholders including local, national and internationals entities. The 
interests of this kind of stakeholders outside the firm may be affected by inside 
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corporate behaviour. This social responsibility sets corporate governance at a high level 
of abstraction.66  
 
2.1.3   Emergence and Development of the Concept of Corporate Governance   
Although the phrase ‘corporate governance’ emerged as a theoretical subject in the 
1980s, corporate governance practices have been used for much longer. These practices 
have been improved according to current needs, especially by companies set up by 
trading empires and when limited liability companies were first invented in the early 
19th century.67     
Moreover, the principles of corporate governance have been greatly assisted by the 
wave of corporate consolidation at the turn of the 20th century and its financial 
requirements which have been partly achieved through public offerings of shares. 
Consequently, ownership structures of firms became dispersed among a wide range of 
investors which necessarily led to developing the idea of governance.68  
By the beginning of the 20th century, firms in developing countries had become larger 
and more complex with numerous worldwide shareholders. Geographically widespread 
ownership inspired Berle and Means to innovate an important idea in corporate 
governance which was termed the ‘separation of ownership and control’.69 However, 
although Berle and Means described this idea in 1932, it was not put into practice until 
much later in England. By 1951 a clear separation could be seen between control and 
ownership in England which resulted in a managerial revolution taking place, 
particularly in large companies. The idea became very common by the 1980s.70 
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Some considerable improvements occurred in corporate governance in the 1970s. 
Listed companies became required to form audit committees on their boards comprising 
independent outside directors. The adoption of two-tier boards was encouraged in 
several countries. The duties of boards of directors towards stakeholders, companies' 
responsibilities have been widely debated to improve. The annual public report which 
follows accounting standards became a requirement for all listed companies.71  
There was a reconsideration of a number of significant issues in the 1980s such as 
excessive remuneration for directors and standards of transparency. Moreover, a 
number of reports emerged such as the Cadbury Report in 1992 as well as the corporate 
governance codes.72 
The importance of corporate governance has been recognised and its practices have 
improved around the world since the beginning of the century. There are abundant 
references to corporate governance and its best practices. Most countries have 
published corporate governance codes for all listed firms to comply with or explain why 
they have not done so. However, this advanced level of corporate governance did not 
prevent the global financial crisis in 2008, and it has not been enough to disclose 
unreported indebtedness or dubious attitudes among executive directors. This draws 
attention to the importance of constant review of the principles, practices and processes 
of corporate governance according to the real needs, environment and culture in each 
country. It should be noted that "raising standards of corporate governance cannot be 
achieved by structures and rules alone. They are important because they provide a 
framework which will encourage and support good governance, but what counts is the 
way in which they are put to use".73  
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2.1.4   Objectives of Corporate Governance and its Fundamental Principles 
According to the Cadbury report, the main issue of corporate governance is to support 
the role of shareholders in the accountability of board of directors.74 The UK Code 
widens this purpose to ensure the sustainable success of a firm over the longer term by 
focusing on facilitating effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management. It stipulates 
that this purpose can be achieved through significant principles such as accountability, 
transparency and probity.75 
Most principles and business values of good corporate governance either in public or 
private firms have been built on three fundamental values.76 Those supreme values are 
accountability, transparency and probity which, in fact, represent some of the essential 
concepts of a democratic system. They already form part of the UK Code. A return to 
those great values will pay considerable dividends in terms of both social justice and 
financial returns for the company.77  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance published in 1999 are still considered 
the international benchmark on the subject. They cover six aspects that impact the 
relationship not only between the managers and shareholders of firms but also other 
stakeholders such as employees and creditors. The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) is an international organisation of 34 countries. It 
concerns itself with financial market integrity and economic efficiency, and seeks to 
stimulate and compare practices and ideas as well as review progress in trade and 
financial markets. Those principles target policymakers and regulators market to 
promote the legal and regulatory frameworks that support corporate governance, 
particularly in listed firms.78    
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are:79  
                                                          
74 Ibid, para. 6.1.  
75 See the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016, para. 1.4, at 1. 
76 Garratt, B. (2003). Thin on Top Why Corporate Governance Matters and how to Measure and Improve 
Board Performance (1st ed.). London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, at 3. 
77 Ibid, at 11. 
78 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2004). OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, OECD Publications Service, at 2-5. 




1. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework: … 
promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and 
clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
2. The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions: … protect and facilitate 
the exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
3. The equitable treatment of shareholders: … All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights, including 
minority and foreign shareholders.  
4. The role of stakeholders in corporate governance: … by law or through mutual 
agreements and encourage active cooperation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises. 
5. Disclosure and transparency: ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made 
on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company. 
6. The responsibilities of the board: … ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
These principles were subject to a second review conducted in 2014/15 under the 
responsibility of the OECD Corporate Governance Committee. The review received 
significant contributions from relevant international organisations, business advisory 
committees and experts in several countries. The 2015 version maintained the core 
principles of the 2004 version and strengthened them to ensure that the high quality 
would continue. The new principles were adopted by the OECD Council and the G20 
Leaders in 2015 and named "G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance”.80 
Siems argues that a global model of corporate governance is not a perfect solution, with 
many differences in social, cultural and economic levels. The model that applies to the 
leading OECD countries may be incompatible with many developing countries, where 
the economy, including the corporate sector, is dominated by ineffective formal 
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institutions.81 He suggests that the OECD Principles may be more useful when they are 
considered as a "common frame of reference" for the debate about reforming corporate 
governance in academia and practice rather than being a universal benchmark that 
should be translated into rules of codified company law.82 
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2.2   The Major Corporate Governance Theories Affecting the Board of 
Directors 
2.2.1   Introduction 
This research aims to discuss joint stock companies, which have dispersed ownership 
and generally have large capital and labour inputs, as well as a wide impact on different 
external parties and sectors.  
There are a number of significant issues that need to be clarified in these kinds of 
companies. The first is, who owns a joint stock company, in light of the fact that the 
firm is legally considered as both a legal person and citizen who has independent rights 
and responsibilities. 
Secondly, who is the principal in a joint stock company? Is it shareholders, or the 
company itself as a legal person who has rights and interests which may conflict with 
both shareholders and leaders? 
Thirdly, what are the boundaries governing shareholders in terms of ownership, 
leadership and the right to dispose of the company assets? The liability and disposition 
of shareholders should be considered in the light of the complicated assets of a firm 
such as intellectual rights, secrets, moral rights and employees’ experiences and its 
power and role in a society, which may impact the local environment, the quality of life 
and surrounding industries. We should consider also the particular nature of the joint 
stock company and the importance of comprehensive balance between boundaries of 
liability, control and individual ownership in the context of shareholders. This 
particular nature of shareholder ownership may influence the limitation of their power 
and the priority of interests. 
Fourthly, how many categories of shareholders with diverse kinds of interests are there 
in a firm? Do they all have the same rights? There are speculators who are concerned 
with movements in the daily price of shares; investors who concentrate on the annual 
earnings of shares; and senior investors who have a different long-term priority which 
is to improve the company, expand its productions and compete successfully.  
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This research will deal with many of the above issues, particularly those relevant to the 
role of the board of directors. Studying the theoretical aspect of corporate governance 
and discussing the main corporate governance theories is essential to understand 
concepts and principles of corporate governance and the nature of a joint stock company 
as well as the boundaries of relationships between various groups in a firm.   
There are numerous corporate governance theories which arise from different 
theoretical perspectives, whether they be political, ethical, social, institutional and 
economic. Some of them seek to serve particular aspects of corporate governance while 
others may be formed as a result of a reaction to and the tackling of some problems, 
circumstances, needs and weaknesses which emerged. 
 
2.2.2   Agency Theory 
In the corporate governance context, agency theory relates to the scenario when 
principals delegate their duties and decision-making authority to agents who work on 
their behalf.83 This relation is mostly represented by the managers as the agents and the 
shareholders as the principals. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the agency 
perspective from recognising rights of other company parties such as creditors and 
employees.84  
The separation of ownership and control has contributed greatly to the prominence of 
agency theory which, in general terms, provides a simple nexus between only two 
participants: shareholders and managers who are supposed to act in the interests of the 
former.85 Despite agents being controlled by principals’ rules which aim to maximise 
shareholder value,86 the interests of principals and agents do not always converge. From 
this arises the concept of agency costs, which describes the resources spent on 
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monitoring by the principal and the incentives of agents.87  These costly mechanisms 
may guarantee good conduct in the principals’ interests and reduce opportunistic 
actions by agents as well as impacting on the firm’s returns at the same time.88  
In spite of the devices and mechanisms that reduce agency cost, it is difficult to deny 
that some divergence between the principal’s interests and the agent's actions will 
occur.89 This includes misuse of the agent’s power for pecuniary gain or the taking of 
risks in pursuit of their own interests. Moreover, the difference in the level of 
information between the agent and principal serves the former and puts the latter at a 
disadvantage.90  
Some researchers differentiate between “owning capital” and “owning the firm”. This, 
therefore, means that there are not enough justifications to claim that shareholders own 
the company, and this does not enable them to control the firm on their own.91 This is 
particularly the case when taking into account that shareholders are surely able in 
general to sell their shares at any time or simply for a profit.92  
It is difficult to deny that shareholders bear risks as providers of capital which is 
certainly affected by management decisions. However, there are other groups that may 
suffer more than them with less opportunities for survival. These groups include 
managers and employees who have a stronger correlation with a firm and there is no 
straightforward justification for giving them less preferential treatment than investors.93  
A company is not merely physical and financial assets, it is composed also of its human 
capital who own the portable knowledge productions. The modern company relies on 
multiple factors of production which are dependent on each other, such as money, time, 
skills, ideas and experiences that deserve to be appreciated equally. This leads to a 
comprehensive view of the different actors who own a firm including capital, 
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management and labour at the least, and who are all entitled to a rent in exchange for 
bearing risks.94  
To overcome the potential mischief that results from conflicts and divergences between 
agents and principals, Lan and Heracleous draw attention to the need to critically review 
and reformulate agency theory in order to successfully deal with the complexities of 
real-world organisations and open up new directions for legal theorization and 
empirical research. In particular, they suggest revising three underlying doctrines of 
agency theory which have had a large impact on corporate governance.95  
First, the principal in the principal-agent relationship should be redefined to be more 
aligned with legal doctrine and the corporation’s societal function. This could be done 
by classifying the firm itself as a principal instead of shareholders. Hence, the 
corporation can be defined “as a legal entity acting as the nexus for contracting among 
several parties/stakeholders contributing to team production”.96  
Second, it should be noted that the board of directors is not merely a first-order agent 
to shareholders or any other parties exclusively. Rather, it is an autonomous fiduciary 
body with sufficient power that enable them to do the right actions away from any 
interferences from any kind of beneficiaries. 
Third, the role of the board of directors should focus on the intermediary instead of the 
traditional role of the board of monitoring managers’ actions which is supposed to serve 
principals’ interests. Intermediary hierarchy function works with all groups as a team 
and balances the competing interests of different parties that impact on the production, 
assets, strategic decisions and performance of the firm. This rethinking of agency theory 
makes it more consistent with both the principles of stakeholder theory and the 
assumptions of stewardship theory,97  which will be discussed later.  
Fontrodona and Sison propose that a company should be seen as a body of agents and 
a node of competencies with coordinated activities seeking to achieve a common goal, 
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not a mere aggregation of individual skills. They believe that the goal will be achievable 
by rehabilitating agency theory through a human perspective.98  
 
2.2.3   Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory expands the group of constituents to cover “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”.99 
This applies to any kind of stockholder, including creditors, managers, employees, 
customers, suppliers, business partners, local communities and the general public as 
well as any types of relationships that require to be appreciated by managers. According 
to stakeholder theory, those parties deserve to obtain benefits and they can also affect 
the decision-making of the firm in both processes and outcomes.100 They all represent 
a part of a firm’s capital, infrastructure and human capital commitments as well as 
provide a different level of services to it. In exchange, they also expect to gain 
appropriate benefits and avoid risks from their firms.101 Therefore, stakeholder theory 
assumes two levels of a board’s duties: a contractual duty to the shareholders’ interests 
and at the same time a moral duty to take other stakeholders into consideration.102 
Despite the fact that shareholders have an asset specificity, this alone does not qualify 
them to acquire special consideration over all other stakeholders who may be more 
involved and affected by the firm's risks. Nevertheless, shareholders are more capable 
of withdrawing themselves from the company via the stock market.103 Therefore, the 
stakeholder approach depends on the idea that seeking to satisfy all groups who have a 
stake or a legitimate claim in the business relies on reformulating implementations and 
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processes to be able to run and integrate stakeholders’ relationships and interests for 
the long-term success of the company, as well as to ensure that management, the 
business environment, relationships and the shared interests are active and promoted.104   
On the other hand, dealing with a variety of unmeasurable interests at different levels 
of stakeholder groups may give managers a chance to exploit this complicated climate 
to be unaccountable for their actions.105 There is also the possibility in some 
environments to favour particular stakeholder groups at the expense of others.106 
However, in today’s fast changing business environment it is difficult to cover the 
myriad of groups who have a stake or interest in a firm. Therefore, attention should be 
drawn to the key stakeholder's interests and to creating integrated and coherent 
relationships as well as the key purpose of the firm.107 
Freeman and McVea argue that the stakeholder theory can offer a comprehensive 
framework to improve and combine the many other theories, such as agency theory, 
human relationships, transaction costs, contract theory, and even ethics and the 
environment into a coherent whole.108 However, they also highlight some 
characteristics and issues that need to be developed in the stakeholder approach. These 
are summarised below:109 
1- The stakeholder approach provides a flexible framework that is able to deal with 
environmental shifts to manage strategically the mutual influence between the firm and 
the environment.     
2- The survival of the firm is the greatest priority of the stakeholder approach. Hence, 
the firm should try to achieve its key objectives and understand stakeholder 
relationships in this context. This does not mean focusing on maximising a single 
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objective but instead governing, balancing and integrating relationships and multiple 
objectives.  
3- Unlike other theories that adopt the individualism approach in the protection of 
interests, there is a critical role for values in the stakeholder theory in the areas of 
business ethics and business and society. It supposes that ensuring long-term success 
requires stakeholders to share a set of core values whatever their differences. This is 
particularly in the case of boundaries blurred between firms, industries and public and 
private lives. 
However, there are a series of shortcomings surrounding stakeholder theory which 
revolve around two major points. First, the term stakeholder is relatively vague and the 
definition of its object remains controversial. Furthermore, its objective to create value 
for all stakeholders with multiple targets is impossible to achieve. Similarly, it is unable 
to tackle the shortcomings of capitalist theories. This undefined management objective 
leads to confusion, conflict, inefficiencies and even a weakening of the corporation.110 
Second, stakeholder theory is merely an ideological product based upon socialisation 
and moral behaviour. It does not have a sufficient scientific thoroughness to deal with 
the financial and economic objectives of companies. Moreover, it does not provide a 
clear description of a company’s behaviours and its links with internal and external 
actors as well as how to tackle the challenges and the internal and external variables 
and how to manage conflicting interests.111 
 
2.2.4   Stewardship Theory 
Although stewardship theory sees itself as an alternative approach to agency theory, 
both theories draw on the same assumptions. However, stewardship theory empowers 
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managers to take autonomous executive action rather than placing them under the 
excessive control of the firm’s owners.112 
In contrast to the individualism perspective of agency theory, the stewardship theory 
derives from psychology and sociology perspectives. It assumes that maximising 
shareholder returns is based on firm performance and the capability of top management 
to integrate their targets as part of the organisation as they are also keen to protect their 
reputations. Moreover, it recognises that organisational success needs vital structures 
which place confidence in the stewards, empower and offer them maximum autonomy, 
as well as reduce the monitoring of their behaviours. Furthermore, in order to minimise 
agency costs further, stewardship theory looks to unite the role of the CEO and the 
chairman.113 
Based on the fact that there are different shareholders with multiple objectives and a 
number of competing stakeholders, a firm cannot build its decisions on individualistic 
or self-serving behaviour. This situation motivates fostering the interests of the group 
and pro-organisational behaviour.114 Stewardship theory assumes that all interests of 
managers, the company and its owners are able to be aligned through the collective 
behaviour of stewards115 as long as those stewards are supported by a long-term 
correlation based on trust, autonomy and stability even when there is no individual 
utility or extra financial incentive.116  
Most groups in a firm may be satisfied when they seek to achieve objectives of the firm 
at large and try to redirect their interests to accomplishments, performance and success 
of the organisation as a whole. This is a logical consequence that has resulted from the 
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fact that increasing organisational wealth generally influences all aspects of the firm, 
such as sales growth, profits on dividends and share prices etc.117  
 
2.2.5   Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory draws attention to a different but equally important aspect 
that focuses on providing access to a firm’s resources via the board of directors. It 
considers the board of directors as crucial in meeting a firm’s demands for resources.118  
There are two major roles of the board of directors: firstly, they represent shareholders 
in monitoring managers, which is asserted by agency theorists; secondly, they support 
a firm in provisioning of resources, which is the dominant one according to resource 
dependence theorists.119 Those demanded resources include advisory services, 
information, skills, legitimacy and networks of relationships as well as obtaining 
support from external entities.120 
Resource dependence theory concentrates on the external role and linkages of each 
member of the board of directors who came from diverse independent organisations 
and is supposed to play a vital function in securing essential resources for a firm. 
Therefore, appointing representatives of independent organisations as members of the 
board of directors is of critical importance in this context.121  
According to Abdullah and Valentine, the desired resources which promote the 
opportunities of organisations in both levels of performance and survival can be 
classified into four categories:122 first, the executive experiences in general strategy, 
law and finance which could be provided by the insiders’ directors; second, the business 
experiences in decision making and problem solving which relies on engaging the 
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senior business experts from large companies to work on the board of directors; third, 
the support specialists in several substantial specialised fields such as legal advice, 
banking, insurance and public relations; and fourth, the society influence, which could 
be obtained via appointing some political leaders, university professors and members 
of leaders of community organisations.  
 
2.2.6   Nexus Theory 
The contractual or nexus-of-contracts theory satisfies the major claims of stakeholder 
theory. It is based on participation in the firm’s governance structures by all 
stakeholders as contractors to protect the interests of each group of constituencies 
through efficient bargaining between them.123 According to this theory, there are two 
conditions that should be met: fair bargaining among all groups and ensuring that there 
are no unjust consequences inflicted on third parties.124  
The goals of this theory will be achieved through selecting satisfactory means from 
other parties to work side by side to maximise return on the assets, which impact on the 
firm's production and make a balance between internal and external costs. Further 
support might also come from government regulation, a tort liability system and 
contract law.125  
2.2.7   Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory emerged from the idea that it is extremely inadequate to look at only 
the relationship between the board and the shareholders or merely focus on a particular 
aspect such as compliance or the legal setting. Instead, it seeks to take into account the 
whole picture of dynamics that influences corporate governance.126  
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This theory offers another interpretation of corporate governance which focuses on all 
actors of a social system and responds to a variety of dimensions that interact and 
influence each other, such as cultural, political, physical, technical and economic. It 
assumes that actors, including regulators; institutional investors; listed companies and 
their employees, customers and suppliers; the financial press and analysts are able to 
co-evolve and to adapt to changing circumstances. In addition, actors are also able to 
facilitate good corporate governance through creating new rules, regulations and 
frameworks, which resulted from feedback processes whether positive or negative.127 
This theory is highly effective when it is supported by an enabling environment, a 
capability of adaptation, a flexibility and the ability of co-evolve with broader external 
environment.128  
 
2.2.8   Other Corporate Governance Theories 
There are numerous other corporate governance theories which are based on or serve 
different theoretical perspectives. Transaction cost theory, for example, seeks to 
combine people with different views of law, economics and organisations in 
interdisciplinary alliance to build a large firm that is capable of playing the role of the 
market in determining and allocating resources.129 The transaction cost economics 
theory takes into consideration the firm's internal efficiencies rather than external 
contracting of firms. This makes required transactions cheaper or more efficient as a 
firm has its own internal capital market.130  
Whilst the political theory is interested in the issues that under the governments' 
concerns of the corporate governance context, such as their allocating and determining 
of corporate power, structures, profits and privileges,131 the business ethics theory 
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focuses on honesty, justice, fairness and the “rights and wrongs” in business, setting 
these values as their ultimate goal. This helps companies to build a healthy social 
relationship which is a positive influence on their actions and the levels of 
interactions.132  
Managerial hegemony and class hegemony theories focus on the gap between 
expected and actual actions of the board of directors and how to deal with these in the 
light of behavioural theory. Moreover, their focus is on the extent of the impact of 
potential asymmetry of information and elite networks that may be exploited by 
managers away from the board’s monitoring.133  
Path dependency theory assumes that "the path used by each country will necessarily 
influence the outcome. This means that the evolution of corporate governance will be 
progressive and different according to each country. At the same time the model 
towards which each country will converge will depend on its starting point, and the 
result will differ according to whether the initial model at the beginning was stakeholder 
or shareholder".134 
Some theorists have tried to review and improve upon the existing theories. One of 
these attempts is director primacy which developed the societal role of agency theory 
by drawing an alternative conception of the principal and of the role and status of the 
board of directors as autonomous fiduciaries. In this context, there is an alignment 
between this model of director primacy and both stewardship and stakeholder 
theories.135   
Keay argues that there is no need to modify the dominant theories. Instead, he advocates 
another approach, namely the entity maximisation and sustainability theory, which 
sees the company as a separate legal entity. This theory focusses on maximising the 
wealth of the company as an entity in a manner that can guarantee its survival and 
sustainability. According to this theory, the broad range of investors in the company 
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should be valued and receive benefit from their investment depending on what is the 
best for the company as an entity. The board of directors should, therefore, seek to 
maximise the overall long-run market value of the firm as a whole. However, the 
investment made by different people and groups should be taken into account.136   
 
2.2.9   Conclusion  
Theories and models of corporate governance are constantly evolving as a result of 
overlapping influences and a variety of concerns.137 These continual changes are driven 
directly and indirectly by two other significant dynamics; first, the internal environment 
which focuses on shareholders’ relationships and the maximising of profits; and second, 
on the external environment which tries to deal perfectly with some pivotal issues such 
as financial funding, human resource development, business collaborations, 
communication and information technology.138  
The differences between countries in terms of cultural values, political, historical and 
social circumstances and economic contexts is another factor that influences the 
theoretical perspective of corporate governance of an individual country.139 However, 
the equilibrium between exogenous and endogenous changes will not be achieved by a 
single theory of corporate governance. Hence, careful consideration of the various 
theories is the best way to build an effective governance practice.140 This is confirmed 
by Abdullah and Valentine who state that: “Literature has proven that even with strict 
regulations, there have been infringements in corporate governance. Hence it is crucial 
that a holistic realisation be driven across the corporate world that would bring about a 
different perspective towards corporate governance ... Therefore, it is important to re-
visit corporate governance in the light of the convergence of these theories.”141  
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In a case-based approach, all theories of corporate governance have relative merits and, 
therefore, no single theory offers an integral explanation of corporate governance.142 
All the theories, including agency, stewardship and resource dependence, have some 
feasible elements that can be applied in different environments and circumstances and 
can contribute to governance improvement.143   
Some researchers support the trend that looks at corporate governance as not just 
knowledge, but rather as an art that is based on human activities, which are highly 
affected by interacting variables and subject to a high number of changes. The concepts 
of increasing market value, profit maximisation and economic efficiency and rationality 
cannot operate in isolation from the social process and non-economic factors, including 
legislation, institutional contexts and social correlations. Thus, it will be impossible to 
measure through only scientific precision or to be identified by any single model or 
structure of corporate governance for all organisations at all times.144 Quite to the 
contrary, corporate governance needs to be workable, adaptable, flexible and 
innovative. Introducing value creation for all parties broadens capabilities and 
cooperative value in the management framework as well as enhances internal control 
mechanisms and avoids the probability of any kind of conflict.145  
It is difficult for board of directors to deal with interests of different parties and diversity 
of firm's priorities as a zero-sum game. For example, maximising shares values does 
not necessarily entail the same result for the corporation at large.146 Therefore, "The 
position here seems to be that a director can take into account group interests when 
carrying out his role as a director of a group member, but not to the point of 
subordinating the interests of his company to the interests of the group as a whole".147 
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The traditional perspective that sees shareholders as principals and directors as their 
agents is not supported by legal systems such as that of England. Instead, they deem 
the firm as principal and the board of directors as autonomous fiduciaries and mediating 
hierarchs who act on behalf of the interests of the whole corporation. The legal systems 
also recognise various stakeholders as team members who have claims and they need a 
fair balance in competing on the firm’s resources.148 
The Companies Act 2006 has mentioned this broad view of principals and it provides 
a clearer and stronger formulation than its predecessor of 2002.149 Section 172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006 stipulates “Duty to promote the success of the company:  
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to: 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, (b) the interests of 
the company’s employees, (c) the need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others, (d) the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment, (e) the 
desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company.”150 
Similarly, the Saudi law clearly mentions that one of the main functions of the board is 
to regulate the relationship with stakeholders with a view to protecting their respective 
rights and maintaining good relationships with them as well as regulating the 
company’s social contributions.151 This issue has received further attention from the 
new Saudi CGR of 2017, as will be discussed in chapter five of this thesis.  
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2.3   The Most Prominent Models of Corporate Governance Used 
Worldwide   
2.3.1   Introduction 
The successive financial crises that have affected many countries around the world in 
the last few decades has increased the need to search for and adopt a strong corporate 
governance method and legislation. Moreover, some other factors give good corporate 
governance practices further importance and drive improvements in corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the development of capital markets, increasing 
investor confidence and the need to reduce barriers between worldwide capital markets, 
as well as the tendency for companies to expand through privatisations of state-owned 
enterprises, acquisitions and mergers.152 The legal environment and local circumstances 
are highly effective in determining the corporate governance system and its appropriate 
practices.  
Given the internationalisation of cross-border portfolios and international markets' 
interactions through technological advances, it can be said that there is global consensus 
about the importance of many core principles of corporate governance. One of the most 
famous sets of principles are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Principles. However, there are several systems of corporate 
governance that have been formed in different legal and economic environments. These 
have also been subjected to various cultural and political contexts. Corporate 
governance models can therefore be said to depend on the legal and economic systems, 
capital market development and the ownership structure adopted by each country.153 
Moreover, many of the differences in "corporate governance systems around the world 
stem from the differences in the nature of legal obligations that managers have to the 
financiers, as well as in the differences in how courts interpret and enforce these 
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obligations".154 Such factors have a significant role in both forming models and the 
practice of corporate governance.  
This chapter will discuss some of the most prominent and most successful models of 
corporate governance which have the essential elements of a good governance system, 
such as in the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.155 
 
2.3.2   The Anglo-Saxon Model; the US System 
The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance in both the USA and the UK has been 
built on a common law system that tends to focus on shareholders and gives their 
interests and rights wide protection. Furthermore, these countries often have a more 
dispersed shareholder ownership structure from a large number of outside investors. 
This contrasts with countries that have civil law where a concentrated share ownership 
structure is popular.156 This Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance has three 
leading features. It is: market-oriented, outsider-dominated and shareholder-focused.157  
Generally, the Anglo-Saxon model adopts the outsider system with regard to 
institutional investor ownership and control structures which rely on the market.158 This 
system assumes that there is no conflict between the separation of ownership and 
control and minority shareholders' protection due to the legal infrastructure and 
advanced capital markets.159 
The Anglo-Saxon model could also be termed capital-related, which assumes that the 
concepts of market capitalism and self-regulation are capable of creating a balance 
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between the functions of self-interest and decentralised markets. As long as they can 
provide a well-functioning stock market, this gives shareholders an ability to sell their 
shares safely. Moreover, these markets should have strict regulations that ensure the 
integrity of information disclosure and insider trading, with institutional settings that 
are based on a fiduciary relationship between shareholders and managers and promote 
profit-oriented conduct.160 The structure of corporate ownership is the most salient 
feature that distinguishes this system. In the US, for example, more than 50% of 
outstanding shares are owned by individual shareholders.161  
It could, therefore, be said that the system of corporate governance in the US gives 
shareholders the dominant position in relation to other stakeholders, such as creditors, 
employees, suppliers and the wider community. The companies that belong to this 
system of corporate governance are seeking to maximise the profits for their investors. 
 
2.3.3   The Anglo- Saxon Model; the UK System 
Despite the fact that corporate governance in the UK belongs to the Anglo-Saxon 
system and so shares most of the above characteristics, there are a number of 
remarkable differences between the system in the UK and that in the US, particularly 
in terms of stakeholder protection. Some of these divergences have arisen from the 
UK’s relationship with countries in Continental Europe as it is part of the EU. These 
have diverse models of corporate governance and some particular regulations that 
adjust their corporate sectors toward European integration.162 
 
Mullineux broadly debates some of the different aspects of the corporate governance 
models in the USA and the UK. These can be summarised in the six points below:163 
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- The US system is widely based on rules and litigation whereas the UK has a 
principles-orientated system that relies on the concept of ‘comply or explain’ of 
codes. These codes give shareholders a pivotal role in appointing directors and 
replacing CEOs and Chairmen as well as influencing their remuneration. 
However, the concept of ‘comply or explain’ gives a listed company a chance 
to avoid complying with some rules of the UK Corporate Governance Code if 
it can explain the circumstances and reasons that drive it to do so. 
- The system in the UK concentrates more on protecting outside shareholders "ex 
ante" and facilitates their role of monitoring by providing financial reporting. In 
contrast, the US system focuses on the primacy of share traders' protection "ex 
post" and on providing accurate market pricing for them. It could be said that 
the most divergent point between the US and the UK systems is that the US 
system focuses on an efficient capital market (equity) through guaranteeing 
legal price ‘right’ of the share. 
- The UK system has more concentrated share-ownership in the hands of 
institutional investors than the US system. This situation makes institutional 
investors eligible to play vastly greater roles and have a prominent position in 
corporate governance in the UK in contrast to the case in the US. 
- Unlike the case in the UK, the CEOs in the US have a considerable level of 
power and there is no need for them to be isolated from any elevated liability, 
including to be chairman of the board of directors. Moreover, they are eligible 
to sit on or chair any committees such as remuneration and internal audit 
committees.   
- There are also a number of other divergences such as the financial reporting 
model and its requirements, the system of auditor accountability and the firm's 
efficiency running compared with its capital resources which have been 
addressed by the UK model through different methods than those in the US 
context. This may make the UK legislations related to corporate governance 
much closer to continental Europe than the US. 
 




2.3.4   The Continental European Model; the German System  
Continental European countries who have built their corporate governance system on 
civil law often adopt a concentrated share ownership structure which prioritises 
protection at the expense of minority shareholders.164 Moreover, these countries tend to 
focus on certain stakeholder groups through giving their interests and rights wide legal 
protection rather than to shareholders.165 In other words, the stakeholder theory is the 
underlying principle that distinguishes the Continental corporate governance system.166 
Many Continental European countries, especially Germany, have adopted the insider 
system in terms of institutional investor ownership and control structures.167 Moreover, 
in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model, these countries have a two-tier board: the 
executive board of directors and the supervisory board: "The supervisory board is 
formed according to different procedures across Europe but in many cases employees 
have the right to appoint or recommend several members to the supervisory board".168  
This model has three main features: it is bank-oriented, meaning that it gives banks the 
dominant role in a complex system of cross-shareholding and company financing; it is 
insider-dominated, i.e. a production-oriented, company-centred management system; 
and finally, it is stakeholder-focused.169 Therefore, in this system, banks and other 
dominant ownerships, including governments in some countries, might be able to place 
their representatives on the supervisory board, thus exercising some control.170 
In Germany, banks and insurance companies have owned more than 50% of all shares 
and have strong relationships, business interdependencies and long-term commitment 
involvement. Similarly, in Austria large shareholders occupy 54% of the companies 
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and control between 50 and 75 per cent of the voting rights.171 Thus, the value 
orientation that targets maximisation of shareholder return and the value-based conduct 
of trading stocks play a minor role in this system.172 
In the continental literature on corporate governance, good practice for firms does not 
necessarily mean what is good for shareholders as corporations have independent 
volition.173 Nevertheless, the continental tradition highlights the labour-related aspects 
and employee involvement schemes and participatory management, and gives them a 
right to participate in strategic management decisions. For example, in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, employees of companies of a certain 
size have the right to elect some members of the supervisory body or directors. This is 
also the case to some extent in Finland and France.174 Consequently, the influence of 
the labour sector is much greater in the European model when compared with the 
limited role of trade unions in the Anglo-Saxon model.175   
Mallin argues that: "It is likely that, over time, the remaining influence of banks in 
terms of direct influence in a company will reduce, and it will be the distinction between 
ownership and control that helps drive and shape corporate governance reform".176 
Furthermore, some noteworthy changes have happened recently in the German system, 
such as stock-based remuneration packages and the introduction of the principle of 
shareholder value, as well as further regulatory initiatives in increasing transparency 
and accountability. The adoption of international accounting standards and 
improvement in stock market regulations have maximised initial public offerings and 
created some degree of convergence between the German and Anglo-Saxon models. 
However, these changes have not dissipated the above pivotal divergences which are 
                                                          
171 Cernat, L. (2004). The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, 
or still the century of diversity?. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), at 150. 
172 Jürgens, U., and Rupp, J. (2002). Working Paper - The German system of corporate governance: 
characteristics and changes. Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), No. FS II 02-203, at 4.  
available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50757, accessed on 12/3/2015. 
173 Cernat, L. (2004). The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, 
or still the century of diversity?. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), at 149. 
174 Weil, G., and Manges, L. (2002). Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to 
the European Union and its Member States, European Commission, Final report and Annexes, Weil, 
Gotshal and Manges, at 32. 
175 Cernat, L. (2004). The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, 
or Still the Century of Diversity?. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), at 150, 152. 
176 Mallin, C. (2013). Corporate Governance (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 228. 
59 
 
based on a host of institutional, legal and cultural barriers firmly rooted in those two 
doctrines.177  
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2.4   The Theory and Model of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia  
It is clear that Saudi legislation seeks to adopt rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed on the stock market to ensure their 
compliance with the best governance practices. This is in order to guarantee the 
protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.178 
The corporate governance theory and the adopted model in Saudi Arabia seems to be 
much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and more in harmony with its general theory 
which aims to generate a fair return for shareholders. Saudi legislation and the corporate 
governance regulations adopt the unitary board of directors and do not provide an 
option to approve a two-tier model.179 The Saudi system does not support the trend of 
a bank-oriented or any other long-term dominant ownership. Furthermore, Saudi 
corporations are not subject to any legal enforcement or compliance that gives 
employees a right to participate in strategic management decisions or to have any 
representative form. 
On the other hand, the Saudi legal system, including its corporate governance regime, 
is based on civil law as is the case in Germany and France.180 It also contains many 
rules that protect and regulate rights and interests of stakeholders' groups and minority 
shareholders as well as providing some limitations to CEO power. For example, Saudi 
law prevents the position of the chairman of the board of directors from being merged 
with any other executive position in the company.181 Unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, 
the government in Saudi Arabia dominates most labour, financial, services and business 
sectors, and recently it has tended to privatise some of them under its supervision.182 
Moreover, the ownership structure of many large joint stock companies has been 
occupied by state-concentrated ownership. This environment to some extent boosts the 
state’s role and control over the corporate sector. 
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Regardless of the extent of compatibility that the Saudi system has with either model 
or theory, no system of corporate governance can operate in isolation from the effect of 
companies' actions on the wider groups of various stakeholders.183 Therefore, reviewing 
the Continental European system of corporate governance in depth will be helpful in 
reforming and developing corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. One of the useful 
concepts of the Continental European system of corporate governance is that of 
engaging employees in governance issues without diluting shareholder influence. This 
would be particularly useful as, unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, there are no civil 
institutions or labour unions that might provide further protection for employees.184    
In conclusion, there is no need to search for the best system to imitate blindly. Instead, 
the principal practical question when designing a corporate governance system is how 
to introduce significant legal protection for investors and other stakeholders as well as 
how to achieve the firm's goals successfully.185 Corporate governance systems and legal 
protection of investors in most countries including developed or developing need to be 
continuously improved.186  
Moreover, the theories and models of corporate governance should be viewed in light 
of the local legal system, the ownership structure and the capital market 
characteristics.187 In addition, the challenges and negative impacts that come from the 
local setting should also be considered.188 
 
2.5   Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the importance, concepts and major principles of corporate 
governance. Moreover, it explored the major corporate governance theories and models 
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which arise from different theoretical perspectives. Some of these theories seek to serve 
particular aspects of corporate governance while others may be formed as a result of a 
reaction to and the tackling of some problems and needs in corporate governance. Each 
of the theories has its relative merits and some have feasible elements that can be 
applied to contribute to governance improvements in different environments and 
circumstances.189 Therefore, studying the main theories is essential to understand the 
role of the board of directors and the boundaries of the relationships between various 
groups in a firm and the importance of finding a comprehensive balance between 
liability, control and ownership. 
The board of directors and the firm have a unique relationship which can never be 
described as an agent-principal relationship between the board and shareholders 
exclusively.190 Hence, both English and Saudi legislation deem the firm (not its 
shareholders) to be the principal and the board of directors as autonomous fiduciaries 
and mediating hierarchs who act on behalf of the interests of the whole corporation. 
They also recognise various stakeholders as team members who have claims, needs and 
rights.191     
The chapter also highlighted the most prominent models of corporate governance used 
worldwide that affect the role of the board of directors and described the main 
characteristics of each of them. Furthermore, this chapter attempted to point out to what 
extent these models are compatible with those in Saudi Arabia. 
The model adopted in Saudi Arabia is much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and more 
in harmony with its general theory as it aims to generate a fair return for shareholders. 
Like this model, Saudi legislators adopted the unitary board of directors and have not 
supported the bank-oriented system which creates long-term dominant ownership. 
Furthermore, there are no regulations that support any form of employee representation 
or participation in decision-making. However, the legal and economic environments in 
Saudi Arabia to some extent boost the state’s role, ownership and control over the 
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corporate sector. The government also dominates most labour and financial services as 
well as business sectors. Therefore, some of the principles of the Continental European 
model may be useful in developing corporate governance in the Saudi context. 
Moreover, there is a real need to introduce significant legal protection for investors and 
achieve the firm's goals successfully. 
The chapter clarified the theories and models which impact on the corporate governance 
system in each country. This, however, necessitates clarification of the legal 
environment, judicial system, local circumstances, economic system and political 
context in Saudi Arabia. These will all be discussed in the next chapter alongside the 
prominent characteristics of the capital market and the relations between the 
government and corporate sector which impact on the board of directors. Moreover, the 
discussion will try to cover Saudi Arabia's new vision for 2030 which includes 
economic projects that promise dramatic changes that will expand the role of the 
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3.1   Introduction  
The preceding chapter mentioned that the legal environment, local circumstances, 
economic system, cultural values and political context are highly significant in 
determining the corporate governance system and its theory in each country. 
 
In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the legal and judicial systems and the 
political and cultural environments in Saudi Arabia, as well as the prominent 
characteristics of the capital market and the relations between the government and 
corporate sector which impact on the board of directors. Moreover, the discussion will 
try to cover Saudi Arabia’s future economic projects that have been announced recently. 
These promise dramatic changes that will expand the role of the corporate sector at the 
expense of the current governmental dominance. However, in order to achieve the 
desired results, those economic objectives need to meet the legal, political and 
economic requirements that are compatible with the principles of corporate governance 





3.2   State Authorities and Legal Environment in Saudi Arabia 
3.2.1   State authorities  
Saudi Arabia was founded in 1932 as a fully sovereign Arab Islamic state192 based on 
a monarchical system.193 This is limited to the sons and grandsons of the Founder King 
Abdul Aziz Al Saud.194 Like most countries, the state authority, in general, consists of 
judicial, executive and regulatory authorities but conversely there is no separation 
between these three authorities.195 In other words, the King has the final authority over 
all these bodies.196 
 
The executive authority of internal and foreign affairs of the state in Saudi Arabia is 
assigned to the Council of Ministers.197 It has full power over all executive and 
administrative affairs and the final authority to draw up the internal, external, financial, 
economic, educational and defense policies, and over other government agencies. 
Moreover, it supervises and monitors all ministries and government agencies in terms 
of the implementation of policies, laws, regulations and resolutions.198 It is presided 
over by the King who supervises and directs the general policy of the state and monitors 
the implementation of laws. He also works to safeguard coordination and cooperation 
among the various governmental agencies.199 Moreover, each member of ministers of 
the Council of Ministers are appointed by the King and he has full authority to remove 
them; he may also dissolve the Council of Ministers and reconstitute it as a whole.200 
According to Saudi law, the King is the supreme commander of all armed forces and 
has the right to appoint and terminate the services of their officers.201  
 
Legislative authority (or regulatory authority as it is called to avoid confusing it with 
the legislative role of Shari'ah) in Saudi Arabia has the task of formulating laws and 
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rules of state affairs in accordance with the principles of Islamic Shari'ah.202 In the Saudi 
system, the function of enacting and amending laws and regulations, approving 
international treaties and agreements and concessions have been assigned to the Council 
of Ministers (the executive authority), not to an independent entity like a Parliament.203 
The Council of Ministers reviews the drafts of such legislation and votes on them article 
by article and then as a whole; after that they will be issued by Royal Decree.204  
 
Saudi law stipulates that "the Judiciary shall be an independent authority. There shall 
be no power over judges in their judicial function other than the power of the Islamic 
Shari'ah."205 However, it also stipulates that "appointment and termination of judges 
shall be by Royal Order, at the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council".206 It 
should be noted here that this Supreme Judicial Council is currently presided over by 
the minister of justice who is a member of the Council of Ministers (the executive 
authority). 
 
Saudi Arabia also has the Shura Council207 which can, to some extent, undertake the 
role of Parliament or in more accurate phrase the “consultant council”. This Council 
consists of a hundred and twenty members, excluding the chairman, composed of 
scholars, experts and specialists who have all been chosen and can be relieved by the 
King.208 He also defines their grades, rights, duties and all their affairs through Royal 
Orders;209 he may also dissolve and reconstitute the Shura Council.210  
 
The function of this council is to review and study laws, policies and regulations211 of 
the state that are referred to it by the President of the Council of Ministers and provide 
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opinions and suggestions on them.212 Moreover, they discuss annual reports of 
ministries and governmental agencies and give appropriate suggestions.213 However, 
all these suggestions and resolutions will be reviewed by the Council of Ministers.214 
Furthermore, Saudi law gives each minister the right to propose a new draft law or an 
amendment to an active law215 whereas it should be proposed by a group of ten 
members of the Shura Council to submit the proposal to the King.216  
 
It should be noted that there are no political parties in Saudi Arabia and there is no 
direct representation or proxy representation. Nor are there any elected officials in at 
level of the state apparatus. Moreover, there are no trade unions or civilian institutions 
for overseeing the state. This context should, therefore, be considered in any attempt to 
reform laws or transplant rules or principles from different contexts.    
3.2.2   The Role of Shari'ah 
There are numerous articles in different laws that emphasise the pivotal role of Islamic 
Shari‘ah in Saudi Arabia. These articles express that Shari‘ah is the final reference for 
all legislation, which must be formulated in accordance with the principles and the 
sources of Shari‘ah; all development regulations needed must not be departed from 
either.217 The first article of the Basic Law of Governance stipulates that "The Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam and 
its constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of His 
Messenger..."218 This act also states that governance "derives its authority from the 
Book of God Most High and the Sunnah of his Messenger, both of which govern this 
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Law and all the laws of the State”.219 The King is responsible for running state affairs 
according to the dictates of Islamic Shari'ah.220 He also supervises the ministers' 
implementation of Shari'ah laws and the state’s general policies as they are collectively 
responsible before the King.221 Moreover, the courts ought to apply the provisions of 
Islamic Shari‘ah and the other promulgated laws that are not in conflict with them.222  
 
Despite all the rules that emphasise the role of Shari'ah in Saudi main legislation, there 
are in fact a number of rules that conflict with Shari'ah teachings, especially in the 
banking sector for example. This also applies to other rules that have been imposed by 
the needs of civil society in the modern state which have been simply borrowed from 
transnational law without any serious attempt to investigate local solutions or to 
consider the divergence in environment.223 The process of enacting laws and their 
codification are controversial issues in Saudi Arabia and the subject of long-term 
disagreements between politicians and scholars of Shari'ah. This dispute has affected 
even the usage of the term "law"224 in Saudi Arabia, with legislators preferring to avoid 
the term altogether and use "system" instead. Cultural controversy can also arise with 
many steps being taken by the government towards civil society modernisation.225 
 
To understand this situation, it should be recognised that Shari'ah is not only a body of 
laws but also a religion with provisions that cover all aspects of people's lives including 
worship, business activities and relationships. Islamic doctrine is a part of Saudi culture; 
it is owned by all Saudi people226 and affects the majority of them who respect its 
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provisions, seek to follow them and are keen to protect their beliefs. This claim can be 
proved by emphasising the above rules in Saudi law and the cultural controversy that 
will be explained later. Therefore, it is extremely important to clarify the concept of 
Shari'ah and to distinguish its genuine principles from peoples’ interpretations.  
To understand the confusing relationship between Shari'ah and law, this research 
divides the provisions attributed to Shari'ah into four categories: 
The first consists of absolute provisions that are based on the text of the holy book of 
the "Quran" or the correct text of the "Hadiths" of the Prophet Muhammed which are 
recognised by all or the majority of Islamic scholars. These provisions may include 
either rules or general principles such as provisions on inheritance, divorce settlements, 
the wearing of headscarves ("Hijab") and the Islamic penalties for specific crimes. 
Moreover, Shari'ah prohibits drinking alcohol and usury, whether in the form of paying 
or receiving interest.  
 
Second, there are several principles and general rules that regulate whether something 
is permissible "Halal" or prohibited "Haram" in the Shari'ah context – this can be 
derived from the Islamic texts, provisions and instructions. For example, the principle 
of justice, the protection of human rights and their funds, the principle of preventing 
damage, harm and risk taking and so on. A further one is the general principle that 
activities are permissible as long as they do not conflict with Shari'ah goals. Such 
principles can be considered guidance for judging the regulations, evaluating new needs 
and innovating solutions for events and problems that did not happen during the time 
of the Prophet Muhammed. 
 
There is an entire field of Islamic literature devoted to the study of this kind of 
knowledge with subtopics such as principles of islamic jurisprudence "Asol Alfigh", 
the objectives of Shari'ah "Maqasid AlShari'ah" and the policies of the Islamic 
government "Siyasah Shar'iyah". In addition, there is the importance of taking ''custom'' 
into consideration as a vital source in law-making.227 These focus on how to use the 
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limited texts of Islamic sources to regulate novel events. This makes Shari'ah creative 
and innovative and enables it to be flexible to accept good global experiences. 
 
Accordingly, it can be said that Shari'ah admits every new rule that does not conflict 
with the general framework of Islamic objectives, teachings and human rights and 
people interests according to Shari'ah principles wherever the rules originate from.228 
This appears to confirm Shari'ah’s recognition of the role of social and human 
experiences in improving legislation; something which is not monopolised by any one 
nation. Historically, through this open and flexible perspective, Islamic civilization has 
played a pivotal role in regulating people’s affairs and creating proactive solutions for 
many existing or perceived problems. It has also benefited and improved the 
experiences of people and civilisations that it has been in contact with.229 The current 
dilemma in Islamic legislation is not about the capability of Shari'ah but rather the 
capabilities of Islamic scholars, politicians, and people concerned with cultural 
improvement.  
 
There is no denying that the development of law is an integral part of the development 
of culture, civilisation, social relationships, industry and economics. Hence, the 
advanced nations in these aspects have been more able to introduce, direct and control 
the law and its progression. Consequently, in the last two centuries, the role of Islamic 
scholars has switched from producing rules to harmonising legal products of Western 
civilisation with Shari'ah. It should be noted here that there is a strong relation between 
law and culture. Therefore, many legal rules of Western commerce and finance, for 
instance, are built on capitalist principles which focus, in general, on maximising 
profits. In contrast, religious teachings including Shari'ah support justice and social 
welfare. This situation makes Islamic scholars tend to be reluctant and resistant, 
particularly when some of those legal rules diverge from Shari'ah in either their 
principles or goals. 
  
Thirdly, there are the debatable provisions that have not obtained the consensus of all 
or the majority of Islamic scholars who may see the case from different perspectives 
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and, therefore, give a variety of opinions or conflicting judgments on it. It will be 
recalled that this kind of provision represents the majority of "Fiqh" Islamic 
jurisprudence that has been recorded230 and there are several schools that deal with 
those debatable issues with their specific methods. There are four schools: Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali that have become most famous and each has influence on 
specific regions in the Islamic world. Consequently, it is difficult for this kind of 
provision to be attributed to Shari'ah as conclusive provisions because it is impossible 
to take both contradictory opinions or select one of the scholarly opinions at the expense 
of another. In addition, this situation has not prevented ongoing debates among Islamic 
scholars inside each school. However, at the individual level, anyone can follow 
whichever opinion he or she is convinced by. This situation for individuals can be 
applied by groups of people or indeed a country, such as Saudi Arabia which adopted 
Hanbali doctrine.231    
 
Along similar lines, there are other debatable issues such as the ongoing debate among 
Islamic scholars about company issues such as "legal person" and "limited liability 
company".232 Conflicting opinions on this have emerged from Islamic scholars. Thus, 
it is difficult to claim that Shari'ah offers a conclusive judgment or there is necessarily 
a negative attitude towards them from Shari'ah. 
 
The fourth category features the provisions incorrectly attributed to Shari'ah. These 
misunderstandings of Shari'ah arise unscientifically in political, social and cultural 
contexts. In other words, these provisions may be used as tools in the political and 
cultural conflicts in Islamic states, and this has been occurring since the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
 
                                                          
230 Apart from the essential Islamic provisions and the prime principles of Shari'ah, the unanimous issues 
are exceedingly limited in Islamic jurisprudence. See for example the book named "Consensus" who 
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In the last few centuries, Islamic civilisation, including the provisions that can be 
derived from Shari'ah, has been retreating in the face of the domination of Western 
civilisation in many aspects including militarily, commercially, economically and 
industrially. Colonialism by European states that occurred in several Muslim countries 
widened the gap between these two cultures, particularly when they imposed their laws 
over the countries they occupied.  Moreover, the situation worsened when some 
dictatorial Muslim leaders imposed a Western lifestyle over Muslim societies and 
legislated strongly against Shari'ah and many Islamic features like the Hijab. Moreover, 
a number of them adopted the Socialist system which is directly opposed to Islamic 
teachings.233 
 
Taking all of the above factors together, an atmosphere of distrust arose against Western 
civilisation and its culture and generated resistance among Sharia scholars towards 
foreign legislation and any modernising projects proposed by their countries’ leaders 
as well.234 This information can be used to understand the Saudi context as it contains 
the most holy sites of Muslims; its population and other Muslims also consider Saudi 
Arabia as the ideal Islamic country. Therefore, the usage of Shari'ah provisions in the 
conflicts between politicians and Islamic scholars is most visible in Saudi context. As 
a result of this confliction, some strange provisions have emerged, which have never 
belonged to Shari'ah or are consistent with its principles, for example, the prohibition 
on the usage of the term "law", forbidding benefiting from Western laws at all even 
when their rules are compatible with Shari'ah,235  as well as banning women from 
driving. This resistance comes from people who think that these provisions will protect 
the supremacy of Shari'ah and protect women from the bad decision to remove Hijabs, 
for instance, which has already happened elsewhere. Such provisions are not fair and 
should not be attributed to Shari'ah. 
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In conclusion, this relationship between Shari'ah and law has very heavily impacted on 
both the legislative and judicial systems in Saudi Arabia. This includes the development 
of the company sector at both levels of the legislative and judiciary, which will be 
discussed in the upcoming sections.  
  
3.2.3   The Saudi Judicial System   
Saudi law, in general, assigns judicial authority to two branches: the General Courts 
"Sharia Courts" and the Administrative Judicial Body "Board of Grievances", which 
has been allocated for disputes where the government is a party. This dual model is a 
tradition in countries that belong to the French legal family where civil law has been 
adopted. Likewise, many Middle East countries including Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia 
have copied this system.236 Both of these judicial bodies have an independent Supreme 
Judicial Council which has a supervisory role over courts and judges and oversees 
administrative aspects of the judiciary. As well as a huge court, courts of appeals and 
other courts that related to their jurisdiction.237  
 
Despite Saudi law restricting judicial authority to those two judicial bodies, there are, 
in fact, several administrative committees that have a judicial jurisdiction. The Saudi 
legal system does not recognise these committees as part of the judicial authority but 
does grant them full jurisdiction to adjudicate some civil, commercial and 
administrative cases in accordance with the judicial jurisdiction assigned to each 
committee by its constituted decree.238 Such administrative committees can be found in 
a variety fields, such as Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes, the Tax 
Committees, the Committees for Penalizing Traffic Violations, the Mining Disputes 
Committee, the Banking Disputes Settlement Committee, the Copyright Committee, 
                                                          
236 Sfeir, G. (1988). The Saudi Approach to Law Reform. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 
36(4), at 746. 
237 Articles 4, 8 of Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See also 
articles 5, 9 of Law of the Judiciary 2007 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Customs Committee, the Labor Disputes Settlement Committee, the Committees for 
Press and Publication Violations and so on. 
 
AI-Jarbou discussed the possible reasons for creating these kinds of semi-judicial 
committees. One reason is that the situation is a response to the requirement of the 
comprehensive development that has occurred in Saudi Arabia at all levels and the 
current courts do not have sufficient experience to deal with it. Other interpretations 
tend to justify their establishment to ease the caseload before courts or to cope with 
disputes arising from applying the decrees or regulations due to the privacy of those 
issues.239  
Codification is one of the most important justifications for the creation of these unusual 
judicial bodies in the Saudi context. More accurately, those committees are following 
the particular provisions that have been codified in each field and then been 
adjudicating thereunder.240 This idea of codifying Shari‘ah rules has received strong 
opposition from Shari'ah scholars who control the judicial authority. This resistance to 
codifying Shari'ah rules into a single civil code comes from the fact that this idea has 
led some countries to dispossess Shari'ah from its pivotal role in the judicial 
authority.241 It should be noted that the number of those committees is reducing over 
time through the development of the Saudi judicial system and some of their liabilities 
have been transferred to the appropriate courts.242  
  
 
Starting from the fact that Shari'ah is the master authority for Saudi courts, it therefore 
also plays another role in appointing judges and their rehabilitation. Saudi laws require 
a candidate to "hold a degree of one of the Sharia colleges in the Kingdom or any 
equivalent degree, provided that, in the latter case, he shall pass a special examination 
to be prepared by the Supreme Judicial Council".243 Gaining a postgraduate degree 
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further enables judges to be promoted through the ranks of the judiciary. However, 
judges working in criminal, labour and commercial courts are required to "undergo at 
least two months of training in the Commercial, Labour and Criminal Procedure laws 
and other relevant regulations".244  
 
3.2.4   The Judicial Authorities Related to the Company Sector 
The structure of judicial authority related to the company sector has also been affected 
by the dispute between Shari'ah scholars and the Saudi policy-makers. This 
disagreement has pushed the Shari'ah courts to refuse to introduce and implement the 
Commercial Law (Law of the Commercial Court) issued in 1931 as the first prime 
commercial legislation in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, this drove the authorities to exclude 
commercial and company cases from the judicial authority and create alternative ways 
to fill the gap in the judicial system as a logical consequence of that situation.245 
 
The first commercial tribunal entity in Saudi Arabia was established in 1926 and was 
named the 'traders council'. It comprised seven members who had been appointed by 
the king. In 1931, the Commercial Law (Law of the Commercial Court) was issued, 
including the regulations that arranged the jurisdiction, procedure and composition of 
a commercial council or 'commercial tribunal', which covered the jurisdiction of 
company disputes. One year before the Company Law was published in 1965, the Saudi 
Legislature Authority assigned the settlement of commercial and companies disputes 
to two separate entities. Then, in 1967 those two authorities merged under the name of 
'The Settlement of Commercial Disputes Authority' with full judicial powers under the 
umbrella of the Ministry of Commerce.246 
 
Decree number (402) of the Council of Ministers issued in 1987 abolished 'The 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes Authority' and transferred its jurisdiction to the 
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specialised commercial divisions in the Board of Grievances with two levels of 
courts/litigations, first instance and appellate. With this decree, commercial and 
company cases finally came under judicial authority. This excludes certain issues such 
as banking disputes and cases involving the stock market which are still assigned to 
administrative committees. 
 
In 2007, a significant reform happened in the Saudi judicial authority. A new law was 
published for both the General Courts "Sharia Courts" and the Board of Grievances 
which have also expanded their authorities.247 This law stipulates creating the 
commercial courts under the General Courts framework, which can be considered as 
the first commercial court as there has never been one in the previous Saudi judicial 
structures. The Royal Decree of this new law included also an operational mechanism 
that discussed the needs of those courts and regulated the stages for creating bodies or 
legislation needed and the ways of transferring the tasks between the judicial systems. 
It also includes a timetable about collecting the authorities of commercial judiciary 
under the commercial court, which lead to abolish several current administrative 
judicial committees gradually.248  Accordingly, the commercial courts was to run under 
the Board of Grievances until 2 October 2016 as that had been agreed and indicated in 
the documents signed by Saudi Arabia’s two judicial parties.249 With this kind of court, 
the Saudi commercial environment will become more harmonised with global 
development and respond to the economic needs and commercial international 
agreements; it will also be able to engage more with foreign investors in its market.250  
 
In contrast, while all companies are monitored by the Ministry of Commerce and are 
subject to the jurisdiction of commercial courts, the Capital Market Authority is the 
authorised body which has the jurisdiction over listed companies in Saudi Arabia. 
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3.2.4.1   The Capital Market Authority   
The nature of the administrative and judicial bodies that have authority over the board 
of directors significantly impacts on the performance of the board of directors and the 
roles and relationships with its members, shareholders, stakeholders and the company 
as a whole. Listed joint stock companies in Saudi Arabia come under the supervision 
of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and are subject to its jurisdiction, not to the 
Ministry of Commerce or commercial courts. The members of the board of the CMA 
are appointed by Royal Order; this also determines the salaries and benefits of the board 
members.251 The CMA has corporate personality and financial and administrative 
independence. It also reports directly to the president of the Council of Ministers (the 
king).252 The CMA has a particular law that determines the scope of its authority, its 
jurisdiction and its power in enacting regulations and enforcing the provisions of the 
Capital Market Law and other relevant regulations and rules. In order to fulfil this 
function, the CMA has the power to inspect records, and gather evidence and 
documents required to tackle any violations or prevent them in the first place.253 
 
The CMA establishes the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), 
whose members shall be appointed by the board of the CMA for a renewable three-year 
term. Such a committee has the full jurisdiction to decide complaints or lawsuits and to 
issue decisions over all relevant disputes in both public and private rights, as well as to 
consider the grievances against actions and decisions taken by the CMA.254 The law 
also empowers the Committee to punish anyone violating the law with fines, 
imprisonment, suspension of trade, seizure of property, travel bans and so on according 
to set conditions.255 Moreover, it has the powers required to investigate these disputes, 
including subpoenaing witnesses and ordering the production of any necessary 
evidence and documents.256 Disputes and issues that are not mentioned by the Capital 
Market Law and the regulations issued by the CMA are essentially subject to the 
jurisdiction of commercial courts.257  
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The CMA can also file a lawsuit before the CRSD against certain violations. It has the 
power to determine these violations as well as the authority to issue regulations and 
rules related to them.258 For example, article 57 of the Capital Market Law empowers 
the CMA to file a lawsuit against those violating articles 49 and 50 which determine 
matters relating to fraud and insider trading. These two articles give the CMA the power 
to set rules determining acts and practices constituting violations of such matters, as 
well as specifying and defining related terms.259 This means that the CMA in some 
cases plays the roles of legislator, claimant, inspector, jury and judge at the same time. 
 
According to Saudi law, the Council of Ministers shall issue a resolution to form an 
appeals panel for a renewable three-year term to receive appeals against the decisions 
of the CRSD and to issue final decisions for the complaints or lawsuits considered. The 
appeals panel comprises three members representing the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, the Ministry of Finance, and the Bureau of Experts at the Council of 
Ministers.260 In practice, the data show that the CMA Board and the Committees for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes issued 241 sanction decisions; 102 of which were 
issued and enforced against listed companies/senior executives. On the other hand, 
there were 36 final judgments issued in favour of the CMA in cases brought by or 
against it, compared with three final judgments which were issued against the CMA in 
cases brought by or against it. These data come from the latest report of the CMA in 
Saudi Arabia.261 
 
It should be noted that despite the fact that the CRSD and the appeals panel are carrying 
out judicial functions and they have the full authority to do so, the Saudi law does not 
deem the members of these committees as judges and it considers their decisions as 
administrative decisions not judicial verdicts.262 Moreover, the CRSD and the appeals 
panel are exercising their judicial duties away from the courts which, unlike them, have 
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the supreme principles of justice, judicial independence and objective procedures. The 
members of the CRSD and the appeals panel have been appointed from legal 
consultants specialising in the jurisprudence of transactions, who have expertise in 
commercial and financial affairs, securities and financial markets. The law prevents 
them from having any financial or commercial interest even indirectly or having a 
kinship relationship with parties to lawsuits up to the fourth degree of relatives.263 
However, this does not mean that they have sufficient legal qualifications and 
independence, which the members of the judicial authority have. 
 
Another important point in this context is that the Capital Market Law uses fines and 
financial penalties imposed on violators of the provisions of the law as financial 
resources of the CMA.264 The law requires the CMA to deduct from its total income all 
current capital expenses, any expenses needed and double the total of its expenditures 
as a general reserve, and then it shall remit the surplus revenues collected to the Ministry 
of Finance.265  
 
The above influential factors may create an atmosphere of uncertainty about the 
credibility of the litigation in Saudi capital market. These may cause serious negative 
effects not only on Saudi companies and the relationships with their board members but 
also on attracting foreign investors. Such a situation goes against the current strong 
trend towards privatisation and maximising the role of the corporate sector in Saudi 
Arabia, which needs to improve regulations, the judicial system, the environment of the 
market economy and measures of protection for the rights of all parties. 
 
The recent final resolution issued on 9 February 2017 against Mohammad Al Mojil 
Group Company has created a big debate in the Saudi capital market and may disclose 
the extent of concerns in this regard, when strict sanctions including fines of billions 
and many years of imprisonment can be issued by a mere administrative authority. This 
resolution gave 5 years’ imprisonment for each of the chairmen of this company and 
the deputy, and a fine of 1.5 billion Saudi riyals ($400 million) to be deposited in the 
CMA account as well as a variety of other strict sanctions for auditors and master 
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executive managers. In addition, the resolution invites any individual shareholder or 
third party who sustained damages from this violation to file a case before the CRSD 
and to claim compensation.266  
 
3.2.4.2   Suggested Reform  
As discussed earlier, the long-term disagreements between Shari'ah scholars who 
dominate the judicial authority and the Saudi policy-makers have brought into existence 
several administrative committees that have a judicial jurisdiction. Such a dispute has 
negatively affected the structure of the judicial authority and pushed the Shari'ah courts 
to refuse to introduce and implement some legislation that conflicts with Shari'ah and, 
at the same time, has pushed the government to create these kinds of semi-judicial 
committees. This disagreement negatively impacts on the requirement of the 
comprehensive development and damages the local economy, commerce and the needs 
of civil society. Therefore, both politicians and Islamic scholars should work together 
to end this conflict and find a solution that ensures that all kinds of disputes including 
securities disputes will be covered by the structure of judicial authority.  
This serious dilemma may be solved by two main methods, which have some obstacles 
but these are fewer than the problems that may come from the current situation.  
First, the policy-makers can recognise and comply with numerous articles in different 
laws in Saudi Arabia that emphasise that all legislation must be formulated in 
accordance with the principles and the sources of Shari‘ah including regulations 
relevant to development.267 These articles also impose on the courts to apply the 
provisions of Islamic Shari‘ah exclusively.268 This would mean banning all practices 
whether national or international that depart from Shari‘ah in all sectors, including 
commerce, corporate, banking and securities market. There is nothing that prevents a 
country from enacting legislation that harmonises with local culture and responds to the 
demands of the majority of citizens, as long as it does not damage third parties. These 
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rights and local particularities should be respected by foreign investors who want to 
work or invest in Saudi Arabia. 
 
On the other hand, Shari'ah scholars could be more proactive and respond to the 
requirement of the development and the economic needs and also be more harmonised 
with the global commercial system and international agreements. Moreover, the 
negative position against the codification needs to be reviewed by Shari'ah scholars and 
be made flexible to follow specific provisions that have been codified in some fields 
and then been adjudicated thereunder, as long as this codification does not conflict with 
Shari'ah teachings. This will be achieved in two ways: encouraging research to find 
appropriate solutions and new products to meet economic and financial needs that are 
compatible with Shari'ah; and by improving the judicial authority, qualifying 
programmes, curriculums and judges’ competence so that they are qualified and have 
sufficient experience to deal with the cases filed before semi-judicial committees. 
 
It should be noted that these two actions, to some extent, are already in place. A good 
example comes from banking sector that was once very removed from the provisions 
of Shari‘ah. However, now the Islamic banking system provides a wide variety of 
financial products that are internationally applicable and globally recognised. 
Moreover, the Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia offer several postgraduate 
programmes concerned with legal comparative studies, including financial and 
commercial law.269 Furthermore, they have implemented, especially in the last decade, 
scholarship programmes abroad and sent many students who have undergraduate 
degrees in Shari'ah to study in the most prestigious universities around the world. Many 
of them return with useful knowledge and experience.270 This solution is more suitable 
to the recent trend that is clearly stipulated by the Saudi law issued in 2007 which allows 
the commercial courts to cover all authorities of the commercial judiciary and aims to 
abolish the current administrative judicial committees over time.271 
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The second way to solve the judicial dilemma and its negative effects caused by the 
semi-judicial committees in Saudi Arabia is to improve these committees, transforming 
them into authentic courts with two levels: first instance and appellate. This would 
require the Saudi legal system to recognise these committees as part of the judicial 
authority or at least for them to be recognised by the government as courts with all their 
powers, authority and independence. This applies also to appointing their members, 
their tenures, work locations and the nature of their decisions to be similar to those in 
the judicial authority. Moreover, the members of these committees should be selected 
from highly qualified individuals according to standards that meet the functions of 
judicial authority and the specific jurisdictions they will deal with. 
 
It may be difficult to create courts, under the current judicial authority, which deal with 
some cases that conflict with Shari'ah and the Basic Law of Governance. However, this 
exactly applies to the current committees that are run in the same location and legal 
environment but with different names and procedures. This may point to a problem 
with names and not actual practice. Therefore, these committees can have the same 
characteristics and procedures of the courts regardless of the name they are given.  
In conclusion, it is should be noted by both politicians and Islamic scholars that the 
unfairness, the abuse and the neglect of rights that may arise from the current situation 
of vesting some judicial functions to administrative committees are, in fact, in much 
greater conflict with both Shari'ah teachings and the Basic Law of Governance. 
 
 
3.2.5   The Major Legislation Affecting the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies in Saudi Arabia Compared to those in England 
3.2.5.1   The Saudi Legal Family 
According to Hanson, the Arab World was a fertile ground for the transplantation of 
French legal concepts as a result of two main reasons. The first was the events of the 
previous centuries that involved Europe, particularly France, and the Ottoman Empire, 
at the level of politics and economics. These strengthened the transplantation of the 
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French legal system into Middle Eastern countries. The second was the concept of the 
immutability of Shari'ah that is consistent with the principle of the personality of the 
law and its dependence on the texts of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammed as well as the broad administrative and political powers of the Islamic 
government under the principles of public policies and interests. Those factors are more 
harmonised with French jurisprudence and its distinction between public and private 
law which led to establishing a separate system of administrative law.272  
 
Saudi Arabia has developed its legal system by benefiting from its neighbours' expertise 
as long as this does not conflict with Islamic law. Egypt was the foremost country at 
integrating Western civilisation, including French legal concepts, with Islamic 
principles. This allowed Egypt to modernise its legal system and create associated 
institutions. This made Egypt a window for receiving French legal principles into 
Islamic culture, and then on to Saudi Arabia.273   
 
In contrast, the UK legal system has been built on common law, which is developed 
through case law. Unlike Saudi Arabia, this makes the UK legal system more flexible 
in the creation of rules and in involving judges in the process of law-making. This 
differs from the process of law-making in Saudi Arabia which is subject to bureaucratic 
procedures that are assigned exclusively to the legislature, which is held by the king or 
the Council of Ministers, the executive authority. 
 
The Saudi Arabian legal system, to some extent, has been built on civil law like many 
Middle Eastern countries which belong to the French legal family. Therefore, the rule 
of stare decisis or any doctrine that restricts judges to case law are not followed by 
Saudi courts, whether those decisions are issued by lower or higher courts. This makes 
a judge independent to rule in a different way even if the facts presented are similar.274 
However, the law of the Board of Grievances issued in 2007 instructs that the Board 
shall classify the rendered courts' judgments as well as print and publish them.275 The 
                                                          
272 Hanson, M. (1987). The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia. Arab 
Law Quarterly, 2(3), at 290-291.  
273 Ibid, at 291.  
274 Karl, D. (1991). Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know. The George 
Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, 25(1), at 149 -150. 
275 Article 21 of Law of the Board of Grievances 2007 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Board of Grievances has published several volumes of those court judgments including 
commercial cases, even those issued before the recent law.276 This requirement of 
publishing and collecting judgments does not oblige Saudi courts to follow the rule of 
stare decisis compulsorily but it does create general legal principles and judicial norms 
that may be considered a judicial resource. This is very helpful in assisting the 
principles of transparency and justice as well as supporting judges to make their 
decisions quickly, as well as being more likely to be approved by the higher courts.277  
 
The analytical study by La Porta et al., which compares legal families in terms of legal 
enforcement, should be referred to here. They point out that: 
"The French family has the weakest quality of accounting ... An investor in a 
French-civil-law country is poorly protected by both the laws and the system 
that enforces them. The converse is true for an investor in a common-law 
country, on average … legal families with investor-friendlier laws are also the 
ones with stronger enforcement of laws. Poor enforcement and accounting 




3.2.5.2   The New Company Law  
On the 4th of December 2015, the new Law of Companies was published in Saudi Arabia 
which superseded the previous law issued in 1965 and gave existing companies a one-
year time limit to comply with its new rules.279 This law is designed to meet the 
contemporary needs of the company sector and create a motivating environment for 
them to increase their contribution to the national economy. It also tackles the 
shortcomings of the obsolete law and the dispersed decrees that tried to amend it. The 
new law removes several barriers and restrictions in front of the growth of the company 
sector. It also includes numerous rules that enhance the good practices of corporate 
governance. On the one hand, the new law reduces the costs and the procedures for the 
establishment of a firm. For instance, it minimises the statutory reserve capital and the 
                                                          
276 For further details, see the official website of the Board of Grievances available at 
http://bog.gov.sa/ScientificContent/JudicialBlogs/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on 18/8/2016. 
277 Ibid.   
278 Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal of 
Political Economy, 106(6), at 1141- 1145. 
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capital required for establishing a public company. Also, the number of members 
required to set up a joint stock company has been reduced.280 According to this law, a 
single person who meets certain conditions can set up a company.281 Moreover, the new 
law gives modern communications technology a vital role, it allows companies to 
maximise shareholder participation by holding the meetings of general assemblies via 
modern means of communication. The website of the Ministry of Commerce becomes 
adequate on its own for a firm to advertise itself and publish its Memorandum of 
Association electronically. Those facilitated rules may encourage Saudi businessmen 
to modify their institutions to shape firms and to encourage family companies, which 
receive greater attention in the new law, to become joint stock companies.282  
 
On the other hand, the new law makes several principles of corporate governance 
compulsory rather than remaining optional or being considered soft law. For example, 
it prevents the position of the chairman of the board of directors and any other executive 
position in the company from being combined.283 Moreover, it forces companies to 
adopt a cumulative election method in appointing members of the board of directors. 
The new law also minimises the loss ratio of capital of a company which necessitates 
an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders within prescribed timelines to solve the 
problem or the company will be dissolved by force of law. This rate of loss was 75% 
of the capital whereas it is only 50% in the new law.284 There are also strict sanctions 
of imprisonment and fines stipulated by the new law which act as a strong warning 
against the board of directors or any company parties not to breach the provisions of 
this law or provide false data and so on.285 
 
England is one of the foremost countries that has issued rules that organise operations 
of firms and serve to develop corporate governance. The Companies Act 2006 has over 
1,300 sections and is considered the prime piece of legislation that regulates English 
law in the company sector. This Act has emerged as a result of a long term cumulative 
experience which made it simple, efficient and cost effective for companies to use in 
                                                          
280 Ibid, article 54.   
281 Ibid, article 55. 
282 Ibid, articles 13, 86/3. 
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the modern era. It also codifies directors' duties, clarifies shareholders' rights and 
simplifies the administrative procedures required.286 Using such a law comparatively 
will help attempts to reform company law in other nations.      
 
There is other legislation in England related to the board of directors which cannot be 
found in Saudi Arabia – the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. This Act is 
an important part of English company law as it disqualifies directors who are suspected 
of misconduct and prevent them from "being directors of companies, and from being 
otherwise concerned with a company’s affairs".287  
 
3.2.5.3   The Corporate Governance Regulations and Others Regulations Issued by 
the Capital Market Authority  
The Capital Market Authority has issued the Corporate Governance Regulations as well 
as many other regulations in order to organise the conduct of listed companies; these 
aim to protect the rights of shareholders and stakeholders as well as to create a healthier 
environment for investment. There are more than a dozen regulations, such as the 
Listing Rules, the Resolution of Securities Disputes Proceedings Regulations, Merger 
and Acquisition Regulations, Investment Funds Regulations, Securities Business 
Regulations, Market Conduct Regulations, Offers of Securities Regulations, Credit 
Rating Agencies Regulations, Investment Accounts Instructions, Procedures and 
instructions for companies whose losses have reached 50% of their capital.288 Some of 
these regulations and their annexes of applications and forms are very useful for the 
board of directors in raising their awareness about discharging their duties perfectly. 
They may also guide them in dealing with some crucial situations which may help them 
to tackle problems and avoid prosecutions in the first place.   
 
The first Corporate Governance Regulations was issued in 2006 with 5 sections and 19 
articles that highlight the rules and standards required to ensure compliance of joint 
stock companies with best governance practices.289 This regulation comes under the 
                                                          
286 The description of the UK Companies Act 2006, the National Archives of the UK government, 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes) , accessed on 18/8/2016. 
287 See the Introductory text of Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
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approach of "comply or explain" for all listed companies; this means that "a company 
must disclose in the board of directors' report, the provisions that have been 
implemented and the provisions that have not been implemented as well as the reasons 
for not implementing them".290 However, over time many decrees have been issued 
which have forced listed companies to follow certain rules; several of these compulsory 
rules were inserted in the new Company Law 2015.291 
 
On the 13th of February 2017, the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia issued a 
new Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) which superseded the previous 
regulation issued in 2006. The new regulation has changed many provisions, tackled 
numerous shortcomings and provided copious details. The main characteristics and key 
differences of the new CGR can be summarised as follows: 
- The new CGR aims to provide some details to explain the provisions of the new 
Saudi Law of Companies issued on the 4th of December 2015, as the old CGR 
was not in harmony with it and conflicted with some of its provisions.292     
- Unlike the previous CGR, which comes under the approach of "comply or 
explain" for all listed companies,293 the articles of the new CGR, except a few 
guidance rules, are compulsory for all listed companies.294  
- The number of parts and rules in the new CGR is greater than the number in the 
old one. There are twelve parts in the new CGR, containing 98 articles with 
copious details, compared to just 5 parts, including 19 articles, in the old one. 
- The new CGR provides some forms and schedules for disclosing remunerations 
and obliges listed companies to prepare their remuneration documents 
accordingly.295 
                                                          
290 Article 1/c of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There 
are more than 8 articles in Saudi CGR became mandatory on all listed companies. 
291 There are more than 8 articles in Saudi CGR became mandatory for all listed companies by different 
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This thesis will deal with all of the relevant changes and shortcomings considered in 
the new regulation. It also clarifies the extent of the improvement in corporate 
governance that could result from the new regulation and those aspects related to the 
thesis that require further reform. 
 
The regulations of listed joint stock companies and the capital market rules can be found 
also in England. There are, for example, the Rules of the London Stock Exchange and 
the requirements of the United Kingdom Listing Authority which regulate the operation 
of the trading system. In addition, there are the UK Corporate Governance and 
Stewardship Codes and UK standards for accounting, auditing and actuarial work 
which have been set by the Financial Reporting Council.296 
  
This thesis will review the relevant Saudi rules that are related to the board of directors 
in the light of those in England and global standards of corporate governance. 
  
                                                          
296 See the introduction of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
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3.3   The Economic Environment in Saudi Arabia Affecting Corporate 
Governance   
3.3.1   Structure of Saudi Economy  
The Saudi economy is characterised by a dependency on oil and by the many 
petrochemical productions which are controlled or run by a limited number of state-
owned companies. Oil output represented more than 73% of the total government 
revenues in 2015, with petrochemical exports representing the majority of the 
remaining percentage of non-oil national income.297  
 
Much of the oil revenues have been redistributed in the economy through government 
spending on goods, services and employee salaries. Because of this the government has 
raised spending on wages in government works and used employment in the public 
sector as a simple tool to distribute and participate in the national wealth. Hence, the 
expenditure ratio of wages and salaries and allowances exceeded 50% of the approved 
budget for 2015 expenses.298 The sudden oil wealth assisted Saudi Arabia in developing 
its infrastructure quickly and in increasing living standards of its citizens. At the same 
time, it reduced the role of the private sector which depended too heavily on public 
sector activities and spending plans. The private sector, in turn, relies on foreign 
workers who represent more than 74% of the labour force in its companies where 
wages, benefits and rights are lower.299 
 
For decades, the public sector and government expenditure in Saudi Arabia has been 
the main engine for the economy and has dominated most economic activities.300 At the 
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same time, the company sector has grown in the shadow of the public sector through 
government tenders or providing services to it.301 This situation has created several 
problems in the governance of the public sector such as the excessive expansion in 
employment, weakness of productivity, difficulty in evaluating the level of 
performance and accountability, weak competitiveness in light of automatic 
promotions, and weakness in selecting the most efficient employees and in the 
management of human resources.302 This situation has also created another problem in 
the labour force structure. The unemployment rate for the national labour force reached 
11.5% even though there were more than 8 million foreign workers in Saudi Arabia.303   
 
The Saudi economy has been influenced by government expenditures, which moves in 
parallel with the volatility of oil prices. This dependency meant that the macroeconomic 
indicators and the government revenues declined by 42% in 2015 as a direct 
consequence of weak oil prices (down 48%) in 2014. The Saudi stock exchange also 
decreased by 17.1%.304   
 
Dignam and his colleague argue that:  
“Macroeconomic conditions matter in corporate governance outcomes, and 
recognising the interdependent relationship between micro-level corporate legal 
structure and macroeconomic factors, such as trade, capital controls and 
demand, alters our understanding of the way corporate governance systems 
operate and, in turn, how policy can be formulated. This is important because 
the relationship is often overlooked or misunderstood”.305   
Hence, structural reforms should be made in the Saudi economy to redirect its policies 
and tools in order to stimulate non-oil economic diversification, job creation for citizens 
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as well as reduce the wage bill in the public sector. The economy’s plan-makers in 
Saudi Arabia have drawn attention to the need for economic diversity, something which 
has also been recommended by the International Monetary Fund.306 Thus, the Saudi 
Five-Year Plan emphasised the importance of enabling the private sector to play a vital 




3.3.2   The Listed Companies in Saudi Arabia 
The first joint stock company in Saudi Arabia was established in 1932, which is 
considered as the historical beginnings of the Saudi stock market. From that time, the 
market has gradually added joint stock companies every year. In 1984, the stock market 
became regulated by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA); this went on to 
introduce an electronic settlement and clearing system in 1989. The Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) was established in 2003 pursuant to a Royal Decree in 2003. It has a 
direct link with the Prime Minister and enjoys financial and administrative autonomy. 
The CMA has made a quantum leap of the market in terms of developing the regulatory 
and supervisory aspects. It seeks to secure efficiency in the stock market and has full 
power to set up and impose rules in order to protect investors and maintain fairness.308 
Hence, The CMA issued the first Corporate Governance Regulation in 2006 and revised 
it by adding numerous amendment decrees. It also issued a new CGR in 2017 to 
harmonise its regulations with the new provisions and trends found in the Law of 
Companies issued in 2015. 
 
The Saudi stock market consists of sixteen sectors containing a total of 175 listed 
companies. In terms of market value (market capitalisation), the Saudi stock market is 
at the forefront of the rankings of emerging markets. Moreover, it is the largest Arab 
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market with a market capitalisation of 1.6 trillion Saudi riyals ($427 billion) according 
to a 2016 assessment.309   
 
There are eight listed companies whose accumulated losses have reached between 50% 
and 75% of their capital while there is one company which has accumulated losses 
between 75% and less than 100% of its capital. There are four companies that have lost 
100% or more of their capital.310   
 
It should be noted that the ten biggest companies of the Saudi market represent almost 
half of the Saudi market value. The ownership of these companies is concentrated in 
the hands of the government.311 There are three governmental organisations: the Public 
Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, General Organization for Social Insurance and the 
Public Pension Agency, and these account for 39% of the Saudi stock market.312 
Moreover, the governmental institutions are among the major shareholders of more than 
54 listed companies.313   
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3.3.3   Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030 
Extensive changes occurred in Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2015. A new king with 
a different economic agenda and leadership team was installed. On the political level, 
Saudi Arabia was forced into military intervention in Yemen to support its legitimate 
government and stop Houthi militias backed by Iran. Moreover, the price of oil reached 
its lowest level in a decade. These events have had a massive impact on the Saudi 
economy and its administrative methods. Thus, the new government issued ‘Saudi 
Arabia’s Vision for 2030’ in early 2016, including a number of programmes such as 
the National Transformation Program and many substantial changes to the structure of 
the Saudi economy. This vision is directed by the king’s son, Prince Mohammed, who 
enjoys a level of power that no other Saudi prince has ever had since the kingdom was 
founded in 1932. He is the kingdom’s Crown Prince, the Defence Minister and the 
Chief of Council for Economic and Development Affairs, which supervises the 
ministries of finance, oil and the economy, as well as the Public Investment Fund and 
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco).314   
 
Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030 can be considered a major historical turning point that 
may have a broad impact on the diversification of the economy, the culture of work and 
corporate governance practices. Its target is to maximise the role of the private sector 
in the long-term with a view to contributing to gross domestic product (GDP) and 
increasing the economy liberalisation in terms of ownership, employment, trade and 
competition. This is necessary to facilitate investment, remove all obstacles preventing 
the participation of the private sector, encourage investment in new fields and improve 
regulations and the environment of the market economy. The Vision also seeks to 
enhance the level of efficiency in the private sector and its ability to manage various 
production units to meet the requirements of production base diversification of the 
national economy.315  
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In order to achieve this target, the government is intending to launch a series of 
executive programmes. One of the most important programmes that could pave the way 
for the private sector is the government restructuring programme. It aims to reduce the 
government’s outlay and promote efficient planning. This will be implemented within 
some ministries, institutions and government entities. This will also boost coordination 
among them to align them to the requirements of the new phase. The Vision aims to 
transform the government’s role from providing services to regulating and monitoring 
them.316   
 
Privatisation is another significant tool that is emphasised by Vision for 2030. There is 
a strong trend to create a comprehensive privatisation programme that involves most 
government functions, public agencies and state-owned companies whether complete 
or partial. For example, healthcare, municipal services, housing, finance, energy, the 
national airline, telecoms firm, electricity company and so on. Such an ambitious 
privatisation plan will even cover some parts of education services (charter schools), 
military industries, some services in the ministry of justice and the national oil industry 
icon, Aramco.317 This enthusiastic trend towards privatisation drove The Economist 
magazine to ask prince Mohammed, who is at the head of the Saudi economy, whether 
this was a ‘Thatcher revolution for Saudi Arabia’ to which he replied ‘most 
certainly’.318 
  
As part of the privatising strategy, Saudi Arabia is considering an IPO of around 5% of 
Aramco, the world’s biggest oil company.319 This will happen in 2018 and will include 
some of its subsidiaries. The aim is to turn it into an energy/industrial conglomerate in 
order to diversify Saudi income and secure the continuity and growth of Aramco.320 
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The new Saudi government seeks to bring multiple benefits through privatisation and 
effective participation with the private sector to create initiatives and joint programmes. 
In this way, the Saudi Vision aims to slash government waste, increase the rate of 
transparency and counter corruption, as well as increase the private sector’s 
contribution to GDP and non-oil production. Moreover, this marks an attempt to raise 
the rate of nongovernment jobs in the private sector to employ more than 50% of the 
national labour force. Through this cooperation, Saudi Arabia will expand its 
investments in the religious tourism sector, the development of the petrochemical 
sector, gas production, mineral wealth and so on.321 
Privatisation will create numerous listed companies in the Saudi market which will be 
directed by boards of directors rather than being dominated by government. This 
situation will raise the demands of nominating employees to boards because 
privatisation significantly impacts the structure of labour force in Saudi Arabia, 
representing a serious concern for the government, which needs to give them further 
protection in corporate sectors. Moreover, this will increase the need to apply the 
principles of corporate governance, including transparency and accountability over the 
boards of the targeted sectors. This could be similar to the situation in England, 
particularly in the 1980s, when a number of significant issues were reconsidered such 
as excessive remuneration for directors and standards of transparency.322 
3.3.4   The Impact of Saudi Political and Economic Environments in Corporate 
Governance   
Starting from above facts of culture values in Saudi Arabia and the prominent 
characteristics of legal, political, and economic environment, Saudi Arabia is a non-
democratic country that is based on an absolute monarchical system which puts all 
authority in the hands of the king. Laws are issued by royal decree or the decree of the 
Council of Ministers which is presided over by the king. There are also wide powers 
for a minister in issuing bylaws and legal decrees in their ministry and interpreting 
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legislations. Judicial authority and its administrative affairs are managed by the 
Minister of Justice. Moreover, the semi-parliament members are appointed by the king, 
not via public elections. By contrast, corporate governance relies on a number of 
fundamental principles and concepts of a democratic regime such as participation, 
transparency and accountability.  
 
According to the report of the World Bank, the ownership and control of Saudi listed 
companies appears to be highly concentrated in the State and its founding families.323 
The report mentions that several laws and institutions in Saudi Arabia are in their early 
stages and remain untested, and awareness of the importance of good corporate 
governance and implementation need to be raised. Thus, corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia needs to make additional efforts to focus on enforcement and to turn the ‘law 
on the books’ into practice. Moreover, attention is drawn to the importance of the public 
disclosure of information related to ownership structure, beneficial ownership and other 
non-financial, board member qualifications, nomination procedures and so forth to 
reduce the current concern.324   
 
A number of researchers have raised concerns about the ability to move forward in the 
new Vision for 2030 safely in this situation whilst maintaining the rights of shareholders 
and stakeholders and ensuring the success and diversification of the economy, as well 
as solving employment problems. The Economist Magazine which met the leader of 
the Saudi Vision, doubted that the Vision could be successful. It argued that there was 
a huge difference between plan and practice as there are massive obstacles that need to 
be solved. The capital markets in Saudi Arabia are weak and have not yet gained the 
trust of domestic and foreign investors. Moreover, the economic environment and 
structure of the financial system are suffering from bureaucracy and poor 
infrastructure.325   
 
                                                          
323  Ibid. 
324 The World Bank, February 2009, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Country 
Assessment, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, at 1, 4. 
325 The Economist magazine, 9 Jan 2016, The Saudi blueprint, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21685450-desert-kingdom-striving-dominate-its-region-and-
modernise-its-economy-same?cid1=cust/ednew/n/n/n/2016017n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/ME/email, 
accessed on 18/8/2016. 
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Developing countries have different circumstances such as basic legal frameworks, 
corporate ownership model, structure of the financial system, the strength of ties 
between business interests and government, rule of law, quality of accounting standards 
and transparency, crony capitalism, the rate of law enforcement and the existence of 
capital market institutions. It may be difficult to undertake fundamental reform against 
the interests of main actors, and the government may not have sufficient ability to deal 
with serious potential threats of privatisation. Therefore, the corporate governance 
problem in a broader perspective is an equilibrium problem, which prevents financial 
markets from flourish. However, following the guidelines of developed countries in 
terms of privatisation may result in counterproductive effects.326  Hence, despite the 
claim that the comprehensive privatisation programme will make use of the best 
international practices, follow a balanced and scientific manner and reform the laws 
and processes as necessary, the ability to implement it is still a concern. Privatisation 
in such an environment may be more likely to imitate the Russian or Egyptian models 
rather than the English one. 
 
These characteristics draw attention to the importance of the internal corporate 
structure, including the board of directors. This is the central aspect that needs to be 
considered when reviewing the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia. This 
research will try to provide some suggestions to help board of directors in the Saudi 
context to deal with the deficiencies in the political, legal and economic environment 
and the lack of oversight institutions as well as to protect the interests of all parties in a 
company. The upcoming chapters will discuss the rules that need to be added to 
corporate governance regulations in Saudi Arabia to meet the requirements and 
conditions of good corporate governance practices. Therefore, the research will discuss 
the composition of the board of directors that is most appropriate to the Saudi economic 
environment and the main actors so that the board of directors can build an efficient 
relationship with them in line with Saudi conditions. 
 
                                                          
326 Erik Berglöf, E., and Thadden, E., (1999). The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries, at 17,18 and 26. 
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3.4   Conclusion   
This chapter highlighted the unique environment in Saudi Arabia in terms of the 
political, legal and judicial aspects, as well as the structure of the Saudi economy and 
listed companies. This environment has some anomalous characteristics which create 
challenges in corporate governance that significantly influence the roles and 
relationships of the board of directors in listed companies. The chapter discussed the 
key environmental factors that affected corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. These 
can be summarised in the following points: 
• The state apparatus broadly consists of judicial, executive and regulatory authorities 
but there is no separation between them in Saudi Arabia; they are all controlled by 
the Council of Ministers which is presided over by the king. In other words, the 
king is the final authority for all these bodies. Legislation is issued through royal 
decree or the decree of the Council of Ministers which is presided over by the king. 
The listed companies fall under the supervision of the Capital Market Authority 
which has its own jurisdiction and is not subject to the jurisdiction of commercial 
courts.  
• The competent authority responsible for disputes of listed companies works outside 
the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. The listed companies in Saudi Arabia are 
subject to the CMA and the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes (CRSD) established by the CMA, which also has the authority 
to issue regulations and rules. This may create an atmosphere of uncertainty about 
the credibility of litigation in the Saudi capital market and may have serious 
negative effects on both the role of the board of directors and attracting foreign 
investors. The chapter recommended that politicians and Islamic scholars should 
work together to end all administrative committees that have a judicial jurisdiction 
in Saudi Arabia. 
• The chapter discussed the new Law of Companies published in Saudi Arabia on 4 
December 2015 which superseded the 1965 law. This new law provides many 
different provisions related to corporate governance. It is designed to meet the 
contemporary needs of the company sector. The new law removes several barriers 
and restrictions to the growth of the company sector and reduces the costs and the 
procedures for the establishment of a firm. Moreover, it includes numerous rules 
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that enhance the good practices of corporate governance. It provides some 
simplifications to shareholder participation and further protection of their rights. 
One critical addition in the new law gives the audit committee a stronger position 
and further independence, in particular over appointing and removing members of 
such a committee by the AGM. There is also a tendency to expand the power of the 
board of directors in the new law and remove obstacles that may prevent the board 
from fulfilling its duties. However, there are also strict sanctions of imprisonment 
and fines stipulated by the new law which act as a strong warning to the board of 
directors or any company parties not to breach the provisions of this law or provide 
false data and so on. 
• This chapter described the key features of the new Saudi Corporate Governance 
Regulation (CGR) introduced in 2017 to respond to the changes in the new Saudi 
Law of Companies. The new CGR superseded the previous regulation issued in 
2006. Numerous provisions have been changed, many shortcomings tackled and 
copious details provided. This makes the new CGR a quantum leap in corporate 
governance legislation in Saudi Arabia, which will improve corporate governance 
practices and contribute towards meeting the standards of good corporate 
governance. Moreover, unlike the old CGR, the provisions of the new CGR are 
compulsory for all listed companies, except a small number of guidance articles.   
• The structure of the Saudi economy is another factor that creates challenges for the 
corporate sector. It relies on oil and many petrochemical products that are controlled 
or run by a limited number of state-owned companies. The public sector and 
government expenditure has been the main engine for the economy and has 
dominated most economic activities. Moreover, the ownership and control of Saudi 
listed companies appears to be highly concentrated in the state and its founding 
families. The ten biggest companies of the Saudi market represent almost half of 
the whole Saudi market value. Governmental institutions are among the major 
shareholders of more than 30% of listed companies. 
• The Saudi Vision for 2030 issued in 2016 may have a broad impact on the 
diversification of the economy, the culture of work and corporate governance 
practices. Its target is to maximise the role of the private sector in the long-term and 
increase economic liberalisation. There is a strong trend to create a comprehensive 
privatisation programme that involves most public agencies and state-owned 
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companies in order to slash government waste, increase the rate of transparency and 
counter corruption. This chapter discussed the vision in light of the essential 
characteristics of the current economy and corporate sector and the current legal 
and political environment. Concerns have been raised about the ability to move 
forward in those programmes safely whilst maintaining the rights of shareholders 
and stakeholders and ensuring the success and diversification of the economy, as 
well as solving employment problems. 
These environmental characteristics draw attention to the importance of the internal 
corporate structure, including the board of directors. This is the central aspect that needs 
to be considered when reviewing the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia. 
Therefore, the upcoming chapter will discuss the composition of the board of directors 
that is most appropriate to the Saudi economic environment to meet the requirements 











The Composition of the Board of Directors in Saudi 





4.1   Introduction and Definition of ‘Board of Directors’  
The board of directors is considered a cornerstone of corporate governance and it is a 
body that plays a key governance function on behalf of shareholders. It exists because 
many listed companies have a large number of shareholders who individually do not 
have ability to monitor and evaluate the executive managers.327 Furthermore, some 
shareholders do not have sufficient incentives to meet their expected roles. Therefore, 
they delegate these roles to a group of elected directors. This method is the most 
efficient way of observing and evaluating the conduct of executives and of protecting 
the rights of all parties involved.328  
Generally, any person who occupies the position of director can be called a ‘Director’ 
even if he or she does not form part of a board of directors.329 Thus, it is necessary here 
to clarify exactly what is meant by the board of directors. A short definition is that it is 
a group of people who are responsible for governing a firm legally.330 The board of 
directors may be broadly defined as “a group of people who are elected by a company's 
shareholders to represent them as a governing body of a corporation, and who meet 
periodically to monitor the company's management and represent the interests of the 
shareholders”.331 As such, the board has extensive powers to manage and oversee the 
company's business. These responsibilities are vested by the articles of association and 
these allow them to act collectively as a board. It is therefore the board of directors, 
rather than the members, which has authority to act and transact in the company's name 
and on its behalf.332 At the same time, the directors are jointly responsible for the 
method of administration and they will be held accountable for all damages sustained 
                                                          
327 Boubaker, S., Nguyen, Bang Dang, Nguyen, Duc Khuong, and SpringerLink. (2012). Corporate 
Governance: Recent Developments and New Trends. Berlin, Heidelberg, at 185. 
328 Ibid.  
329 Section 250 of the Companies Act 2006. 
330 Boubaker, S., Nguyen, Bang Dang, Nguyen, Duc Khuong, and SpringerLink. (2012). Corporate 
Governance: Recent Developments and New Trends. Berlin, Heidelberg, at 160. 
331 See “Board of Directors”, Credo Reference. (2007). Dictionary of accounting [electronic resources]. 
(4th ed.). London: A and C Black, available at: http://www.accountingtools.com /board-of -directors-
definition, accessed on 19/7/2014. 
332 Cane, P., and Conaghan, J. (2008). The New Oxford Companion to Law. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. available at: 
http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/view/10.1093/acref/9780199290 
543.001.0001/acref-9780199290543-e-173, accessed on 19/7/2014. 
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by the company arising from their misconduct, violation and breach of any provisions 
of the law or the company’s bylaws.333     
In order to understand the role of the board of directors under corporate governance, 
this research should consider issues that are more profound than merely the duties of 
the board of directors. One of the major issues in this context is the composition of the 
board of directors as this plays a pivotal role in any function carried out by the board of 
directors thereafter. There is a strong relationship between the role and duties of the 
board of directors and the issues of board composition, including, the size of the board 
of directors, the types of membership and the percentage of these types on the board 
and their qualifications. As well as, the issues of standards required to select the board 
members and the duration of the membership. 
It should be noted that trust in boards of directors has reduced dramatically because of 
their involvement in the many scandals that have emerged in recent decades. They have 
been accused of taking poor decisions and neglecting their monitoring 
responsibilities.334 Therefore, putting the issues of composition of the board of directors 
under careful consideration by improving corporate governance legislation becomes an 
important requirement that needs to be implemented. These rules will allow 
shareholders to receive superior representation on boards of directors and assist 
protecting the interests of both shareholders and stakeholders as well as dealing with 
the diverse interests and conflicts safely. 
  
                                                          
333 Article 78 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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4.2   Appointing the Board of Directors and its Tenure 
4.2.1   Appointing the Board of Directors  
According to English law, the board of directors shall be elected on an individual 
basis,335 whereas the new Saudi Law of Companies 2015 stipulates that voting in listed 
companies must be based on an accumulation of votes. Accumulative voting gives 
shareholders voting rights equivalent to the number of shares they hold, whether they 
use all of them for one nominee or divide them between several nominees.336 
The new Saudi Law of Companies issued in 2015 brings an end to a confusing issue 
related to the relationship between the positions of chairman of the board of directors 
and the managing director. This issue had been mentioned in conflicting articles present 
in old Saudi laws. The old Saudi Law of Companies clearly states that the chairman of 
the board of directors is also able to hold the office of managing director.337 In contrast, 
the Saudi CGR issued in 2006 prohibits the chairman of the board of directors from 
holding any executive positions in the company, including that of managing director.338 
Despite this, Saudi legislators made many of the articles in the old CGR compulsory 
for all listed companies, but not this article. This conflict continued for eight years 
without any legal revision, which suggests that the Saudi legislature had intended to 
give boards of directors more executive powers at that time, as long as the company’s 
bylaws specified the duties of these two positions. However, both the new Saudi Law 
of Companies 2015 and the new Saudi CGR issued in 2017 prohibit holding the position 
of the chairman of the board of directors in conjunction with any other executive 
position in the company.339 The law also emphasises that in all cases, one individual 
shall not have exclusive powers to make decisions in the company.340 
There is a strong view in the UK Code which states that “there should be a clear division 
of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the 
                                                          
335 Section 160 of the Companies Act 2006. 
336 Article 95/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And article 8/b of the 
Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For further details about this 
issue, see the section of “Adopting Cumulative Voting” in chapter five.   
337 Article 79 of the Law of Companies 1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
338 Article 12/d of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
339 Article 81/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And article 24/b of the 
Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
340 Article 24/d of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
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executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual 
should have unfettered powers of decision”. 341  This separation between the chairman 
and chief executive creates a significant benefit for the company as well as giving 
greater consistency to the real functions of both the chairman and the chief executive. 
One of the major roles of a chairman is to focus on strategic issues whereas the CEO 
has responsibility for day-to-day management. In other words, it is a genuine board 
member role which focuses on issues of ‘directing’ the business instead of ‘managing’ 
the business.342 This does not mean that all other members of the board of directors 
should not take on the role of CEO. However, many studies argue that firms with 
appointed CEOs as directors enjoy a positive stock market reaction and are less 
vulnerable to bankruptcy and they are better able to comply with laws.343 Nevertheless, 
both Saudi and British laws determine that the majority of the members of the board of 
directors should be non-executives.344  
There is an important issue which relates to the nature of the membership of the board 
of directors in England. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
requires all company directors to be natural persons and prohibits the appointment of 
legal persons as directors.345 When this provision has come into force it will nullify the 
provisions of the Companies Act 2006 which requires companies to have at least one 
director who is a natural person.346  
In Saudi law, there are no equivalent sections that deal with this issue, but there are 
some references to the representation of the legal person. These indicate that there is 
nothing to prevent a legal person or body corporate from placing a representative on 
boards. For example, the new CGR defines the term "person" as covering any natural 
                                                          
341 Section a/2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
342 Cook, J., and Vernon, G. (1998). Building the Board of Directors. Nature Biotechnology, 16 Suppl, 
at 41. 
343 Johnson, S., Schnatterly, K., and Hill, A. (2013). Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social 
Capital, Human Capital. Journal of Management, 39(1), at 241. available at 
http://jom.sagepub.com/content/39/1/232, accessed on 19/7/2014. 
344 Article 16/2 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See also 
section b/1.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
345  Section 87 of Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. It should be noted here that in 
September 2016 the UK government indefinitely postponed implementation of the ban to consider 
permitting exceptions in limited circumstances, as authorized by the statute. As of this writing the 
government had not yet defined the scope of such exceptions or the situations in which they will be 
granted. For further details, see Bainbridge, S. (2017). Corporate Directors in the United Kingdom. 
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research, Paper No. 17-04. 
346  Sections 155 and 164 of the Companies Act 2006.  
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or legal person recognised by Saudi law.347 Moreover, the Saudi CGR prevents an 
independent director from “being a representative of a legal person that holds five 
percent or more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group”.348 That means 
a legal person in Saudi law can be represented by any kind of membership except an 
independent director in the particular case above. However, the minister of commerce 
in Saudi Arabia issued a resolution to regulate the appointment of a representative of a 
legal person on the board of directors. This resolution requires a legal person to present 
forward a natural person permanently with all the personal responsibilities of other 
directors. Therefore, this representative can be held accountable under both criminal 
and civil liability for their wrongful acts towards the company and for all damages 
sustained by the company arising from their misconduct.349 
Nevertheless, clear amendments in Saudi law should take place in this regard to avoid 
the detrimental conduct and opportunistic behaviour that may exploit the inadequate 
legislation of representation of a legal person. There was nothing to prevent the Saudi 
legislature from including the rule from the above resolution issued in 1998 in the new 
CGR issued in February 2017 to combine all requirements in one piece of legislation. 
4.2.2   The Tenure of the Board of Directors  
The law provides the general framework for the duration of membership to ensure that 
all directors are submitted for re-election at regular intervals.350 The other detailed 
provisions for the duration of membership should be stipulated by the articles of 
association of the company or bylaws according to the particular needs and 
circumstances of firms.351 
Saudi law prevents the appointment of directors, including the chairman, the managing 
director and the secretary as directors for a term that exceeds three years even if the 
                                                          
347  Article 1 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
348  Ibid, article 20/c- 2. 
349 See the resolution number (423) of Minister of Commerce in Saudi Arabia, dated 7/1/1998. See also 
AI-Jabre, M. (1996). The Saudi Commercial Law (5th ed.). Riyadh: King Fahd National Library, at  333-
334.  
350 Section b/7 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
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company constitution provides otherwise. Nevertheless, directors will always be 
eligible for re-appointment, provided that does not conflict with the company bylaws.352  
The UK Corporate Governance Code deals with this issue from much wider perspective 
than Saudi CGR, it considers the different circumstances of firms and classifies the 
duration of membership for the re-election by shareholders into three levels: 
- The annual re-election for three kinds of membership: first, all directors at the 
first annual general meeting after their appointment; second, the directors of 
FTSE 350 companies; third, non-executive directors who have served longer 
than nine years.353 All those kinds should be subject to annual election by 
shareholders.  
- Intervals that do not exceed three years for re-election of all directors of non-
FTSE 350 companies.354  
- The six-year review: a rigorous review for a non-executive director holding 
term beyond six years.355 
It has long been known that shareholders also have a right to remove all or some of the 
board of directors’ members at any time even if the company’s constitution provide 
otherwise. In a similar manner, Saudi laws and those of England have provided rigorous 
articles about this issue to demonstrate this power of shareholders in their meetings.356    
The above-mentioned measures and rules of accumulative voting, the board of directors 
consisting of a majority of non-executive members, the separation of function of the 
chairman of the board of directors and the managing director and finally the provisions 
for the tenure of the board of directors, will work side by side to prevent the board of 
directors from becoming a circle of familiar associates, but, instead, a decision-making 
group that adds real value. Moreover, these will qualify the board of directors’ members 
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to offer constructive criticism and protect the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders.357 
  
                                                          




4.3   The Structure of the Board of Directors                                
It is important to bear in mind that the structure of the board of directors significantly 
depends on the system of corporate governance adopted. There are several systems of 
corporate governance and these have been formed in different legal and economic 
environments. According to Shleifer et al,358 the best corporate governance systems in 
the world are the Anglo-Saxon model in the United States and the United Kingdom and 
the models that have been adopted by Germany and Japan. Some researchers have 
outlined the differences between these corporate governance models. They argue that 
the Anglo-Saxon model has three main features; it is market-oriented, outsider-
dominated and shareholder-focused. In contrast, in the German model there is a bank-
oriented trend which gives banks the dominant role in a complex system of cross-
shareholding and company financing; an insider-dominated culture which is 
production-oriented and has a company-centred management system; and also, there is 
a stakeholder-focused culture.359   
Taking above characteristics into account, it can be argued that it is very important to 
consider the role of an internal corporate structure as the cornerstone that needs to be 
considered when reviewing any corporate governance system, especially in developing 
countries.  
 
4.3.1   The Types of Boards of Directors 
A board of directors is the most important internal corporate institution for coordinating 
the interactions within company boundaries, for regulating the relationships between 
the different constituencies and for enacting corporate bylaws. Moreover, it plays other 
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roles such as creating strategies, delegating responsibilities and monitoring fulfilment 
in order to safeguard the interests of different stakeholders. 
The traditional models of the board of directors which are most common are the one-
tier system which derives from the Anglo-American tradition and the two-tier system 
which owes its basic structure to the German culture.360 The structure of a corporation's 
board of governance is one of the major differences between American and German 
business models. This research aims to highlight these two types of board of directors 
and attempts to identify their supreme principles and characteristics. This will help in 
reforming the laws of the board of directors in corporate governance in Saudi law. 
 
4.3.1.1   The Unitary Board 
The one-tier board system which has been adopted by most western economies, 
including the United States and the UK, has also been selected by Saudi legislators. In 
this type of board, both executive directors who manage the business of the corporation 
and non-executive directors who indirectly oversee management work together on the 
same board.361 This combination of the monitoring and the managing bodies of the 
corporation is one of the most important features of the unitary model of governance.362 
In the unitary model of corporate governance, the board of directors, which manages 
the corporation, is appointed at the shareholders' meeting. The board of directors then 
selects some of its members to work with the Audit committee to perform the 
monitoring function.363 The shareholders in this model have more power in the final 
decision on the composition of the controlling body and the members who sit on 
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management bodies. Furthermore, through the shareholders' meeting, shareholders 
have the power to remove all or some members of the board of directors at any time.364  
Taking into account the difference between the US and the UK systems as discussed 
earlier, the unitary system of corporate governance in the US and in the UK depends on 
the dispersed ownership of companies which puts shareholders in the dominant position 
in relation to other stakeholders, such as creditors, employees, suppliers and the wider 
community, who may be able to protect their rights through contractual agreements or 
external entities. The priority of companies that belong to this system of corporate 
governance is to maximise the profits for their investors. 
The Saudi legislators have dealt with the board of directors through the one-tier model 
and they have not provided any text for using any alternative models. The Saudi Law 
of Companies makes it compulsory for joint stock companies to form a board of 
directors that consists of at least three members and not exceeding eleven members.365 
The law gives such a unitary board of directors the full powers and joint and ultimate 
responsibilities in the administration of the company.366  
 
4.3.1.2   The Two-Tier Board 
The two-tier model of governance has a supervisory board and another board of 
management that create more separation between ownership and control.367 The upper 
tier of the supervisory board is directly appointed by the shareholders’ meeting. 
Subsequently, this supervisory board appoints a lower tier of management and is also 
able to remove them at any time.368 However, the supervisory board cannot become 
directly involved in managing the company as it excludes all executives.369 Thus, the 
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main role of the supervisory board is to monitor the management board of executives 
which has a wide authority, even in major transactions of the corporation excepting 
some specific transactions which have been subject to the approval of the supervisory 
board.370 It could be said that this monitoring function is somewhat similar to what is 
implemented by the Audit committee in the one-tier model.371   
It should be noted that, in the two-tier model, some of the powers and duties of the 
shareholders’ meeting are transferred to the supervisory board. For example, this board 
can approve the balance sheet which is unknown to the Audit committee in the unitary 
model.372 In other words, the two-tier model gives the shareholders’ meeting a limited 
power that can divided into two main roles: amending the bylaws, and appointing and 
removing the members of the supervisory board.373 Some researchers consider this 
limited function of the shareholders’ meeting to be a beneficial characteristic, especially 
for firms that have widely distributed shares. They argue that this situation maximises 
the interests of minority shareholders who are represented by the supervisory board and 
gives them better serve than what they may receive from their vote at a shareholders’ 
meeting.374  
Germany is considered one of the most notable countries to have adopted the two-tier 
model375 , also having been adopted by many other European countries and Japan.376 
This model is most prevalent where corporate governance rules explicitly maximise the 
value of stakeholders and support labour participation on the board of directors.377 
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However, despite both shareholders and employees being represented on the German 
supervisory board, it is frequently common that representatives of large shareholders 
dominate the supervisory board.378    
Both Aste and Glau identified several factors that make the two-tier model highly 
advantageous. First, the structure of responsibilities is explicitly evident. This separated 
structure and its associated efficiencies allow for further independent supervision of the 
management. It also has a clearer scope of duties and better application than a unitary 
model and this helps to control the problem of conflicts of interest. Second, due to the 
two boards, the decision-making is quicker and has a more procedural efficiency, such 
as enabling private meetings to be held for various matters. Third, the two-tier system 
creates an environment conducive to diversity and open discourse among directors and 
explores the potential candidates of directors in lower tier to transfer to the upper tier. 
Finally, the two-tier board attracts more investors, principally foreigners, who are 
generally more confident about two-tier boards as they have a better chance of checking 
corporate management.379  
However, there are some disadvantages that appear to be the major causes of the 
limitation of the spread of two-tier boards. These shortcomings can be summarised in 
the following points: 
“Excessive formality, particularly with regard to the directorate's obligations to 
report to the supervisory board and the formal division of responsibility between 
managers and monitors, results in inefficiencies, such as unnecessary meetings 
and burdensome amounts of paperwork. Too rigid. The structurally restrictive 
nature of the two-tier board. Increased costs. Compensating additional directors 
and the time costs generated from regular meetings, which must be scheduled 
and rescheduled, between directorate and supervisory board members.”380  
Moreover, other disadvantages may arise through a potential power imbalance between 
the two levels of boards. Whether when the supervisory board exercises too much 
power over the directorate or if the supervisory board is dominated by the directorate, 
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which is familiar problems in the German two-tier model.381 Exploiting minority 
shareholders is another significant shortcoming that is more visible in the two tier model 
where a robust of separation between ownership and control. This situation may create 
an opportunity to limit the expression of shareholders' voice at approving of the balance 
sheet.382 
In addition, the exclusion of the supervisory board from management may cause a lack 
of direct information which they need to develop an objective picture of the company's 
performance. This is especially the case when the legal environment and circumstances 
of the firm prevent them from obtaining information in other ways, such as regular 
meetings with employees, corporate auditors, customers, government auditors, 
suppliers and creditors.383  
 
4.3.1.3   Types of Boards of Directors in View of the Saudi Context 
There is no need to search for the best foreign system for the board of directors to be 
imitated without taking into account the problems and negative aspects ensuing from 
the local setting, that need to be changed. Corporate governance systems in most 
countries, whether developed or developing, need to continually revise the mechanisms 
for the legal protection of investors.384 Therefore, the principal practical issue in this 
context is not whether to emulate the United States, Germany, or Japan, but rather to 
find significant legal protection so that mechanisms of corporate governance systems 
can develop.385  
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It is difficult to say which model of the board of directors is better because both are 
based on strong principles and have beneficial characteristics. On the other hand, they 
also have various disadvantages that need to be avoided. However, adopting the two-
tier board model will be a significant step toward controlling the conflicts of interest 
and introducing a truly independent supervisory board.386 In contrast, adoption of the 
one-tier board structure will be a significant step toward a genuine combination of the 
managing and monitoring functions in the board of directors, where the controlling and 
the managerial functions coincide.387    
It should be noted that corporate governance is based on two types of mechanisms: the 
first one is internal to the company and it seeks to give shareholders some level of 
ability to influence the board of directors; the second one is external to the company, it 
exists in the regulatory environment and it depends on state agencies for the detection 
of corruption.388  It should be recalled that the success or failure of corporate reform 
may depend greatly on the political and economic climate as a result of the close 
connection between politics and corporate governance. For example, the failure of the 
two-tier board, which happened in the French business community in the 1960s, was 
not because it was a flawed structure but rather because it was introduced at a difficult 
time in French political and economic history. By 1966, the business community was 
strongly dominated by the French government and it had adopted a policy of 
nationalisation. Therefore, it formed many state-owned companies as well as exercising 
indirect control over many private companies and business executives who showed 
allegiance to the government. This contrasts with the great success of the developed 
German two-tier board where the German government curbed the state control over big 
businesses early.389  
In chapter three, the research discussed the limited role of the company sector in the 
Saudi economy, which relies on oil exportation, and where the government owns a high 
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percentage of the majority of blue chip companies listed on the market. Moreover, the 
majority of the labour force in Saudi Arabia works in the government sector. 
Consequently, the government supports and drives companies to achieve the national 
development goals and accommodate of the national workforce as much as possible. 
Therefore, the government is looking forward to the corporate sector contribution in 
this issue. Moreover, the chapter discussed the political and legal environment in Saudi 
Arabia as a developing country, and the lack of democratic principles that successful 
corporate governance depends on.  
It can be said that the adoption of the two-tier board structure in the Saudi context may 
seem more beneficial than the one-tier structure as it best represents minority 
shareholders and is able to cover the deficit of the general assembly, which already 
transfers some of its powers to the supervisory board. Therefore, this model maximises 
the role of the board of directors which becomes better able to exercise many activities 
towards achieving the targets of corporate governance. This model is extremely 
beneficial in developing countries where there is a not a well-established legal 
environment and a scarcity of supervision, as well as many obstacles preventing the 
shareholders association from playing their role. Furthermore, the two-tier model 
protects the interests of stakeholders more, particularly employees who receive further 
support from the Saudi government. 
The two-tier board structure could be more suitable to the Saudi context, but this does 
not necessarily mean that it is the only way to reform corporate governance in Saudi 
Arabia. Both models of board structure should be revised and improved. The two-tier 
model, for instance, still needs some measures to improve its structure from a corporate 
governance perspective, which could be done by:  
“More clearly defining the responsibilities of supervisory board members. 
Restricting the number of boards on which a supervisory board member may 
sit. Requiring supervisory board members to hold a minimum number of shares. 
Formally soliciting director nominations from shareholders. Encouraging board 
meetings to be held by video conference. These alternatives are based on a 
related set of underlying principles: limiting the power of the executive directors 
and increasing the power of the supervisory board”.390   
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However, the majority of these measures already existed in the Saudi laws of corporate 
governance, which has adopted the one-tier system. And the research will deal with all 
of these measures in its sites in coming topics. 
This research aims to study the principles and characteristics, whether in the one-tier or 
the two-tier model, along with the local circumstances and the legal environment. An 
attempt will then be made to determine which principles are more suitable for the Saudi 
context and which would make it easier to achieve the targets of corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia. These steps are very important in order to improve the corporate 
governance law, according to the real needs and may guarantee a greater chance of 
quality of implementation. 
One of the superior principles that can be derived from the two-tier model is the robust 
system of checks and balances which creates an effective deterrent against abuse of 
power, even if it increases the authority of auditing. The effective implementation of 
this principle is better in the two-tier system where there is a separation between 
managerial and monitoring functions.391 Nevertheless, this feature of a balance of 
power is not exclusive to the two-tier model. It is also possible to detect within the 
structure of the one-tier system, where members of the board of directors are allocated 
to sit on the Audit committee, especially with the continually assessed on the system of 
checks and balances.392 
The Saudi law takes into account this principle as it makes it compulsory for listed 
companies to take the majority of the members of the board of directors’ members from 
non-executive positions.393 Moreover, it requires the board of directors to set up a 
committee using non-executive board members called the ‘Audit Committee’394 along 
with the ‘Nomination and Remuneration Committee’395 and clarifies all of their powers 
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and tasks. These two committees carry out, to a limited extent, a similar task to the 
supervisory board in the two-tier system.396   
There are useful rules and concepts of corporate governance in the German two-tier 
system that can help to reform corporate governance in Saudi Arabia. One of the best 
such practices is giving employees a role in corporate governance which enhances the 
employees’ participation in decision-making without negative impact on shareholder 
influence.397  
On the other hand, the most interesting principle of the unitary system is the integration 
of the managing and monitoring functions in one board of directors.398 The members 
of the Audit committee in one-tier models are playing another role in the process of 
decision-making as they also belong to the boards of directors. This situation helps to 
harmonise the functions of managing and monitoring,399  as well as to create 
opportunities for self-dealing.400 However, it is difficult to deny that the two-tier system 
also performs similar functions to a certain extent.401  
On the whole, it is recommended that Saudi law should be more flexible in allowing 
the adoption of both models of the board of directors in order to give firms an 
opportunity to select which one is more suitable for their needs and circumstances. This 
flexibility is already existed in several countries, such as Italy402 and France, where the 
law offers companies the option to choose the traditional model of the unitary board or 
the alternative board structure of the two-tier board.403  
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It is difficult to ignore the fact that the adoption of the two-tier model is considered as 
a typical solution for numerous specific cases. These can be summed up below:  
• The two-tier board is an effective tool of governance for state-owned firms.404 
Accordingly, public servants are allowed to be members of the supervisory 
board, and it facilitates the political functions of monitoring and managing.405   
• It is extremely beneficial for family companies, especially in cases of succession 
between two generations.406  
• The two-tier model can play a major role in facilitating privatisation in order to 
transfer the control from the state to the private sector.407 
• The two-tier board could help large multinational corporations to make quick 
decisions.408 Moreover, large international companies prefer to make the two-
tier board compulsory for their branches subsidiaries, because they often want 
to exercise more formal control over them.409 Otherwise, it could be said that it 
may help branches to be independent and to liberate them from their parent 
company.410  
• Adopting the two-tier board in a merger between two companies may guarantee 
satisfaction for both parties. It will be able to give each one a leadership 
position, either the head of the directorate or the head of the supervisory 
board.411 
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4.3.2   The Size of the Board of Directors 
Both the Saudi and English company laws require listed companies to be administered 
by multiple directors: no less than three directors under Saudi law,412 and no less than 
two under English law.413 From the point of view of decision-making, which is based 
on voting, determining the minimum number of board members at three or any odd 
number makes more sense than two. The Law of Companies in Saudi Arabia obliges a 
company to specify the number of directors in its bylaws.414 Moreover, if a position on 
the board becomes vacant, the board of directors can appoint a replacement director 
from the top of the list of candidates provided that 5 days’ notice is given to the Ministry 
of Commerce and the CMA for listed companies, as well as adding such appointments 
to the schedule for the next AGM, unless the company constitution states otherwise.415  
However, if the number of directors falls below the minimum prescribed in the law or 
in the company’s bylaws, the remaining directors must convene an AGM within 60 
days.416 
The Saudi law prevents companies from appointing more than eleven directors.417 
However, the data show that in practice the average size of a board of a listed company 
in Saudi Arabia is 8.2 members.418 In England, the Corporate Governance Code 
provides more flexibility. It gives companies the freedom to have a board size which is 
suitable for the requirements of their business provided that it is not so large as to be 
unwieldy.419 
 
There is an inaccurate conventional wisdom, that smaller boards are always better 
boards.420 In fact, larger boards are very suitable for many types of firms; for instance, 
those that have diversified functions or depend on debt financing or rely on specific 
knowledge. These types of companies should adopt a higher fraction of insiders and 
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outsiders on their boards which meet their greater advising requirements by bringing 
more representatives on the board who provide advice and expertise.421 A large board 
contributes to maximising firm value as it is more qualified to collect specialists from 
various functional fields.422 Moreover, the board size is positively correlated with a 
firm’s size. Therefore, large firms require more directors on the board.423  
On the contrary, Guest424 sets out some negative aspects of a large board. In terms of 
communication and coordination issues, there is a greater difficulty in arranging board 
meetings because there are a larger number of directors. This also impacts on reaching 
a consensus which has a negative effect on decision-making. Furthermore, many 
weaknesses appear in a board’s cohesion, such as the board being undermined and an 
ambiguity of purpose. The ‘director free-riding’ problem is another disadvantage that 
results from diffusing the responsibility of monitoring and diluting personal 
responsibility.425 This situation gives managers on large boards a greater opportunity to 
dominate the boards and reduce the monitoring efficiency of the board of directors to 
become merely symbolic.426   
Nevertheless, smaller boards can be more cohesive, more productive, and create a 
perfect environment for monitoring.427 Moreover, a small board encourages each 
member to take personal responsibility for monitoring, whether that is management 
activity or financial statements.428 These advantages drive some studies to identify the 
optimal board size as less than 10 members.429    
However, there are several overlapping factors that impact the size of the board of 
directors not only with regard to firm specific characteristics but also country 
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circumstances. The legal environment and nature of the institution sometimes require a 
particular role and function of a board.430 Moreover, the size of the company and the 
presence of growth opportunities, the firm’s age and ownership structures, the 
diversification of company scope, and complexity of a firm’s operations are greatly 
impact on the board size.431 In addition, the majority of company boards are tailored to 
their unique competitive environment and process. Therefore, restricting board size is 
unlikely to enhance their value.432    
It is worth noting that any regulatory framework that applies to all companies with very 
different needs and subjects them to uniform requirements on board structure could be 
imperfect and lead to redundant and costly monitoring.433 The strong relationship 
between board structure and firm characteristics and environmental conditions should 
mean that each firm is given a choice to select its board size independently.434  
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4.4   Membership of the Board of Directors 
4.4.1   Diversity of the Board Membership    
Depending on affiliations and transactions, directors can be classified into three 
groups:435 First, the executive directors, such as firm officers; Second, the affiliated 
non-executive directors who are not full-time employees of the firm but are associated 
with it in some way, including senior investors in the firm or those providing services 
to it; Third, the independent non-executive directors who are business executives, 
academics, and leading experts from the private or public sectors with some specific 
conditions about their associated with the firm. However, all directors have the same 
powers in the board of directors whatever category they occupy. This applies to 
management decisions and whether or not they belong to the executive directors who 
are involved in the running of the day-to-day business of the company.436    
According to the last published report of the CMA in Saudi Arabia, the percentage of 
independent members’ seats in listed companies’ boards of directors is 50.1%; also, the 
executive members represent 40.1% of total seats in the boards of directors of listed 
companies. Hence, both non-executive and independent members accounted for almost 
90.3% of total seats in the boards of directors of listed companies in 2016.437  
Saudi law obliges firms to clarify in the annual report of the board of directors the 
structure of the board of directors and classify their membership into three levels: 
executive board member, non-executive board member and independent board 
member.438 In a similar manner, the UK Code expressed reservations over a board’s 
decision-taking being dominated by individuals or small groups of individuals. Thus, a 
board of directors should consist of an appropriate combination of executive and non-
executive directors, including independents.439 
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Both regulations in England and those in Saudi require that the nomination of board 
members be subjected to objective criteria which guarantee the appropriate balance of 
capabilities required such as skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the 
company. This variety of experiences and positions of the boards' members and its 
committees allow effective discharging of board duties and responsibilities.440 A 
growing tendency towards putting more standards to selection of membership of the 
board of directors can be observed in corporate governance provisions as they play a 
pivotal role in companies’ activities. These conditions are assumed to have an important 
impact on achieving the goals of corporate governance, especially in the environments 
that face a lack of monitoring institutions for board of directors. 
The regulations in Saudi Arabia and England not only provides some of the required 
standards and conditions of membership for the board of directors but also obliges the 
board of directors to lay down approved policies and standards by the General 
Assembly and specify this issue explicitly. The board of directors should allocate a 
particular committee to hold this nomination and pursuit functions to implement 
them.441 To emphasise this important matter, the UK Code requires those approved 
standards and conditions to be included in the annual report in a separate section,442 as 
well as being available for inspection by any person at the company’s registered office 
during normal business hours and at the Annual General Meeting.443  
 
4.4.2   The General Conditions of the Board Membership  
One of the main powers of the Nomination Committee is to suggest clear policies and 
standards for membership of the board of directors and prepare a description of the 
capabilities and qualifications required,444 as well as the other common conditions 
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related to the personal details of board members, such as age and whether or not they 
have previous criminal convictions etc.445 
The new Saudi CGR, unlike the old one, stipulates some details about the conditions of 
professional competence, experience, knowledge and skill that should be met by every 
individual to be eligible to sit on a board of directors in a listed company. It requires 
the company’s policy to consider five points in particular to ensure the board's duties 
are efficiently discharged and to apply best practices:   
1- Ability and skills of leadership.  
2- Competence, academic qualifications, and proper professional and personal 
skills especially in businesses, management, economics, accounting and law or 
governance.  
3- Ability to guide and strategic and long-term planning as well as 
understanding technical requirements related to the job. 
4- Ability and knowledge of finance.  
5- Physical fitness. 446 
It should be noted that the Saudi Law prevents a member of the board of directors from 
being a board member of more than five joint stock companies at the same time.447 By 
contrast, the UK Corporate Governance Code differentiates between executive and non-
executive members. It prevents a full-time executive director from taking more than 
one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company or the chairmanship of such a 
company.448 Whilst it limits non-executive directors by setting out the expected time 
commitment in the letter of appointment, which should be sufficient to meet what is 
expected of them.449 These logical differences between executive and non-executive 
and between small and large companies need to be considered by Saudi legislators.  
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The principles of corporate governance tend to place limits on the number of multiple 
directorships to avoid the problems of directors becoming too busy and overstretched. 
In such cases, directors would be unable to get involved effectively with many board 
appointments because they would be unable to discharge their monitoring duties. There 
is an inverse relationship between too many multiple directorships and firm value as 
well as the fact that it increases agency costs.450 Limited participation in directorships 
may provide an additional value to a firm. It prompts CEO outside directors to select 
strategically the best board seats offered by many firms for them. They are keen to take 
a place in mature firms that have a favourable trade-off between total expected 
compensation and workload, and also have the same policies and practices of their own 
firm to use their experience and protect their reputations.451  
There are, however, many advantages in multiple directorships whether for individuals 
or companies. This participation enhances the boards as they receive the individual 
benefits from executive experience from elsewhere and gain a broader perspective and 
develop skills and attributes that are relevant. This encourages the sharing and 
dissemination of best practice.452 The appointment of a CEO as an outside director 
enables the firm to take advantage of their status and reputation to certify the firms and 
their appointment and management.453 Therefore, some researchers argue that “the 
stock market reacts more favourably to the appointment of a CEO outside director than 
to the appointment of a non-CEO outside director when the firm has no outside CEO 
on its board”.454   
On a different note, the new Saudi Law of Companies 2015 abolishes a controversial 
condition stipulated in the old Law of Companies for all directors whatever the type of 
directorship they are occupied. The old law required each member of the board of 
directors to own a number of shares whose value is not less than 10,000 Saudi riyals 
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and this remains non-negotiable even after the removal of membership until the lapse 
of the period specified for hearing the action in liability.455    
It could be said that Saudi legislators at that time, to some extent, had sought to involve 
directors in the company’s share ownership to guarantee further protection to 
shareholder interests. There is a different perspective in the English context as there is 
no requirement for any shares to be held by a member of the board of directors. Instead, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code prevents an independent director from owning any 
shares or having any material business relationship with the company.456 This also 
includes the remunerations for non-executive directors which should not include any 
shares. However, “if, exceptionally, options are granted, shareholder approval should 
be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held 
until at least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board”.457 In this 
exceptional case, the non-executive director who owns these approved shares is not 
considered an independent director. Nevertheless, it could be said that executive 
directors have the right to the enjoyment of those business relationships according to 
English context.  
There are several conflicting studies which either support or oppose the ownership of 
shares by board members. A study in favour of this practice is that by Gao and Song458 
which finds that the separation of ownership and management does not always work 
well in joint stock companies. Their empirical analyses by different models find a 
positive relationship between the proportion of shares held by top management and firm 
performance and profitability, whether those shares are owned by managerial 
personnel, board directors or supervisors. It also reflects the convergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders.459 However, meeting highly effective 
performance from using stock options as incentives is dependent on a variety of 
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standards, such as the proportion held and their market value, and the extent that firm 
shares are owned by the state.460 
On the other hand, some negative impacts might arise from board ownership in terms 
of disclosure and transparency. This increases information asymmetry for the managers 
at the expense of other competitors.461 Moreover, giving non-executive directors the 
opportunity to take part of their remuneration in the form of shares may increase the 
chance of an undesirable focus on share price instead of the underlying company 
performance.462  Moreover, the directors who hold shares are concerned about the 
reputational threats associated with increasing information asymmetry. Thus, they may 
reduce their support for managing earnings to protect their reputations.463 
4.4.3   Executive and Non-Executive Directors 
Both Saudi and English regulations allow executive directors, including CEOs, to be 
members of boards of directors and participate with non-executive and independent 
board members on the board’s decision-taking. As Saudi Arabia and the England are 
based on unitary boards, this guarantees that no individual or small group of individuals 
can dominate the board of directors.464  
The new Saudi CGR identifies a criterion that distinguishes the executive from the non-
executive director: a non-executive director is “a member of the Board who is not a 
full-time member of the management team of the company and does not participate in 
its daily activities”.465 This definition deletes the confusing element in the definition 
provided by the old CGR, which adds a clause that states "... or who does not receive 
[a] monthly or yearly salary".466 The final part of that definition may create some 
                                                          
460 Gao, L., and Song, S. (2008). Management Ownership and Firm Performance; Empirical Evidence 
From the Panel Data of Chinese Listed Firms Between 2000 and 2004. Frontiers of Business Research 
in China, 2(3), at 373. 
461 Akhtaruddin, M., and Haron, H. (2010). Board Ownership, Audit Committees’ Effectiveness, and 
Corporate Voluntary Disclosures. Asian Review of Accounting, 18(1), at 72. 
462 Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors. The Department 
of Trade and Industry, sections 12, 27. 
463 Rose, J., Mazza, C., Norman, C., and Rose, A. (2013). The Influence of Director Stock Ownership 
and Board Discussion Transparency on Financial Reporting Quality. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 38(5), at 400. 
464 Sections b and b/1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. And article 90/4 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
465 Article 1 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
466 Article 2/b of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
130 
 
misunderstanding as it might lead to it becoming impossible for a non-executive 
director to exist. This is because all directors, including non-executive directors, receive 
remunerations which could be composed of different parts, such as a lump sum amount, 
attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain percentage of the profits;467 some of 
these remunerations may be paid monthly or annually. 
The principles of corporate governance consider non-executive directors as guardians 
of the firms’ interests and it is felt that they enhance representation of the shareholders 
and stakeholders. They play a major role in monitoring executives and they guarantee 
that the company is acting in a responsible way by sitting on various committees, such 
as duties committee, nominations committee and remuneration committee.468 The 
financial scandals and economic crisis did not prevent executives in many firms from 
receiving large payments, even those that suffered losses or lower profits.469 Therefore, 
one of the top priorities for reforming the legislation related to corporate governance 
should be maximising the representation of outside directors on corporate boards and 
prime committees. These independent directors are qualified to protect shareholder 
interests and stand up to chief executive officers.470 In addition, legal and commercial 
independence of directors is necessary in order to fulfil the monitoring role and 
guarantee the integrity and accountability of firms.471 
It is compulsory for firms in Saudi Arabia to have a board of directors in which non-
executive members represent the majority of the members of the board of directors.472 
This includes the Chairman of the board of directors who is prohibited from holding 
any other executive position in the company.473 According to the new Saudi law, the 
approach of "comply or explain" is no longer available for Saudi listed companies. 
Hence, it is not allowed for a company to have one person occupy the two positions of 
chairman of the board of directors and chief executive officer. The board of directors’ 
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report would then explain the reasons for not implementing the rule as was the case in 
the old CGR.474  Not only that, but the new CGR prevents the chief executive officer 
from being the chairman of the board during the first year following the end of his/her 
service.475 
More realistic rules can be found in English legislation as well as there being stringent 
rules in other parts at the same time; the UK Code distinguishes between large and 
small companies, whereas it requires combining independence and non-executive when 
dealing with the requirement of members. The UK Code requires small firms which are 
below the recent list of the FTSE 350 report to have at least two independent non-
executive directors. In contrast, large firms have to have at least half the board made up 
of independent non-executive directors, excluding the chairman.476 This means that the 
majority of the members of the board of directors in large firms should be independent. 
However, Saudi law differentiates between independent and non-executive directors 
and deals with independence separately and compulsorily. It requires all companies to 
have either two independent members or one-third of the board, whichever is greater.477 
 
4.4.4   Dependent and Independent Directors 
The non-executive director may not necessarily be an independent director. The 
member must meet certain criteria to be considered an independent director. One of the 
main roles of the board of directors is to follow criteria stipulated by the law and to 
clearly define the policies of membership of the board of directors. The board should 
also review these policies annually and evaluate the extent of the member's 
independence. Moreover, the board should consider the details of the relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear relevant to its determination. 
This significant function of the board of directors is stipulated in both the Saudi and 
English regulations.478 
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To guarantee complete independence, the regulations in both Saudi Arabia and England 
lay down strict rules pertaining to independent board members to ensure that they shall 
be able to perform their duties objectively without bias to help the board to make the 
correct decisions. Both sets of laws deal with this case by providing some examples of 
situations and circumstances but they are not limited to them. These situations are 
considered as an infringement of the independence of directors whatever those 
circumstances relate to, whether ownership, leadership or employment. 
By way of example, the Saudi CGR deems any of the following as an infringement of 
the independence of directors:  
- “if he/she holds five percent or more of the shares of the Company or any other 
company within its group; or is a relative of who owns such percentage.   
- if he/she is a representative of a legal person that holds five percent or more of 
the shares of the Company or any company within its group;   
- if he/she is a relative of any member of the Board of the Company, or any other 
company within the Company’s group;  
- if he/she is a relative of any Senior Executive of the Company, or of any other 
company within the Company’s group;  
- if he/she is a Board member of any company within the group of the Company 
for which he/she is nominated to be a Board member.   
- if he/she is an employee or used to be an employee, during the preceding two 
years, of the Company, of any party dealing with the Company or any company 
within its group, such as external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during 
the preceding two years, held a controlling interest in any such parties;  
- if he/she has a direct or indirect interest in the businesses and contracts executed 
for the Company’s account;   
- if the member of the Board receives financial consideration from the Company 
in addition to the remuneration for his/her membership of the Board or any of 
its committees;  
- if he/she engages in a business where he competes with the Company, or 
conducting businesses in any of the company's activities.    
- if he/she served for more than nine years, consecutive or inconsecutive, as a 
Board member of the Company”.479   
Likewise, the UK Code provides several situations that are partly parallel with those in 
Saudi law: 
- “]he/she] has been an employee of the company or group within the last five 
years; 
- ]he/she] has, or has had within the last three years, a material business 
relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, 
director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the 
company; 
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- ]he/she] has received or receives additional remuneration from the company 
apart from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a 
performance related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension 
scheme; 
- ]he/she] has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or 
senior employees; 
- ]he/she] holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors 
through involvement in other companies or bodies; 
- ]he/she] represents a significant shareholder; or  
- ]he/she] has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their 
first election”.480 
The above requirements draw attention to the fact that legislators seek to exclude and 
close any opportunities that create personal interest for independent directors as these 
may create a negative impact on their objective attitudes. The UK Code considers any 
material business relationship with the company an infringement of independence of a 
director without any limitation mentioned except that it must have occurred in the 
preceding three years.481 In comparison, the Saudi legislator has restricted the period to 
the last two years. Moreover, the Saudi law allows independent directors to hold shares 
and it does not prevent all types of business relationships for them.  However, the Saudi 
legislator determines the ownership that breach the independence on limits of owning 
five percent or more of the issued shares of the company or any of its group or those 
who represent a legal person who holds that percentage.482 
 
4.4.5   The Advantages of Non-Executive Directors 
Regardless of the benefits of the monitoring role of non-executive and independent 
directors which aims to protect shareholder interests, the contribution of non-executive 
and independent directors provides additional value to firms. Pass draws attention to 
the four main advantages of non-executive participation: 
The first is the additional value of experience that comes from external business 
expertise. They may have been former executive directors or honourable decision-
makers from the public sector. Moreover, some of them may have a significant 
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background in politics or the government sector which means they can offer good 
advice.483 
Another important benefit is the detachment which comes from not being involved in 
the day-to-day business of the company. They are in a position that allows them to see 
the ‘big picture’, whether of company circumstances or the outside macro-environment. 
This broader outlook assists the board of directors to be more objective when dealing 
with the company’s affairs. Moreover, they are more capable of seeing both the risks 
and the opportunities for the company.484     
Thirdly, firms could widen their network through non-executive directors who come 
from diverse backgrounds of government and academia, for example. Their previous 
contacts may create promising opportunities for corporations with commercial 
benefits.485 
Finally, non-executive directors are considered a perfect tool in terms of making checks 
and balances in cases of conflicts of interest of stakeholders, including the executive 
board, shareholders and employees.486 
 
4.4.6   The Disadvantages of Non-Executive Directors 
In contrast, doubts have been raised about the role of non-executive directors and their 
contributions. In particular, this has occurred after the increasing numbers of corporate 
scandals which created an atmosphere of mistrust in all types of directors. This includes 
non-executive and independent directors as they have sometimes been involved in those 
scandals.487 
There are, however, many disadvantages to non-executive participation on boards of 
directors. Their part-time contribution is considered as the main shortcoming of non-
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executives because they often only meet a few times a year. This remoteness generates 
ineffective internal decision-making processes and insufficiency of information. The 
limited time they are involved does not qualify them to make critical decisions, 
especially those issued by a nomination committee, a remuneration committee and an 
audit committee, which have a majority of non-executives.488  
Another disadvantage is that many non-executive directors sit on several boards in 
different firms at the same time. These multiple directorships can be distracting and can 
mean that one company benefits at the expense of others. Moreover, this situation may 
create divided loyalties.489 
A controversial issue has been raised about the increase in the number and the role of 
non-executive directors and the extent of its compatibility with the unitary board. More 
outsiders, and more power for them, will widen the division between executive and 
non-executive directors which would render the one-tier board an unworkable model.490 
The unitary board relies on collective responsibility and there are limits to what non-
executives can achieve in a part-time role. 
Pass argues that a big criticism of the way non-executives are recruited to the unitary 
board is that it is not like a two-tier board structure which has a separate supervisory 
board consisting of non-executives and other stakeholders such as employees. He 
suggests three procedures that should take place together. Firstly, non-executive 
representation should be tightened up. Secondly, the effectiveness of executive 
directors should be improved by making them directly accountable for their actions by 
law. Thirdly, the role of a company's annual general meeting should be enhanced and 
this would give shareholders more opportunities to express their views.491 
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4.4.7   Membership of the Board of Directors in View of the Saudi Context 
In taking the above drawbacks into account, it can be said that corporate governance 
will not be improved by merely putting regulatory numerical limitations on outside 
directors’ membership. This factor may not prevent CEOs or dominant owners from 
appointing their allies to the board. They may be legally independent directors but they 
can still prove to be unduly sympathetic to the executive directors. This situation may 
create collusion which makes the CEOs powerful and at the same time takes them away 
from the challenges of board monitoring.492 
Evidence supporting this view comes from the US where, since 2003, the law requires 
the majority of the members of the board of directors to be non-executive members; 
this, in practice, has been the case in most firms since 1996.493 In other words, 
increasing the representation of non-executive or independent directors is not new. It in 
fact was common before 2008 yet this was not enough to avoid the financial crisis. 
Therefore, the leaders of some companies believe that there is no commercial 
justification for involving non-executive directors and they cannot rely on them. In 
addition, they also believe that non-executive directors may not have sufficient 
incentives or information to carry out their duties, particularly, those against CEOs.494 
Firms should in fact focus on the circumstances in their environment and appreciate the 
strengths and weaknesses of both insiders and outsiders.495 In addition, the roles of 
outside directors, their relationships and remuneration should be reviewed, and the way 
they are appointed should be improved, in order to better measure the extent of 
dependence, their effectiveness and accountability.496  It is important to bear in mind 
that increasing the number of outside directors on the board will not necessarily 
generate positive effects on performance that are largely free from internal problems. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of outsiders actually relies on the cost of gaining 
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information about the company. Hence, there is an inverse result if the cost of 
information is high with rising numbers of outsiders on the board.497  
It may true that having a board composed entirely of outsiders may not be ideal for a 
company. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that outsiders 
may be better able to evaluate the management of the firm, replacing them if they fail 
to perform well or are involved in misconduct.498 Moreover, ensuring that the company 
is run effectively is a very important role of outside directors as well. They also have a 
strong incentive to demonstrate their skills and competence in the market. Generally, 
independent non-executive directors come from business or academic backgrounds 
where they play respected roles. They are very keen to protect their reputations and 
avoid any function or situation that may negatively impact on them. Likewise, they 
wish to improve their skills by performing as decision-taking managers and raise their 
value as a human capital.499 Thus, success requires a combination of inside and outside 
directors on the board to fulfil the numerous fiduciary duties required.500 
A good recommendation in this case is that careful attention should be paid to the 
purpose of independents’ participation. Hence, if the target of board independence is to 
monitor and discipline executive directors then increasing the board’s independence 
has merit. However, if the purpose of board’s independence is to improve operating 
performance and to maximise value, that will produce negative results.501 It is, 
therefore, very important to take into account the target of board independence and the 
inverse relationship between effectiveness of outside directors and the cost of acquiring 
information, whether that is when firms compose their boards or when corporate 
governance legislation is reformed.  
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In evaluating the debates in a broader context, some researchers502 argue that each of 
these views about outside directors' contributions is plausible, and they are not 
necessarily incompatible. Moreover, all risks mentioned could be legally addressed by 
corporate governance rules and principles. Hence, there is no cause for concern as they 
will be addressed by raising transparency and defining the roles of all types of directors 
clearly. 
Quite rightly, the law makes no distinction between types of directors in terms of 
responsibilities but does recognise that there are differences between the roles of 
executive and non-executive directors. In one-tier boards, it is unrealistic to expect an 
outsider to be fully able to monitor the executive, and be accountable for the ethical 
management of the business, remuneration policy and board composition. These are 
impossible demands on those fulfilling part time roles. Similarly, it is also unrealistic 
to expect that all executives are honest, competent, ethical and committed to the 
business. However, these demands are, in fact, the collective responsibility of the board 
of directors, as they are jointly responsible for all these functions according to the 
law.503   
This chapter has sought to discuss the importance of the existence of outside directors 
and highlight their most important functions. The corporate governance system does 
not consider non-executives as unique champions who are able to solve all board 
problems. However, the corporate governance system provides many rules, principles 
and constraints that, taken together, can deal with most of the shortcomings of both 
non-executive and executive directors. Even if all risks are not eliminated, the 
regulatory efforts in strengthening corporate governance will limit their impact.  
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4.5   The Shadow Director 
The concept of shadow director has a significant standing on directorship provisions 
“for regulating people who exercise indirect influence or control by giving instructions 
or directions to a company's board of directors which the directors are accustomed to 
obey”.504 This concept applies to any individual who controls a company but is 
unwilling to appear to be doing so.505 Working in the shadows allows such an individual 
to avoid any liabilities imposed on official directors, and at the same time enables him 
to act as a director without the concern of disqualification as well as the individual seeks 
to remain unaccountable for his wrongful acts. The shadow director provisions 
therefore have an obvious role in anti-avoidance rationale.506 
The UK Companies Act 2006 defines the shadow director as “a person in accordance 
with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to 
act”.507 Accordingly, there is no an official position of director occupied by a shadow 
director and there is a difficulty to consider such an individual as a de jure or a de facto 
director. However, a shadow director instead usurps either the primary or ultimate 
decision-making functions of the board508  
It should be noted that there are some important criteria for a person to be deemed a 
shadow director. The UK Companies Act 2006 provides some restrictions and 
exceptions for a person to be regarded as a shadow director. For example, a professional 
adviser and a body corporate with its subsidiary companies.509 Therefore, merely giving 
good advice is not sufficient for an individual to be a shadow director even if the board 
follows this advice. The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
provides additional clarifications for advice to be deemed as an instruction:  
“A person is not to be regarded as a shadow director by reason only that the 
directors act (a) on advice given by that person in a professional capacity; (b) in 
accordance with instructions, a direction, guidance or advice given by that 
person in the exercise of a function conferred by or under an enactment; (c) in 
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accordance with guidance or advice given by that person in that person’s 
capacity as a Minister of the Crown”.510   
To sum up, there are two conditions to treat a person who provides instructions or 
directions as a shadow director: First, the instructions provided to the members of the 
board must relate to their activities when they are acting as the board; Another condition 
relates to the manner of receiving those instructions from the board when they follow 
those instructions without independent reflection or discussion.511 
 
4.5.1   Types of Shadow Director 
The usage of the term 'shadow director' does not necessarily imply anonymity or a 
hidden working; there are many positions and ways that may make a shadow director 
able to operate above board.512 Nevertheless, such positions cannot protect them from 
their liability for what they do. According to English law and the above standards, the 
key factor that identifies a shadow director is the exercise of control over the regular 
directors. Consequently, the role of shadow director may easily be filled even by a 
member of the board who exercises control over other directors.513 Furthermore, there 
are many possible influences over the regular directors with examples stemming from 
duress, bribery or social and moral obligations, such as the influence of one partner 
over the other in a marriage.514    
There are overlapping factors that may generate a significant opportunity for someone 
to become a shadow director. Thus, any natural or corporate person could be a shadow 
director if the necessary elements are present. Such elements include the presence of a 
holding company, the owners of a majority of shares and a major creditor or other 
controllers like banks.515 Nevertheless, being a significant investor, such as a major 
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creditor and owner of a majority of shares is not sufficient to be a shadow director as 
long as the individual who occupies one of these positions does not exploit them to 
exercise control over the company board.516 In addition, there is a significant 
controversy over the issue of considering a holding company as a shadow director. 
According to a recent decision, the Court of Appeal upheld a finding that a director of 
a holding company had not become a de facto or shadow director of its subsidiary.517 
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the majority of shareholders have a legal 
ability to influence the management of the company through their real functions in the 
general assembly.518    
 
4.5.2   The Shadow Director from a Legal Perspective 
Legally, the ultimate responsibility for all the company's business remains vested in the 
board of directors, and they cannot escape liability for the company’s decisions 
whatever the justifications.519 However, corporate governance, including provisions of 
shadow director, plays the major role to protect the board of directors from any 
interference and regulate the majority of their relationships with all kinds of officers or 
stakeholders via several legal principles. 
Noonan and Watson draw attention to the causal relationship between the shadow 
director and the actions of the board of directors which allows a shadow director to 
dominate the board. Consequently, the law deals with the liability of the shadow 
director in the light of the duties of directors that have been breached. Therefore, each 
individual director must be aware of the extent of their inescapable personal 
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a member of the board of directors. They 
may be deceived or exploited by the shadow director but allowing this interference to 
happen will put them in breach of their own duties.520 Even so, the legislation aims to 
support the independent decision-making duty of directors, as well as tries to tackle the 
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unfairly detrimental conduct and opportunistic behaviour whatever its source. Thus, the 
shadow director provisions impose liability on shadow directors to pay the costs of their 
wrongful enterprise.521  
It should be recalled that English legislators dealt with the issue of shadow directors 
early on through several pieces of legislation. This provides many provisions whether 
in respect of determining the concept of a shadow director or clarifying their liabilities. 
The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 states that “the general 
duties apply to a shadow director of a company where and to the extent that they are 
capable of so applying”.522 Thus, English law considers and treats a shadow director as 
an officer of the company and imposes on them many provisions and obligations that 
are related to director duties. These include the following: misleading information; 
misleading indication of activities; criminal consequences of failure to make required 
disclosures; making appointments; register of directors; scope and nature of general 
duties; declaration of interest in transactions; transactions requiring members’ 
approval; directors’ service contracts; derivative claims; direction requiring; duty to 
notify registrar of changes; and a company’s annual return.523 There are also many other 
provisions that apply to shadow directors in various company-related statutes, such as 
the Insolvency Act524 and the Company Directors' Disqualification Act.525   
Moreover, the concept of a shadow director and its applications and constituent 
elements have been the subject of extensive commentary and an increasing number of 
high-profile cases before the English courts; for instance, Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry v Deverell, Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding & Ors and Smithton v 
Naggar.526 
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4.5.3   The Shadow Directorship in Saudi Arabian Law 
It can be said that the first mention provided about shadow directors in Saudi law was 
in the new Saudi CGR issued in February 2017. It partly deals with the concept of 
shadow directors without any provisions to hold them responsible for any interference 
in company matters. In the article one, the new CGR provides some definitions 
including the term “Related Parties” which involves 11 parties, including substantial 
shareholders, board members, senior executives and their relatives and so on. Those 
related parties also include “any person whose advice or guidance influence the 
decisions of the company, the board and the senior executives”.527 Despite this 
acceptable definition of the shadow director, there is no further reference to this concept 
in any other articles in the CGR, and there are no requirements made of that person who 
influences the company’s decisions that would make them responsible for their actions. 
Instead, the CGR deals only with the integral concept of “Related Parties” as a whole 
by stipulating some requirements of the board of directors to regulate their relationships 
with “Related Parties”. There are also some articles that require the board of directors 
to set policies to remedy conflicts of interest,528 including dealing with transactions with 
related parties,529 avoiding conflicts of interest,530 disclosing conflicts of interest531 and 
not accepting gifts.532  
By comparison, English legislation has dealt with shadow directorship provisions for a 
century,533 and it distinguishes clearly between a director and a shadow director by 
providing two separate definitions for them.534 Meanwhile, it can be said that Saudi law 
has, unfortunately, not provided any legislation to deal with its provisions. Instead, the 
Saudi CGR places all the responsibilities on the board of directors: 
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“the Board is responsible for the Company’s business even if it delegates some 
of its powers to committees, individuals or other third parties. In any case, the 
Board may not issue a general or an open-ended delegation”.535 
Consequently, according to Saudi law the term ‘shadow director’ does not take on the 
appearance of a director in any shape or form in Saudi law and does not have any legal 
name or position of de jure directors that is controlled by Saudi law. However, this 
absence of legislation does not negate the existence of practices and applications of 
shadow directorship which might impact and control several companies in Saudi Arabia 
indirectly. This particular influence of a circuitous nature is problematic and needs 
appropriate mechanisms to address it. Hence, Saudi law should introduce express 
statutory provisions to regulate shadow directors. These desired legislations will assist 
to control any individual who exercises an actual influence over the board of a company 
and make them accountable for such interference. 
This crucial legislation is a highly recommended, especially in developing countries 
where a culture of participation, transparency and accountability are lacking in many 
respects. The political structure in some of these countries creates the perfect 
environment for the persistence of class divisions where power, money and influence 
are concentrated in the hands of certain groups in society. Corporate governance is in 
its infancy in many developing countries, including Saudi Arabia, and so it suffers from 
inadequate legislative, judicial, investment and supervisory settings. There is also a lack 
of independent media and strategies for combating corruption.536 
Idensohn summarises the advantages and achievable targets that may be met by 
enacting legislations to regulate the shadow directorship: 
“Responding to current international calls for better corporate governance 
practices in a way that correlates legal responsibility and accountability with 
sufficiently significant actual influence or control. It may also have economic 
benefits in the form of improved corporate management, and in providing 
claimants who suffer loss as the result of a shadow director's influence with an 
additional defendant to pursue, especially if that additional defendant is one 
with greater financial resources. Perhaps more compelling is the sense of 
unfairness about allowing shadow directors to exercise real power and control 
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over companies and yet avoid directors' duties and responsibilities simply by 
acting through a number of intermediaries”. 537  
In the Saudi context, there is an urgent need to enact legislation to deal with shadow 
directors and strongly deter their practices. Such legislation should keep pace with 
increased global legislative developments in this regard, such as the recent English law 
of Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. This law contains several 
measures against shadow director practices and amends some sections in the 
Companies Act 2006. For example, the CA 2006 leaves the determination of duties and 
potential liability of shadow directors to the English courts with some restrictions from 
English common law and the principles of equity.538 However, the recent law imposes 
directors' duties on shadow directors without those restrictions.539  Moreover, it requires 
every company to keep a register of people with a significant control over the 
company.540 
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4.6   Female Representation on Boards of Directors 
Increasing diversity in the board of directors is a significant way of enlarging the pool 
of talent and attracting business as a result of the fact that different classes and people 
come with different skills and talents. Moreover, it is a solution to the continuing 
problem of discrimination.541 Gender diversity and equality is still an issue on boards 
of directors. It has received increasing attention both in academia and in the legislature 
as the majority of board members are male, even in Europe.542    
Poor female representation on corporate boards of directors is still a global 
phenomenon. For example, in Scandinavian countries females take up between 27% 
and 40% of the board positions available543 whereas in Western countries women 
comprise about 15% of corporate board members and only 0.2% in some Asian 
countries.544   
 
4.6.1   The Arguments in Support of an Imposed Quota 
Terjesen and Singh545 discuss some reasons for the increased attention to issues of 
gender inequality and support the presence of women in corporate boards as well as 
introducing quotas for women. First, the current demographic profile of the workforce 
and the fact that women are joining the labour force in increasing numbers and which 
now probably outnumber men. Second, the corporate scandals which caused 
amendments to corporate governance laws regarding the structures and the need to 
increase board diversity, including gender representation. Third, this situation has been 
affected by an increasing proportion of women in parliaments as is the case in more 
than 40 countries where quotas for women have been introduced.  
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Scandinavian countries are considered leaders in adopting a strict quota system, 
particularly in Norway where legislation requires a 40% female representation on 
corporate boards with severe penalties for non-compliance, including corporate 
termination. Similar quota measures are now under serious consideration at the 
European level and several other countries are observing the outcomes carefully.546   
There are numerous benefits to gender diversity on boards. Mathisen et al547 summarise 
some of these advantages. The first advantage is relevant with morality and justice, a 
result of applying quotas, which create a balance on equal opportunities for women and 
other minorities. Second, diversity promotes the value of organisations and their 
resource-dependence as a result of containing the different voices on their boards. This 
will assist them to widen their expertise and expand individual networking with other 
organisations. Widening relations may also increase the organisations' survival odds 
and resource acquisition.548 Third, a variety of perspectives and differences that come 
from gender diversity may bring more benefits to companies. Particularly, on the view 
argues that women are better on cross-cultural awareness and transformational 
leadership skills.549    
Other researchers consider gender diversity as an indicator of the extent of the 
democratisation of the elite social networks which enhances the board culture.550 Larkin 
et al551 argue that women tend to promote ethical behaviour and increased transparency 
within organizations. Thus, increasing female representation on corporate boards could 
indicate that companies are ethical and transparent. This will improve a corporation’s 
image and enable firms to obtain the investors’ trust as well as attracting a wider range 
of qualified individuals.552 Moreover, a company is deemed to be a corporate citizen 
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with full responsibility for both society and its surrounding environment. Therefore, 
gender diversity reflects the corporation’s values in this area.553 According to Williams, 
female directors are better able to enrich a board of directors in specific fields such as 
law, education, or non-profit activities, as well as being more aware of corporate social 
responsibility compared to male directors.554   
 
4.6.2   Gender Diversity in the England 
In England, the government’s ambition is to achieve gender parity on boards and raise 
the female numbers in business.555 The UK Code has not yet introduced quotas for 
women but requires and emphasises gender diversity in the corporate boards through 
several sections, such as: “There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure 
for the appointment of new directors to the board”.556 , “... should be conducted, and 
appointments made on merit, against objective criteria and with due regard for the 
benefits of diversity on the board, including gender”.557, “... A separate section of the 
annual report ... should include a description of the board’s policy on diversity, 
including gender”.558 and “... Evaluation of the board should consider the balance of 
skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company on the board, its 
diversity, including gender”.559  
It is worth noting the significant role played by the Davies recommendations in 
increasing female representation on firms' boards in the UK. Lord Davies was 
appointed by the government and supported by a Steering Committee of experts from 
business and academia. Doldor and his colleagues argue that a precipitating jolt for 
institutional change has occurred and the national debate on women on boards changed 
after the 2011 Davies Review. It set a change agenda and outlined a national strategy 
for women being appointed onto boards, with a target of 25% for FTSE 100 boards by 
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2015. Furthermore, the Davies Report recommended that a Voluntary Code of Conduct 
should be drafted up to ensure more gender-inclusive board appointments. These 
measures enabled accountability and coordination across key players and constant 
monitoring by the Steering Committee. As a result, the percentage of women on FTSE 
100 boards doubled between 2011 and 2015, and more than 30% of new board 
appointments were taken up by women.560 
The Third Report of Session 2016–17 of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee recommends that the Financial Reporting Council should amend the UK 
Corporate Governance Code to promote gender equality and ethnic diversity on 
boards.561 It recommends: 
"that the Government should set a target that from May 2020 at least half of all 
new appointments to senior and executive management level positions in the 
FTSE 350 and all listed companies should be women. Companies should 
explain in their annual report the reasons why they have failed to meet this 
target, and what steps they are taking to rectify the gender inequality on their 
Executive Committees".562 
Some researchers believe that the corporate culture in some European countries such as 
Norway is by its nature more accepting of imposing quotas than might be possible in 
England.563 Choudhury argues that quotas rely on societal consensus regarding the 
importance of gender equality as a public norm in society. This idea already existed in 
Norway but does not necessarily have comparable importance elsewhere. He also states 
that:  
“… some important differences between Norway and the UK suggest that the 
effectiveness of the quota system in Norway will likely not be able to be 
replicated in the UK. For example, gender equality is the prevailing norm in 
Norway. Indeed, the need to bolster its already prominent international 
reputation for gender equality was one of the reasons the quota laws were 
introduced in the first place. Norwegian political tradition has similarly 
emphasised gender equality, although mainly in the public sector, through 
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measures designed to encourage female employment or to promote work family 
reconciliation”.564   
 
4.6.3   The Arguments Against Imposed Quotas 
Several European countries have struggled to make substantial changes to increase the 
number of women on boards. Therefore, many of them have adopted the approach of 
imposing regulations prescribing quotas of different percentages. These countries have 
had varying levels of success but the highest outcome was achieved by Norway with 
its 40% quota for female representation on boards. This indicates that there are different 
overlapping circumstances that may have an impact on this issue. For example, the 
presence of state-owned firms, the extent of state intervention on boards, their 
composition and the ability to impose stringent sanctions for non-compliance. 
Furthermore, success depends on the amount of effort made and the capability of plan 
completion.565 
There is no consensus on the suitability of the enforcement of quotas, even in the EU. 
Opposition to it is broad and fierce, particularly standing against those who stipulate a 
minimum quota of female board members (3 or more or 33 percent or more) as they 
argue that merely female participation is not sufficient.566 There is also more extreme 
demand which stipulates that women must constitute at least 40 percent of the board.567   
German Minister Kristina Schröder is a supporter of women's participation on boards. 
She argues that specific female characteristics influence firm performance positively. 
However, she also criticises coercive quotas which reduce the value of individual 
achievement and merit. She said, “I think it is absurd to impose a uniform quota on very 
different companies ... On the surface, a quota may stimulate fairness but it tends to 
exacerbate unfairness for individuals rather than eliminate it … I once benefited from 
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a quota, people still smugly hold this against me today as if my abilities hadn’t counted 
at all at the time. Many women have had the same experience.”568 Generally, no one 
wants to be patronised and would prefer to be appointed on merit as they want their 
achievements and successes to be ascribed to them.569 Thus, gender diversity should be 
considered under the criterion of supply and demand.570  
A number of studies have cast doubt on the positive effects of female representation on 
boards, especially in terms of corporate performance. They argue that there has been 
insufficient investigation into the mechanisms that underlie these inconclusive results. 
They give some negative aspects of imposed female quotas, such as the privileging of 
groups over individuals and the undermining of equality of opportunity. Moreover, 
adopting female only quotas occurs at the expense of ignoring other more pressing 
social problems.571 The arguments for gender board diversity are similar to other 
cultural and racial types of diversity. Thus, the steps recommended to promote gender 
diversity may also be valid to create many of the conditions necessary for other types 
of board diversity such as culture, age, occupation, or race.572  
Quotas would not by themselves be sufficient and are unable to resolve the problem of 
gender imbalance on their own. Emphasising coercive quotas may lead to the tokenistic 
recruitment of women without any genuine positive impact.573 Many factors that limit 
women’s participation need to be considered besides gender parity laws. Moreover, 
several variable circumstances are playing a major role in the ascendance of females to 
the corporate board, including levels of education, distributions of household tasks 
within families and preferences of working hours.574   
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4.6.4   Imposing Female Quota in View of the Saudi Context 
Two significant aspects here need to be specified. The first is relevant to the 
fundamental target of gender diversity and quotas. From this context there are two 
potential goals: meeting gender parity or improving corporate governance. Dealing 
with one of these goals does not necessarily entail improving the other575 and each of 
them must be approached in a specific manner as they are influenced by overlapping 
factors.576 McCann and Wheeler try to identify the main goal of gender diversity and 
quotas as well. They say, “Women should be appointed as NEDs [Non-Executive 
Directors] as an issue of social justice and in recognition of their economic 
participation, not because it might be good or is thought to be good for business”.577   
According to Fitzsimmons the female quota serves only the numbers themselves rather 
than benefits to the organisation. This tokenism resulted through forcing companies “to 
put women on their boards’ members and outsiders alike assume they are forced to do 
so because it is detrimental. Given that boards’ purpose is to provide oversight and 
guidance to organisations, companies should pursue wider breadth of experience and 
opinions toward the end of improving governance, not for social justice reasons”.578 
The UK Corporate Governance Code clearly provides rules and standards to improve 
the conduct of firms and guarantee diversity on the boards including skills, experience, 
independence, knowledge and gender.579 Despite this legislation looking to support 
gender diversity the priority diversity in this context is still built according to objective 
criteria on merit, not gender. The UK Code clearly states that “The search for board 
candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against objective 
criteria ...”.580  
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The second important aspect is related to the function of law towards any kind of 
minority. Is the role of law to protect the minority participation or impose coercive 
participation? In other words, laws in general seek to guarantee justice and parity for 
all people by making sure that all have the same rights and there are no barriers 
preventing anyone from taking opportunities. This, however, does not mean that law 
could provide any extra privileges to a particular group. There are several laws that 
protect against discrimination especially in terms of gender, such as the Work and 
Families Act 2006 and the Equality Act 2010. A woman could use these to challenge 
her non-appointment to the board of directors if she feels discriminated against by the 
nomination committee, or any part of appointment procedures. 581   
Villiers argues that "the result is that the legislation does not assist women effectively 
at the higher levels for which tribunal challenges are rare ... despite the existence of the 
Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the reality remains that 
women receive an overall average of 22.6% less pay than men, and they face 
occupational segregation and glass ceilings".582 If this is the case, enacting further laws 
may be insufficient to tackle the dilemma of non-compliance and misconduct. Instead, 
creating further measures of monitoring or implementation and improving the 
procedures for women to get their rights seems more effective. 
In conclusion, women in Saudi Arabia are welcome in boards of directors and are not 
discriminated against.583 There are no specific provisions based on gender in corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, but the law requires the board of directors to lay down 
specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for the membership of boards 
of directors.584 Moreover, the law emphasises the importance of an annual review of 
the requirements of suitable skills for membership of the boards of directors and the 
preparation of a description of the required capabilities and qualifications for such 
membership.585  
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However, as a result of several overlapping factors of political and social systems in 
Saudi Arabia, there are many weaknesses on legislations in terms of popular 
participation and the participation in decision-making either in political or civilian 
sectors, which have currently a wide debate to reform. Apart from the context of 
corporate governance, there are shortcomings in particular parts of human rights 
legislation, especially in terms of gender. For instance, women in Saudi Arabia are still 
prevented from driving. Therefore, it is too early in the Saudi context to discuss quotas 
in corporate boards for social target. Many other legal reforms need to be given priority 
first. 
 
4.7   Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the composition of the board of directors, the appointment of its 
members and its tenure, as well as its structure, types and size in Saudi Arabia in the 
light of English law and global standards of corporate governance. It also reviewed 
some international experiences in this regard which may be appropriate to the Saudi 
context and capable of helping it to achieve the objectives of corporate governance. The 
chapter studied in depth the most common traditional models of boards of directors, 
which are the one-tier system and the two-tier system, to discover their main features 
that may be appropriate to the Saudi context and capable of facilitating the mechanisms 
of corporate governance needed. It also discussed the diversity of board membership 
and the role of executive, non-executive, dependent and independent directors. The 
provision of shadow directors received substantial attention as did female 
representation on boards of directors. 
A number of suggestions have been provided to reform Saudi law related to board size, 
conditions and the tenure of directorships in the light of English practice. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code considers the different circumstances of firms and 
distinguishes between large and small companies when it deals with these issues. 
Moreover, it is recommended that Saudi law should be more flexible, similar to some 
European countries, in allowing the adoption of either the unitary system or the two-
tier system, in order to give firms an opportunity to select which one is more suitable 
for their needs and circumstances. Separately, the chapter strongly recommends adding 
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proper rules to Saudi legislation to deal with shadow directors to prevent them from 
interfering. 
Whilst this chapter makes an attempt to reform the rules related to the composition of 
the board of directors, the next chapter will try to review the Saudi legislation that 
regulates the roles and relationships of the board of directors with internal entities and 
actors in the company. Raising the effectiveness of the board of directors, general 
assembly and board committees will help companies deal with the deficiencies in the 
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5.1   Introduction       
In chapter three, the prominent characteristics of the legal, political and economic 
environment in Saudi Arabia were discussed as well as the Saudi new vision and the 
national transformation programme, which aim to rapidly create a comprehensive 
privatisation programme. These characteristics raise significant concerns in terms of 
corporate governance which relies on a number of fundamental bodies and principles 
of democracy such as participation, transparency, accountability, and the presence of 
an independent media and civil oversight institutions. Such an environment also draws 
attention to the importance of the internal corporate structure, including the board of 
directors, which is the central aspect that needs to be considered when reviewing the 
corporate governance system in the Saudi context. 
This chapter will try to review the Saudi legislation that regulates the roles and 
relationships of the board of directors with internal entities and actors such as the 
shareholders’ general assembly, board meetings and board committees in the light of 
corporate governance in English law and global standards. The intention is to make 
some recommendations about the role and relationships of the board of directors that 
will contribute to enriching the respective laws in the form of greater detail, flexibility 
and enforceability, thus reforming and developing them. 
It should be noted here that it is impossible for this research to cover all aspects of the 
board of directors and its duties and responsibilities. Instead, this chapter will focus on 
the roles and relationships of the board of directors that are linked with the main 
question of this research. Moreover, it will try to cover the vital issues that will help a 
company to deal with the deficiencies in the Saudi political, legal and economic 
environment which can be found in English law and global standards. The research will 
not discuss, for example, the detailed duties of the board of directors and the 
relationship of the board of directors with the CEO. Moreover, it will not cover the 
measures that ensure the quality of law enforcement and provisions related to breaches 
of corporate governance rules, negligence and abuse. 
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5.2   The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (AGM) 
5.2.1   The Importance of the Annual General Meeting in the Saudi Context 
The term ‘annual general meeting’ (AGM) can be described as a gathering of the 
shareholders of a company with those who are entitled to attend586 in order to achieve 
certain goals and to make particular decisions. This compulsory annual meeting usually 
involves agreeing to the major actions of last year and on future actions and prospects. 
The AGM discussions cover specifics such as signing off the accounting year, 
considering whether the firm's goals were achieved as planned, and examining director 
accountability and electing new ones.587  Moreover, determining the company's main 
direction should be done in the AGM as well as other fundamental issues such as 
compensation of executives, takeover plans and distribution of profits.588 
Running a corporation involves complicated operations and decisions that need to be 
decided on quickly by the board and management team. Therefore, it is impossible to 
manage the corporation through shareholder referendums as shareholders have 
different capabilities, interests, aims and investment tendencies.589 Hence, by law, 
directors alone have the ultimate responsibility for the company's affairs, therefore, they 
are entitled to exercise all powers required.590     
The role of the AGM from the legal perspective is not to abolish the concept of 
separation of ‘ownership and control’ but to act as a vehicle to monitor the conduct of 
directors, which creates a ‘checks and balance’ mechanism within the firm. The 
administrative authority remains with the board of directors while the shareholders have 
                                                          
586 Pettet, B., Lowry, J., and Reisberg, A. (2009). Pettet's Company Law; Company and Capital Markets 
Law (3rd ed.). New York: Pearson Longman, at 144. 
587 Catasús, and Johed. (2007). Annual General Meetings—Rituals of Closure or Ideal Speech 
Situations?. A Dual Analysis. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 23(2), at 186. And see, Martinez-
Blasco, M., Garcia-Blandon, J., and Argiles-Bosch, M. (2015). Does the Informational Role of the 
Annual General Meeting Depend on a Country’s Legal Tradition?. Journal of Management and 
Governance, 19(4), at 850. 
588 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 762- 763. And 
see, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles II/c, at 23. 
589 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles II, at 19. 
590 Article 75/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See also, Pettet, B., 
Lowry, J., and Reisberg, A. (2009). Pettet's Company Law; Company and Capital Markets Law (3rd 
ed.). New York: Pearson Longman, at 142. 
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the ability to prevent managers from perpetrating abuses to the detriment of their 
interests. Beyond that, the shareholders in that meeting have a right to appoint or 
remove the board of directors or any single member by a simple majority vote of the 
shareholders.591  
The democratic mechanisms of leadership, control and accountability are the ideal way 
to identify and reconcile the diverse interests of the parties as well as ensure 
administrative efficiency, accountability and public scrutiny.592 Therefore, discussing 
accountability issues of shareholders and management in a face-to-face encounter is 
part of social practice and democratic life which company law and corporate 
governance are very dependent on.593  
Meetings are the backbone of democracy as they are the setting where people can 
debate decisions that may affect every member in their society, determine the will of 
the majority as well as probe leaders’ accountability. This also applies to a company as 
it is a specific society where all members have the right to attend and vote for all 
decisions at the general meeting including appointments where members of the board 
of directors can be removed.594 Therefore, the relationship and interaction between 
shareholders and board of directors and the different agencies of these two parties are 
the substantial matters in the corporate governance discourse. Their recurring 
communications are officially can be done in the AGM which is an important element 
in any effective corporate governance system.595  
These relationships and effective interactions in the AGM in the Saudi context are 
extremely important because the actors do not have experience of democratic practices 
in the political sphere and there are no civilian bodies that monitor companies’ 
performance. Moreover, the ownership structure is concentrated in the large listed 
companies. A further issue is that the listed companies fall under the supervision of the 
                                                          
591 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 762- 763. 
592 Apostolides, N. (2007). Directors Versus Shareholders: Evaluating Corporate Governance in the UK 
Using the AGM Scorecard. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), at 1277. 
593 Pettet, B., Lowry, J., and Reisberg, A. (2009). Pettet's Company Law; Company and Capital Markets 
Law (3rd ed.). New York: Pearson Longman, at 148. 
594 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 763.  
595 Catasús, and Johed. (2007). Annual General Meetings—Rituals of Closure or Ideal Speech 
Situations?. A Dual Analysis. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 23(2), at 169- 170. 
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CMA which has its own jurisdiction and it is not subject to the jurisdiction of 
commercial courts.596 These increase the importance of the role of AGMs and the need 
to raise the efficiency of the AGM as it is an essential firewall and a useful tool for 
shareholders to practice their rights and protect their interests. 
Even in developed countries, the AGM has a prominent place as a self-regulatory of 
corporate governance instruments and governments emphasise its value in reining in 
the excesses of corporate conduct.597 Enhancing for compliance with rules and 
following good corporate governance practices should arise from the company itself 
through the collective acts of those who have direct interests rather than the 
government. A well-run AGM is more capable than any other mechanism to compel 
directors to act prudently and implement both statutory and non-statutory 
regulations.598  
 
5.2.2   Facilitating Attendance of the AGM 
There are some factors that reduce the effectiveness of the AGM as a vital vehicle of 
corporate governance. Some of these have arisen due to the separation of ownership 
and control which created more dispersion of ownership and less shareholder control 
over the company. This is because a single shareholder usually holds only a small 
percentage of the overall voting shares. Moreover, there are insufficient incentives and 
instruments to encourage shareholders who are spread across a wide geographical area 
to pay the attendance costs or monitor directorial conduct.599  
                                                          
596 See chapter three. 
597 Apostolides, N. (2007). Directors Versus Shareholders: Evaluating Corporate Governance in the UK 
Using the AGM Scorecard. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), at 1277- 1278. And 
see, Martinez-Blasco, M., Garcia-Blandon, J., and Argiles-Bosch, M. (2015). Does the Informational 
Role of the Annual General Meeting Depend on a Country’s Legal Tradition?. Journal of Management 
and Governance, 19(4), at p 850. 
598 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 763. 
599 Dignam, A., and Lowry, John P. (2014). Company Law (8th ed., Core text series). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 288. 
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This may create the impression to shareholders that the AGM itself is a ritual and all 
crucial matters have been decided in advance.600 Indeed, statistics show that the vast 
majority of shareholders may be indifferent to the AGM, both in terms of attending and 
voting, especially when the company is not in financial difficulties.601 Instead, 
shareholders in listed companies whether individuals or institutions tend to focus much 
more upon investment returns as the principal concern. They usually diversify their 
investments, dividing them among several companies. When there is any instability, 
they prefer to sell their shares and leave.602   
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that shareholders' limited power may 
become very efficient if they act collectively through the AGM. However, certain 
things need to be in place in the general assembly in order to achieve this ambition. The 
first is efficient communication which could be boosted by facilitating attendance of 
shareholders, obtaining information and allowing questions and debates. The second is 
effective exercise of voting rights whether in person or by proxy, which determines the 
fate of the management team. These will assist the company to monitor the managers 
effectively and to pass well-informed resolutions.603  
The principal role in a successful AGM is played by the board of directors as it is the 
body who calls for the convening of the annual general meeting. The board of directors 
must call the AGM annually in the first 6 months after the accounting reference date, 
as well as in a number of specific situations, such as when the board of directors 
receives a meeting request from the firm’s auditor or the audit committee, or from 
shareholders who hold at least 5% of the company’s shares604 – or even 2% of them in 
some certain circumstances through the capital market authority.605 Moreover, it is 
compulsory for the board of directors to call shareholders to the extraordinary general 
                                                          
600 Catasús, and Johed. (2007). Annual General Meetings—Rituals of Closure or Ideal Speech 
Situations?. A Dual Analysis. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 23(2), at 172. 
601 Apostolides, N. (2007). Directors Versus Shareholders: Evaluating Corporate Governance in the UK 
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603 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 765- 767. 
604 Article 90/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
605 Ibid, article 90/3. 
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meeting (EGM) when the company’s losses have reached 50% of its capital.606 The 
general assembly is managed by the chairman of the board of directors who is also 
responsible for calling shareholders to the AGM, sending the topics and the itinerary of 
the meeting and preparing the drafts of decisions.607 One of the main roles of the board 
of directors in this context is to maximise the attendance and contributions of 
shareholders in the AGM, particularly minority shareholders. This has a high priority 
in Saudi listed companies where ownership and control are highly concentrated in the 
State and its founding families.608 
The complexity of accounting reports is one of the things that discourages shareholders 
from entering into discussions on accountability and prevents them from attending the 
AGM at all.609 The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance draw attention to this 
important point of facilitation in the information obtaining. It recommends simplifying 
and summarising the reports and information sent to investors and clarifying the 
policies and standards that regulate the issues that will be discussed in the AGM, such 
as the standards of managers' remunerations, and the biographical information and 
experience (CVs) of candidates for membership of the board of directors. Moreover, 
the OECD Principles recommend taking into account in the AGM agenda the rights of 
minority shareholders to discuss some information and topics that impact on their 
interests.610 
Further ways to facilitate shareholder involvement can be found in the OECD 
suggestions which encourage shareholder participation in the AGM. Improvements 
have been made by some companies which enable shareholders to submit questions in 
advance of the AGM so that adequate replies to them may be given by the board of 
directors or management.611 
                                                          
606 Ibid, article 105/1. 
607 Ibid, articles 86/1 and 90. 
608 The World Bank, February 2009, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Country 
Assessment, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p1, 4. 
609 Catasús, and Johed. (2007). Annual General Meetings—Rituals of Closure or Ideal Speech 
Situations?. A Dual Analysis. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 23(2), at 170.  
610 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles II/ c-4, at 22-23. 
611 Ibid, Principles II/ c-3, at 22. 
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Proper arrangements should be made by the board of directors to encourage 
shareholders to take a place in the AGM. The first step is to announce the meeting 
which shall be done, under Saudi law, at least 10 days before the meeting date through 
a daily newspaper in the territory of the company’s headquarters or by individual 
recorded mail.612 English law gives shareholders the longer period of at least 21 days 
between the notice of call and the meeting date so that they have sufficient time to 
prepare themselves.613 It also provides greater convenience to shareholders by allowing 
the notice of AGM to be called through electronic means.614 This modern means of 
calling shareholders to AGMs was only recently offered in the new Saudi CGR of 
2017,615 bringing it in line with the new Saudi law of companies 2015, which even 
allows the AGM to be conducted via modern means of communication.616 However, 
the new CGR does not address a similar issue arising from the Saudi Law of Companies 
2015 which requires the shareholder, who wishes to attend the AGM, to register his 
name at the headquarters of the company before the meeting date, unless the company 
constitution provides another way or place for registration.617 This should be revised to 
be compatible with article 86 mentioned above, which allows the AGM to be held by 
means of modern technology. The registering of the names of the shareholders who 
want to attend the AGM is more need to be done by modern technology than holding 
the meeting. 
Text messages could be used to call shareholders as they are the fastest and most direct 
way to reach people wherever they are. Especially in Saudi Arabia, where the 
government recognises that the text messages are an official way to call people, as well 
as there are several legal responsibilities and banking and governmental services linked 
with mobile phone numbers. This is due to the fact that all mobile phone numbers in 
Saudi Arabia are recorded with a personal ID and finger print.618 
                                                          
612 Articles 90, 91 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
613 Section 307(2) of the Companies Act 2006. 
614 Ibid, section 338(4). 
615 Articles 12/b of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
616 Article 86 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
617 Article 92 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
618 The Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC) ordered all mobile phone 
service providers in Saudi Arabia to enforce fingerprint authentication on all customers starting from 
21.1.2016. It also gave current customers a period to do so and to link their mobile phone numbers with 
their ID cards, including their national ID number. Failure to comply would result in service being 
completely cut off on 2.6.2016. This decision was made in accordance with a directive from the Ministry 
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The tendency toward further facilitating the needs of the company sector can be 
observed in new Saudi Law of Companies issued in 2015 whose aim is to increase the 
corporate contribution to the national economy. It removes several barriers and reduces 
the costs and procedures previously imposed on companies. For example, according to 
the new Saudi Law of Companies, the percentage of shareholder representation in the 
AGM must reach one quarter or more of the company’s capital value to be valid. If the 
percentage is lower, the law gives the company the right to convene another AGM 
within a month, regardless of the percentage of shareholders represented then. In 
addition, this alternative meeting can be held only one hour after the essential AGM 
provided that this alternative meeting has been mentioned in the statement of calling 
and the company constitution allows this action.619 In contrast, the previous law 
required the announcement of the meeting to be done at least 25 days before the meeting 
date, unlike the new law which stipulates only 10 days.620 Also, the meeting may not 
be valid if attended by shareholders representing less than one half of the company’s 
capital. If so, the alternative meeting cannot be held on the same day according to the 
old law.621 In practice, according to the last report issued in 2016, 53.4% of AGMs of 
Saudi listed firms were convened validly from the first meeting whilst 46.6% of AGMs 
needed a second meeting to be convened successfully.622 
 
The new law also provides some simplifications to shareholder participation and further 
protection for their rights. It gives any shareholder the right to attend an AGM 
regardless of the number of shares he holds623 rather than at least 20 shares required by 
the previous law.624 The new law minimises the loss ratio of capital of a company which 
necessitates an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders from 75% in the old law to 
50%. Furthermore, the new law expands the use of modern means of communication, 
which increases the potential for shareholder participation.625 
                                                          
of the Interior and also covered visitors and tourists. See the official CITC website:  
http://www.citc.gov.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on 7/2/2017. 
619 Ibid, article 93. 
620 See the previous Law of Companies1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, article 88. 
621 Ibid, article 91. 
622 See the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia, Annual Report 2016, at p. 87. 
623 Article 86/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
624 See the previous Law of Companies1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, article 88. 
625 Article 86/3 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Further simplifications and protection for shareholder rights can be found in the new 
Saudi CGR issued on 13th February 2017, which stipulates that one of the main 
functions and powers of the board of directors is “developing effective communication 
channels allowing shareholders to continuously and periodically review the various 
aspects of the company's business as well as any material developments”.626 The new 
CGR requires a company to announce on the stock market website all of the information 
about the nominees for the membership of the board. This shall include their 
experience, qualifications, skills and previous and current memberships and jobs. This 
information shall also be made available in the company's head office and on its 
website.627 Moreover, the new CGR requires that the invitation to the AGM, the items 
of its agenda, the reports of the board, the external auditor, audit committee and 
financial statements be made available to shareholders on the websites of both the 
company and the stock market to enable them to make an informed decision in this 
regard.628 These websites play another role in making the nomination announcement 
according to the new CGR. They should serve as a means to invite any person who 
wishes to be nominated to the membership of the board. The invitation shall remain 
open for at least a month.629 
 
5.2.3   Modern Means of Communication and the AGM 
Using modern means of communication may play a vital role in maximising 
shareholder participation, enabling them to observe their investments more closely and 
protect their interests. Hence, the traditional concept of a meeting needs to be widened 
and developed in accordance with the demands of the modern business environment 
and advancements in information and communication technology. A valid meeting no 
longer relies on the physical presence of all members in the same meeting room. The 
modernised concept of ‘virtual presence’ offers a borderless world where a meeting can 
be held and decisions can be made in separate locations or even without any physical 
place. This flexible platform is a useful way to accelerate decision-making procedures 
                                                          
626 Articles 22/12 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
627 Articles 8/a of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
628 Articles 14/c of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
629 Articles 68 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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and simplify complicated materials for even unsophisticated shareholders through 
using graphics, sound and video.630 Holding an AGM through this method reduces the 
costs of the meeting for both shareholders and the company. It minimises the difficulty 
in travelling and its expenses for shareholders wishing to attend the meeting and saves 
the company money that it spends printing the circulating documents.631  
The Saudi CGR 2017 requests companies to use the most effective and hi-tech means 
in communicating with shareholders and facilitating the exercise of their rights and 
accessing information. It also emphasises that arrangements must be made for 
facilitating the participation of the greatest number of shareholders in the AGM.632 
Furthermore, Saudi new Law of Companies 2015 clearly stipulates that the AGM can 
be held through modern means of communication. This would also allow shareholders 
to get involved in deliberations and voting on the meeting's decisions according to the 
regulations laid down by the concerned authority, the CMA.633 
This is compatible with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance which greatly 
support effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions.634 
Moreover, the Principles recommend the enlarged use of information technology in 
voting including electronic voting in absentia. Also, processes and procedures for the 
AGM should not be made unduly difficult or expensive for shareholders, thus 
preventing them from casting their votes.635 The electronic AGM has obtained statutory 
recognition from many jurisdictions across the world as long as it ensures effective 
shareholder participation in the AGM. For example, a general meeting was convened 
by London Life Assurance which was held in several separate rooms connected by an 
electronic audio-visual aid. That meeting was considered valid in Byng v London Life 
Assurance.636 Some jurisdictions have gone beyond that such as Delaware in the USA 
                                                          
630 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 767- 768. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Articles 6, 13/g of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.   
633 Article 86/3 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
634 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles II/ c-4, at 22-23.    
635 Ibid, Principles II/ c-5, at 24. 
636 See Byng v London Life Assurance [1990] 1 Ch 170. 
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where holding the AGM is possible without any location through remote 
communication technology.637 
Modern electronic technology has the advantage that it can open a secure window and 
create several innovative ways for communication and participation between a 
company and investors. This is especially the case with the development of encryption 
and the safe procedures of electronic signature. A company can enable every single 
shareholder to create their own account on the company’s website. This gives 
shareholders access so that they can review the information, ask questions, register their 
attendance at the AGM, suggest subjects on the AGM agenda, attend the meeting, and 
discuss and vote for the AGM decisions from a distance. This gives shareholders a 
better opportunity to exercise their rights and protect their interests by themselves rather 
than voting by proxy, which is a practice recognised by most laws and internal company 
statutes.   
However, holding the AGM through modern means of communication also has some 
disadvantages and challenges. For instance, it may give the board of directors an 
opportunity to avoid face-to-face dialogue with the shareholders and direct 
accountability. The directors may be more able in an electronic AGM to control the 
meeting and prevent questions being asked or refuse to answer them. Moreover, in order 
to ensure the integrity of the electronic AGM, there are some important procedures and 
requirements such as proper planning, and facilities and physical equipment that must 
be set up properly before convening the meeting. Thus, holding an electronic AGM 
with poor organising and with lack of observation procedures may result negative 
consequences and may destroy the true objective of the AGM. 638 
It can be concluded, therefore, that adopting both methods – physical and electronic – 
for holding the AGM may enable a company to benefit from the advantages and avoid 
the shortcomings. Moreover, the company should take into consideration the 
shareholders' local culture and the extent that communication technology is used. This 
means that the meeting may be much easier to arrange in some countries where it can 
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be held in a few separate rooms distributed across the main cities where the majority of 
the population lives as is the case in Saudi Arabia, for example. 
 
5.2.4   Adopting Cumulative Voting 
Voting is the most significant right that shareholders can exercise, and this can be done 
in the AGM. The effectiveness of this right depends on two factors: the rising number 
of shareholders who take part in the election, discussed in the previous section, and 
improving the way of voting. Unlike English law which allows members of the board 
of directors to be voted on individually,639 the Saudi new Law of Companies 2015 
stipulates that companies must adopt cumulative voting for appointing the board of 
directors at the AGM. This method of election gives shareholders the equivalent rights 
to the number of shares they possess to vote for their representatives, whether they use 
all of them for one nominee or divide them between several nominees, as long as there 
is no duplication. Therefore, the right of voting of each share is unqualified to be used 
more than once in the election.640 
This way of voting was recommended in 2006 by the Saudi CGR. It was not a 
mandatory requirement but falls under the approach of "comply or explain" for all listed 
companies.641 This draws attention to the aim of the new Saudi law to maximise the 
role of minority shareholders by facilitating the appointment of their representatives on 
the board and protecting their interests by making the cumulative voting mandatory. 
Saudi law also requires each company to disclose its policy on voting at AGMs in its 
articles of association.642 Whereas, the UK code goes further in terms of disclosure. It 
stipulates that “when, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of votes have 
been cast against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should explain when 
announcing the results of voting what actions it intends to take to understand the reasons 
behind the vote result”.643 
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641 Article 5 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
642 Article 95 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
643 Section e/2.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
169 
 
Cumulative voting allows minority shareholders to cast all of their available votes for 
a single director nominee. This way may enhance their voting power and give them a 
greater opportunity to guarantee representation on the board of directors. It is 
particularly efficient when majority shareholders distribute their available votes to 
several nominees which may weaken their voting ability.644    
It can be argued that the concept of cumulative voting comes from the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance where the managerial power depends on shareholder 
primacy rather than labour influence or state control. The late 19th century witnessed 
the expansion of cumulative voting in the US, where it became compulsory to adopt it 
in 22 states by the middle of the 20th century and optional in 15 others. However, after 
deregulation in the 1990s the adoption of mandatory cumulative voting declined 
rapidly.645 Instead, the US model provided alternative ideas to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders such as independent directors and facilitate the process for 
stockholders in selecting the directors. This may strengthen the role of minority 
shareholders, and avoid disharmony on the board and inefficiency by the firm’s 
management in the US context which does not rely on concentrated ownership.646 Its 
misuse in hostile takeovers can be considered the major reason for the decline in the 
use of cumulative voting in the US. This is because it may provide an opportunity for 
persons who are motivated by their personal gain to access confidential information, 
pressure the management and work against the broader interests of all stockholders.647 
Cumulative voting is also unsupported in EU countries where the stakeholder-centered 
model and the company is an integral part of the social fabric. As a result of giving 
minority shareholders a franchise in the board of directors at the expense of other 
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stakeholders such as employees, banks and the local community may create conflicts, 
injustice and instability.648  
The shortcomings of cumulative voting can be summarised in four main points. It 
interferes in the board structure in favour of minority shareholders; presumes a distrust 
between board members; creates disharmony in management acts; and serves the 
narrow personal interests of minority shareholders.649  
The decline of cumulative voting in the US and EU does not mean that cumulative 
voting has no value for developing countries and emerging economies where market 
activities, external governance mechanisms, supporting institutions and legal 
enforcement are weak.650 In that context, the demand for insider corporate governance 
mechanisms including cumulative voting are high in order to enable shareholders to 
call on their rights directly and deter the board of directors from abusing their power.651  
High state-owned structure of corporations leads to the domination of government 
agencies over the board of directors through the control and monitoring of its 
responsibilities as well as by limiting minority shareholder participation. Most of these 
government agencies are suffering from bureaucracy and a deficiency of incentives to 
monitor the company's operation closely. This gives senior management more power 
and the situation may become worse by avoiding cumulative voting. As a consequence, 
the corporate sector may lose the ability to find a balance between the conflicting 
interests; the economy at large may become less attractive for investors; and the cost of 
capital may rise. This situation goes against the trend of improving the structure and 
efficiency of the capital markets, encouraging long-term investment, and transforming 
from the state-based economy and developing non-state-owned sectors.652  
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It should be noted that adopting cumulative voting cannot succeed on its own to reduce 
the conflicts between the board of directors and minority shareholders, even in countries 
with highly concentrated ownership. Effective corporate governance requires using a 
variety of integrated mechanisms concurrently, such as through the idea of independent 
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5.3   The Board of Directors, its Members and Meetings 
The composition and models of the board of directors were discussed in chapter four, 
whether that is a unitary or a two-tier system. The chapter also studied the structure of 
the board of directors including its size and diversity, independence and the conditions 
of membership. This section will focus on the role and relationships of the board of 
directors with its members and meetings, which impact on corporate governance in the 
Saudi context. 
 
5.3.1   The Limits of the Powers of the Board of Directors 
The board of directors enjoys full and extensive powers in administrating and 
overseeing the company's business in order to achieve its objectives. This is the case 
unless these powers belong to the jurisdiction of the general meeting or if they are 
restricted by the articles of association. On the other hand, the powers delegated to the 
executive management must be determined by the board of directors as well as the 
reserved powers that are subjected to the board decision.654 Likewise, the executive 
management shall provide to the board the periodic reports about their exercise of the 
delegated powers.655 Thus, the boards have the ultimate responsibility for the company 
even if they delegate some of their powers to the executive managers or to a third party. 
This is the case even when the board sets up committees and also when it alone is the 
official representative before government agencies.656 Moreover, the board should 
supervise and monitor the executive managers and is responsible for preparing the 
financial, economic and administrative policies of the company.657 
Unlike the old Saudi Law of Companies, there is a tendency to expand the power of the 
board of directors in the new Saudi Law of Companies 2015 and to remove obstacles 
that may prevent the board from fulfilling its duties. Hence, the new law allows the 
board to contract loans whatever their tenures and release the debtors of the company 
from their liabilities. Furthermore, the board of directors becomes eligible to sell or 
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mortgage the real property or the place of business of the firm. The board of directors 
no longer needs the upfront permission to do these actions from the AGM or company's 
constitution, as long as they did not provide any provisions in this regard.658 Beyond 
that, the new Saudi law binds the company to all the acts performed by the board of 
directors even if these acts are outside the limits of its competence, except if the 
beneficiary party is acting mala fide (in bad faith).659  
It is worth noting that this wide power of the board of directors needs to be under 
consideration from the shareholders and the principal investors through taking into 
account that they still have the right to prevent or provide some restrictions to these 
powers. They can make some of the above actions be subject to their approval at the 
general meeting. Moreover, they can require the board to call an extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM) to amend the articles of association and add some rules that restrict the 
powers of the board.660   
To facilitate the fulfilment of the duties of the board of directors, the new Saudi law 
allows the board of directors to adopt resolutions by submitting them to the directors 
individually as long as there is no request in writing from any director asking to convene 
the board to deliberate on such resolutions.661 It also allows a company to insert in its 
constitution the authority for a director who cannot attend the meeting to ask another 
director to vote/act on his behalf.662 
 
5.3.2   The Limits of the Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
The OECD Principles refer to the two essential elements of the fiduciary duty of the 
board of directors alongside the standards of reference that reflect the extent of their 
application. Firstly, the duty of care which could be evaluated in accordance with the 
behaviour in similar circumstances that would be exercised by a reasonably prudent 
person. Secondly, the duty of loyalty for the company as one integral entity, which 
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requires board members to monitor transactions of all related parties and to deal with 
all shareholders fairly.663 The duty of loyalty could be expressed by a duty of trust, 
which also requires directors to exercise their powers honestly and fairly for the benefit 
of the shareholders including minority shareholders and taking into account the overall 
objectives of the company to ensure its success.664 Whatever the term selected, the duty 
of loyalty is considered as a core factor which is central to ensuring good performance 
and effective implementation of other duties, rules and policies.665 
Such loyalty could be enhanced through raising the awareness of the board members 
about the boundary of their role and individual responsibilities, gaining sufficient 
information about the company activities and potential risks and setting appropriate 
policies for directors’ remunerations and sanctions for abuse of power. This will be 
discussed later. 
The requirements for directors to exercise their powers with reasonable care, skill and 
diligence, including improving their knowledge, experience and skills needed or 
expected from the director, have been stipulated and emphasised by higher ranking 
legislation in England not only the soft laws.666 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 
provides a clear formulation to take into account the duty of acting in good faith. It 
stipulates that  
“a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters)... the 
likely consequences of any decision in the long term... the desirability of the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct... the 
need to act fairly as between members of the company”.667 
 
Keay extensively analyses the issue of acting in good faith to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole in the light of the interpretations 
                                                          
663 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles VI/a, at 52. 
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provided by the courts668, the scholarly discussion, rules of common law and equitable 
principles, as well as the role of lawyers in assisting interpretation and applying such 
duty.669 He emphasises that despite the fact that the concept of good faith has been 
widely used in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, providing a fixed 
definition is still difficult.670 It might receive further determining and distinctions in the 
future by deciding more law cases.671 However, it is difficult to demonstrate the 
directors’ breach of this duty under the circumstances and the various conﬂicting 
interests that surrounding their decisions and actions.672  
Keay presents various explanations of what ‘good faith’ means that come from several 
law cases. The general use of 'good faith' is to connote honesty and propriety.673 This 
honesty may go beyond the personal level and the absence of malice.674 Objectively, it 
may express the concept of reasonableness to refer the fact that directors must act with 
the caution and diligence that is to be expected of an ordinary person of ordinary 
prudence.675 Many courts explain what ‘bad faith’ is to avoid stating what can be 
covered by acting in good faith.676  
He also discusses at length the matter of the director’s judgment and exercising their 
discretion, which cannot be covered by the criteria and assessment of reasonableness 
that apply when measuring good faith. Thus, the decision of determining what are the 
interests of the shareholders and how they can best be fulfilled is, in general, a matter 
for the directors and their views, not the court and its views.677  However, it is not 
enough for directors to merely declare that they were acting in good faith for the beneﬁt 
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of the company regardless of the evidence and all of the surrounding circumstances, 
which should be gathered and considered by the court.678 This may justify a judge’s 
decision not to believe directors’ claims and to conclude that they were -in fact- not 
acting in good faith.679 Therefore, all of the factors surrounding this issue must be 
subjected to and understood in light of the fundamental requirement to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.680 
The Third Report of Session 2016–17 of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee reviews the opinions that are supportive of or criticise the existing section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006 whether if it is clear, sufficient or ambiguous.681 The 
report recognises that there is a lack of clarity and strength in section 172 of the 
Companies Act.682 However, the report objects to making any amendments in section 
172 at this time. It also argues that the primary cause of weaknesses surrounding this 
section is not its wording but these weaknesses, in fact, come from a failure to comply 
with such section. Therefore, the issue considering the reasons for failure to comply on 
the part of the regulator, not amending the relevant legislation.683 Thus, the report 
recommends that more effective measures should be made to ensure that directors take 
their duties more seriously in a way that is demonstrable. The report strongly 
recommend that firms should be required to prepare more specific and accurate 
reporting, which should be supported by robust enforcement.684 The report states that  
“directors should be required to report in an accessible, narrative and bespoke 
form on how they have complied with their duties under section 172. This will 
force directors to at least actively consider how they meet these requirements 
during the year and increase the prominence of these other factors throughout 
the company and also in the minds of shareholders.” 685 
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Even though the new Saudi Law of Companies gives the board of directors extensive 
powers to achieve the company's objectives,686 it provides detailed rules to ensure that 
there are no abuses or any personal interest for a director whether directly or indirectly 
from the transactions or contracts made on the company’s account.687 The Saudi law 
states that a company should clarify the responsibilities of the board of directors in its 
articles of association.688 However, the new Saudi Law of Companies is silent regarding 
the duty of loyalty and acting in good faith and there is an absence of any express or 
specific reference to this issue unlike what is provided in the Companies Act 2006. This 
issue has been addressed by lower ranking legislation in the Saudi context. 
The new CGR 2017 provides two separate sections that include a number of details 
about the powers and responsibilities of the board, the chairman, the board members 
and the executive management, which must be applied to all listed companies.689 The 
CGR stipulates that the board of directors must work “on the basis of complete 
information, in good faith and with the necessary care and diligence for the interests of 
the company and all shareholders”690 and the board “shall perform its duties of care and 
loyalty in managing the company’s affairs and undertake all actions in the general 
interest of the Company and develop it and maximise its value”.691 Every member of 
the board of directors must take it upon himself to look at the interests of the company 
as a whole in the long term. It should be made clear that by electing a person to be a 
board member, he or she becomes an official representative for all shareholders, not 
just those of the group who voted for them.692 
The Saudi new CGR 2017 states that interpretations of the principles of truthfulness, 
honesty and loyalty shall include, in particular, the following: 
"- Truthfulness: is achieved when the relationship between the board member 
and the company is an honest professional relationship, and he/she discloses to 
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the company any significant information before entering into any transaction or 
contract with the company or any of its affiliates.  
- Loyalty: is achieved when the board member avoids transactions that may 
entail conflicts of interest and ensures fairness of dealing, in compliance with 
the provisions relating to conflicts of interest in these regulations.  
- Care: is achieved by performing the duties and responsibilities set forth in the 
Companies Law, the Capital Market Law and their implementing regulations 
and the company’s bylaws and other relevant laws".693 
In evaluating the above interpretations, an important shortcoming can be found. They 
restrict the definitions of these principles in some procedural issues such as disclosing 
conflicts of interest or following relevant laws. This may restrict the application of these 
principles and have a negative impact on court judgments of different facts presented 
in different circumstances. It should be noted here that judges are not involved in the 
process of law-making in the Saudi context and the rules of stare decisis or any doctrine 
that restricts judges to case law are not followed by Saudi courts. 
Exercising an independent and objective judgment is one of the pivotal duties of a 
director, which significantly relies on gaining the relevant information. Such a duty to 
exercise independent judgment is stipulated in both the UK Companies Act 2006 and 
the UK Code of Corporate Governance.694 This issue is also partly dealt with in the new 
Saudi CGR.695 Taking into account that the above duty, which shall be discharged by 
every single director, is different from the provisions emphasised by the Saudi CGR. It 
merely deals with  the independent status of non-executive directors or the provisions 
preventing directors from having any personal interest in the transactions made for the 
account of the company.696 Independence in exercising an objective judgment needs to 
be understood in the light of the personal role and the individual responsibility of each 
director to gain the proper information, express his opinions objectively in the 
boardroom and serve the interests of the company in the long term. This is intended to 
improve the ability of the board as a whole, to make the right decisions and to prevent 
abuses of power. Such a broad definition of ‘independence’ needs to be considered in 
Saudi legislation. 
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5.3.3   The Role of the Board of Directors in its Meetings 
In order to ensure the proper discharge of the boards’ duties, the board of directors 
should convene meetings regularly. The new Law of Companies 2015 does not leave 
this issue up to the total discretion of the company’s constitution as it was the case with 
the old law.697 The new law does require the boards to hold meetings at least twice a 
year, whereas, the new CGR recommends that the board should convene no less than 
one meeting every three months to make a total of at least four meetings per year.698  
Furthermore, the chairman must call for a meeting once they receive a request to do so 
by two directors.699 It should be noted here that the number of meetings mentioned 
above is the minimum set out by the law for all companies regardless of the differences 
between them. Therefore, the articles of association for each company should take into 
account the number of board meetings that might be suitable for its circumstances and 
to meet its administrative needs.  
It is difficult to specify the appropriate number of meetings that should be convened by 
the board annually but some reports suggest that the frequency of regular board 
meetings should be between four and six times per year in order to enable the directors 
to discharge their duties.700 However, the liability for allocating the proper number of 
meetings rests with the board of directors as there are no rules to prevent them from 
holding the meetings needed. 
There is, in general, a positive relationship between more frequent meetings by the 
board of directors and performing their fiduciary duties more effectively, given the fact 
that a lack of time for directors to perform their duties is the most common problem 
that faces the board.701 According to Saudi law, at least half the directors must attend a 
meeting for it to be valid, provided that the number of present directors is not less than 
three.702 However, when the minimum membership that is required by law or a 
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company's constitution for convening the boards is not available, the new law gives the 
company a period of 60 days to solve this issue through requiring the remaining 
directors to contact the AGM to appoint alternative directors that meet the required 
number.703  
The new law draws attention to the crucial importance of the board’s meetings and the 
effective contribution of board members. It requires the board of directors to include in 
their annual report to the AGM a statement on the number of board meetings and the 
number of meetings attended by each individual director. The law allows an AGM, on 
the recommendation of the board, to remove the director who is absent from three 
successive meetings without giving legitimate excuses.704 A useful method can be 
found in the OECD Principles which enhances the legitimacy and confidence of the 
board in the eyes of shareholders. It recommends that companies should publish the 
attendance records for individual board members.705  
Adopting the resolutions of the board must be made according to the majority vote of 
the directors either present or represented. The chairman’s vote will be carried in case 
of a tie, unless the company’s constitution provides otherwise.706 Acting collectively is 
a significant matter for the directors as they will be jointly responsible for the 
maladministration, misconduct or violation of the provisions of laws or the company’s 
constitution. The liability rests with every single director who voted for the incorrect 
decision that caused damages sustained by the company, the shareholders or third 
parties, although a director who expressly recorded his objection of wrongful provision 
in the minutes of the meeting will not be liable.707 Thus, the board of directors must 
document its meetings and record them in signed minutes, including all deliberations, 
votes and resolutions that happened in the meeting. They should also arrange these 
records in chapters for ease of reference.708 
                                                          
703 Ibid, article 70. 
704 Ibid, article 76/4, 5. 
705 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles VI/e-3, at 60. 
706 Article 83/4 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
707 Ibid, article78/1. 
708 Ibid, article 85. And see article 37/a-1 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. 
181 
 
In comparison, the UK Companies Act 2006 requires companies to take minutes of all 
proceedings at meetings of the boards and have them authenticated and kept for at least 
ten years, otherwise sanctions will be imposed.709 These authenticated minutes could 
be used as evidence to prove all proceedings of directors at the meetings.710 The UK 
Corporate Governance Code goes beyond this as it widens the board minutes to cover 
even unresolved concerns or a proposed action about the running of the company to be 
recorded.711 These measures on recording minutes, keeping them for a long time and 
the sanctions for breach of these measures have a noteworthy role in promoting internal 
control and preventing abuse of power. Thus, these measures should be considered by 
the Saudi legislators.  
Convening a board meeting is not only a matter of quantity (number of directors or 
frequency of meetings) but also a matter of quality. An effective meeting should 
consider the company's strategic plan, manage the expected risks and pre-empt crises, 
not just tackle any current problems.712 An effective board is formed by a variety of 
members, including executive and non-executive directors who work together as a 
cohesive team towards a common goal with a high degree of mutual understanding and 
trust. This depends on the personal qualities of members, their commitment to their 
duties and the leadership qualities of the chairman as he is the keystone for securing 
good corporate governance, which ultimately leads to the success of the board.713  
The chairman plays a central role in promoting independence of thought in the 
boardroom, opening discussions and at the same time keeping the discussion focused 
and dealing with all members fairly. Therefore, a successful board depends on the 
ability of the chairman to discharge six main functions:  
1. Leadership of the board 
2. Management of meetings 
3. Strategic leadership 
4. Linking the board with the management 
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5. Arbitration between board members and others 
6. Acting as the public face of the company714  
 
The company secretary is another central position in the board of directors that needs 
to be occupied by an expert to avoid the board from committing an unintentional fault 
and ensure compliance with applicable laws, policies and standards. The law in both 
England and Saudi Arabia require a listed company to have a secretary.715 That person 
shall be appointed by the board of directors whether from one of its members or not.716 
The company secretary is responsible for coordinating communications with board 
members, documenting meetings and saving reports sent to the board.717 Moreover, the 
secretary and all board members must sign the minutes of deliberations and resolutions 
of the board which must be entered in a special register signed by the chairman and the 
secretary,718 as well as ensure that board procedures comply with the law and internal 
policies.719  
The company secretary can be considered a safety guardian of the board who ensures 
proper information flow to and from the board and its committees and advises the board 
on all matters of governance.720 English law requires that some conditions are met for 
those occupying such an important position in order to ensure that the company takes 
all reasonable steps to select a secretary with the correct experience and knowledge. 
Moreover, the law requires the secretary to have one or more of the qualifications 
below: 
(a) that he has held the office of secretary of a public company for at least three 
of the five years immediately preceding his appointment as secretary; (b) that 
he is a member of any of the bodies specified in subsection (3)721; (c) that he is 
a barrister, advocate or solicitor called or admitted in any part of the United 
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Kingdom; (d) that he is a person who, by virtue of his holding or having held 
any other position or his being a member of any other body, appears to the 
directors to be capable of discharging the functions of secretary of the 
company.722  
Unlike the previous Saudi CGR, which did not provide any provisions in this regard, 
the new CGR issued on 13 February 2017 draws attention to the importance of this 
matter. It recommends that a candidate for the position of secretary have three years of 
related work experience and hold a degree in law, finance, accounting or management 
or any equivalent degree. Otherwise, the candidate should have five years of related 
work experience.723 It should be noted here that the above conditions are not 
compulsory for listed companies as they belong to the limited guiding articles of the 
Saudi new CGR. However, these new rules are necessary in the Saudi context and need 
to be compulsory in order to give the board of directors a sufficient ability to discharge 
their duties and improve their internal corporate governance, which may assist to 
counterbalance the weaknesses in the local environment. 
5.3.4   The Importance of Information and Effective Contribution 
The crucial liabilities and the vital role that the board of directors plays necessitates 
sufficient information to be available to the directors to enable them to make their 
decisions and discharge their duties in an effective manner. The board is responsible 
for gaining the required information from the executive management and any other 
reliable sources. Thus, the availability of information for all members shall be ensured 
by the chairman, particularly for non-executive and new members. Likewise, the board 
is also responsible for ensuring that there is an appropriate procedure for orienting and 
training the new board members about the company’s business and any financial and 
legal aspects if necessary.724 
Directors, particularly non-executive ones, shall seek to access accurate, relevant and 
timely information to fulfil their responsibilities independently and objectively. To do 
this, they need to make contact with the company's major actors such as key managers, 
the internal auditor, the company secretary and key shareholders, as well as access 
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company operations and staff. This may require giving non-executive directors a right 
to hire an independent external adviser on the company’s account.725  
In contrast, unsuccessful attempts to gain sufficient information or to consider matters 
carefully, poor contributions and avoiding making crucial decisions may cause some 
damage and have consequences for the firm. Hence, being a silent and inactive member 
or supporting only the negative decisions in the boardroom do not absolve a director 
from being accountable and held liable. Every individual member needs to do his best 
and allocate ample time for fulfilling his responsibilities and preparing himself for the 
meetings of the board and the committees, as well as for ensuring his effective 
contribution and avoiding the negative consequences.726  
The agenda and the relevant documentation on the meetings shall be received by the 
members with sufficient time to enable them to consider the matters and be prepared. 
Furthermore, all directors have the right to discuss and consult about the meeting 
agenda as it also needs to include the opinion of the CEO before it can be submitted by 
the chairman. In addition, the agenda also needs to be approved by the board once the 
meeting is convened. This does not abolish the right of any member to record his 
objection to this agenda in the minutes of the meeting.727  
There is a need to develop the content and the manner of submission of the documents 
that are sent to all directors with the meeting agenda. These documents should provide 
useful and high-quality information that covers all aspects of the matter that will be 
discussed to help a director to see the whole picture properly and have enough time to 
study it. Depending on the meeting agenda, there are many reports that could be 
included such as the levels of business activity compared with the market, the recent 
financial accounts and the latest report from the chief executive officer. To facilitate 
this issue and reduce its cost, the documents needed could be provided electronically, 
taking into account the confidentiality and the necessity of safeguarding this 
commercially valuable information.728 
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5.3.5   The Remuneration of the Board Members and Top Executives 
There is a close relation between director's remuneration and ensuring transparent 
corporate governance. This arose as a logical consequence of the separation between 
ownership and control and the relation of principal-agent. Such a relationship faces the 
difficult task of finding a balance between providing proper incentives and avoiding the 
major costs of risk.729 The level of financial returns that could be earned by directors 
and top executives is one of the significant matters that affect their role and relationship 
with the company. Therefore, both legislation and company constitutions pay careful 
attention to this issue and allocate a specific committee to prepare an appropriate policy 
of compensation and remuneration of directors which should also be reviewed annually. 
The terms “compensation and remuneration” can cover all long and short-term 
incentive schemes, including salaries, allowances, percentage of profits and bonuses 
related to performance, whether they are annual or periodic.730 This matter of 
remuneration of board members and top executives is subject to the jurisdiction of three 
legislative elements: the law of companies, the articles of association and the relevant 
policy approved by the general meeting. There are also three actors involved in 
preparing, reviewing and approving such remunerations: the AGM, the board of 
directors and the remuneration committee.  
According to the Saudi Law of Companies 2015, the articles of association of the 
company shall determine the method of board remuneration. It allows the remuneration 
to take the form of an attendance allowance, a lump sum amount, rights in rem, a certain 
percentage of the net profits or combining two or more of these privileges.731 Moreover, 
the articles of association should also specify the emoluments of each chairman, deputy 
chairman, managing director and secretary in addition to the remuneration prescribed 
for board members. Otherwise, this determining duty shall be transferred to the board 
of directors,732 which is also responsible for including in its annual report to the AGM 
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a comprehensive statement that covers all privileges, financial and rem, received by 
directors and members of committees. This statement must indicate the amounts 
received by directors in consideration of executive functions or created by their 
services, whether that is technical, advisory or administrative.733 In addition, such a 
report must include details of the highest compensation and remuneration paid by the 
company to the top five executives and the CEO and the chief finance officer, whether 
they are among the top five or not.734 Disclosing the remuneration of board members 
and key executives is compatible with OECD Principles as these consider it good 
corporate governance practice. This is something that has been adopted by an increasing 
number of countries.735  
The AGM is the competent authority, in Saudi law, for defining the remuneration of 
audit committee members736 and approving the remuneration of the members of the 
nomination and remuneration committees.737 Moreover, the remuneration committee 
plays a pivotal role in preparing clear policies of compensation and remuneration for 
directors and top executives in accordance with the standards that should be built based 
on performance.738 However, the Saudi new Law of Companies adds another standard 
to such a policy related to the number of meetings attended by each director.739  
The OECD Principles call for such policies to clarify the specific link between 
remuneration and firm performance including measurable standards and some 
conditions of payment for extra-board activities, which consider the longer-term 
interests of the firm and its shareholders. This assists shareholders to evaluate both the 
incentive schemes and the capability of the board logically, as well as to strike a balance 
between the costs and benefits.740  
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The correlation between director remuneration and firm performance has been adopted 
by the most developed countries, such the USA, the UK, Germany, Italy and Japan.741 
Also, there is a tendency in the European legislative approach to focus on the socio-
legal perspective of director remuneration, which should be built on three norms: first, 
the duties of directors, particularly to consider the long-term interests of the firm, to 
avoid conflicts of interest and to manage risk soundly; second, the rights of shareholders 
to contribute to the management and enhance the long-term interests of the firm; finally, 
the rights of stakeholders to have a role in corporate governance.742  
Saudi law restricts the policy of director remuneration through a conclusive framework 
and some specific rules. It also considers any determinations that violate its provisions 
as null and void. The law stipulates that remuneration which takes the form of a certain 
percentage of profits must not exceed l0% of the net profits of the company after 
deducting the reserves determined by law, the company's constitution or the AGM, as 
well as after distributing a dividend of not less than 5% of the company’s capital to the 
stockholders.743 Furthermore, the Saudi new law sets a maximum limitation of the total 
amount that could be received by a director in all cases, including financial 
remuneration or rem privileges to not exceed 500,000 Saudi riyals per year, equivalent 
to US$133,333.744  
It will be recalled here that while the Saudi new law provides a new rule restricting the 
remuneration for a director to be limited to SR500,000, the same law provides a new 
section that includes 8 articles that place strict sanctions against convicted directors 
which may reach a fine of SR5 million and 5 years’ imprisonment.745  
Regardless of the size of the remuneration provided by the Saudi new law, it is difficult 
to set a single unified amount of the maximum remuneration for all directors regardless 
of size, value, needs, responsibilities and difficulties of the different firms they belong 
to. Such a limitation of the amount of remuneration may need to be reviewed, 
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particularly when taking into account the fact that the currency is subject to the risk of 
price changes and decline. This change may happen much faster than the ability of 
legislation to be amended, which takes a long time and needs to go through several 
legal procedures. Moreover, there is a need to clarify this limitation applied in all cases, 
as expressed by the new law,746 to explain if this even covers the executive directors 
who have additional responsibilities much more than just attending meetings. This may 
assist in avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding. 
When the director's remuneration package has been designed, it is important to take 
into account its capability to retain and attract a good calibre of directors. It is, in 
general, true that linking a part of the director's remuneration with the company's profits 
and the performance to enhance the firm's business is a good idea. However, it should 
be recognised that it may differ from one company to another and is subject to a number 
of factors such as the firm’s size, the ownership structure, the kind of industry and the 
competition between companies in attracting good directors.747  
On a different note, English law requires quoted companies to prepare a separate annual 
report of directors’ remuneration. Moreover, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 adopts a stronger, clearer link between pay and performance to promote better 
engagement between companies and shareholders in quoted companies. It adopts some 
rules to empower shareholders to hold companies accountable through binding 
shareholder votes on a company’s general policy for annual directorial remuneration.748 
The Companies Act 2006 emphasises the information that must be given in the 
company’s reports and annual accounts including all directors’ benefits and 
remuneration, whatever form they may take. Thus, the Companies Act 2006 stipulates 
some detailed examples, such as payments for loss of office and payments by third 
parties for services provided to a person as director or in any capacity while he or she 
is a director.749  
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More examples of these kinds of remuneration can be found in the UK Code such as 
pension contributions and earnings received by an executive director by virtue of 
working as a non-executive director elsewhere. All of these remunerations should be 
regulated by the remuneration committee through a proper policy and be included in 
the remuneration report.750 Disclosing membership of other boards and the 
remuneration that came from them enables shareholders to assess the experiences, 
possible pressures, the sufficiency of time and potential conflicts of interest which 
affect the director's performance. This level of transparency may be more important 
than restricting the number of board memberships that can be held by the same 
director.751  
The UK Code draws attention to the long-term success of the company, which should 
be promoted through well-designed long-term incentive schemes for directors that are 
approved by shareholders.752 The schemes of performance-related remuneration should 
be based on transparent elements that reflect the time commitment and responsibilities. 
This includes non-financial metrics, creating a balance between fixed and performance-
related remuneration and taking into account the position of the firm compared to other 
companies.753 Beyond that, the UK Code requires the remuneration committee to 
include some provisions in such schemes that would enable the firm to stop paying 
remuneration or recover amounts paid in certain cases for the violations of a director.754   
The new Saudi CGR draws attention to some important points that shall be considered 
when establishing the remuneration policy. It shall be consistent with the company's 
long-term strategy, objectives and level of risk that may be faced by a director, as well 
as considering the position, responsibilities, educational qualifications and practical 
experience required to attract and retain talented professionals. The practices of other 
companies in this regard should be taken into account. Moreover, the policy shall 
consider situations and cases of suspending or reclaiming remunerations.755 
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5.3.6   Conclusion 
This section discussed the role and relationships of the board of directors with its 
members and meetings which impact on administrating and overseeing the company's 
business. The findings and recommendations can be summarised by the points below: 
- The new Saudi Law of Companies 2015 expanded the power of the board of 
directors and removed obstacles that may prevent the board from fulfilling its 
duties. However, this broad power needs to be understood in relation to the fact that 
it is contained by the right of shareholders and principal investors to prevent or 
provide some restrictions to these powers.   
- There are two essential elements of the fiduciary duty of the board of directors: the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty for the company as one integral entity which 
has interests in the long term. These duties need to be clarified further in the Saudi 
CGR to avoid restricting them in some procedural issues such as disclosing conflicts 
of interest or following relevant laws. 
- Exercising an independent and objective judgment is one of the pivotal duties of a 
director. Independence in exercising an objective judgment needs to be understood 
in the light of the personal role and the individual responsibility of each director to 
gain the proper information, express his opinions objectively in the boardroom and 
serve the interests of the company in the long term. Such a broad definition of 
‘independence’ needs to be considered in Saudi legislation in the light of the English 
context.756 
- The board of directors must document its meetings and record them in signed 
minutes, including the number of meetings attended by each individual director and 
all deliberations, votes and resolutions that happened in the meeting. It may be 
useful for Saudi legislators to consider some of the measures adopted in England 
such as taking minutes of all proceedings at meetings of the boards and having them 
authenticated and kept for at least ten years.757 This would mean that even 
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unresolved concerns or a proposed action about the running of the company would 
be recorded.758 
- The company secretary is another central position in the board of directors that 
needs to be occupied by an expert to avoid the board committing an unintentional 
fault and ensuring compliance with applicable laws, policies and standards. English 
law requires some conditions to be met for those occupying such an important 
position in order to ensure that the company takes all reasonable steps to select a 
secretary with the correct experience and knowledge.759 Those conditions are 
necessary in the Saudi context and need to be compulsory in order to give the board 
of directors sufficient ability to discharge their duties and improve their internal 
corporate governance, which may assist to counterbalance the weaknesses in the 
local environment. 
- Directors, particularly non-executive ones, should aim to access accurate, relevant 
and timely information to fulfil their responsibilities independently and objectively. 
To do this, they need to make contact with the company's major actors such as key 
managers, the internal auditor, the company secretary and key shareholders. Every 
individual member needs to do his best and prepare himself to fulfil his 
responsibilities and to ensure his effective contribution. On the other hand, there is 
a need to develop the content and the manner of submission of the documents that 
are sent to all directors with the meeting agenda. 
- There is a need to review the limitation set by Saudi law of the total amount that 
could be received by a director in all cases.760 It is difficult to set a single unified 
amount of the maximum remuneration for all directors regardless of size, value, 
needs, responsibilities and difficulties of the different firms they belong to. 
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5.4   The Committees of the Board of Directors 
In order to assist the board to engage with its responsibilities effectively and to improve 
the work environment, the company needs to establish a number of specialist 
committees in accordance with its requirements and circumstances.761 These 
committees, particularly where there is a potential for conflicts of interest, can increase 
the possibility for company affairs to be tackled objectively and independently, as well 
as to increase adherence to the law, relevant bylaws and policies. These committees, 
however, will not reduce the collective responsibility of the board of directors and the 
individual responsibility of its members.762 
According to Saudi law, it is compulsory for a joint stock company to set up three 
committees to be named the “Audit Committee”, 763the “Nomination Committee” and 
the “Remuneration Committee”.764 The new Saudi CGR recommends that companies 
form another two committees, namely the “Risk Management Committee” and 
“Corporate Governance Committee”.765  Except for the audit committee,766 the board 
of directors is responsible for forming all its committees, appointing their members, 
and defining the jurisdictions and duties of each committee.767 Moreover, the board 
should also approve the bylaws of all its committees and lay down the general 
procedures, the tenure of both permanent and ad hoc committees, the powers delegated 
to them and the manner in which their activities can be monitored by the board of 
directors periodically. On the other hand, these committees should notify and report to 
the board their activities, findings and decisions with complete transparency.768 
The Saudi CGR requires the company to appoint a sufficient number of non-executive 
members to certain committees as their objectivity is vital to the company. These 
committees are usually concerned with activities that might involve conflicts of interest, 
such as reviewing the integrity of the financial reports and the deals concluded by the 
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company, nominating the membership of the board, appointing the management and 
determining remuneration.769 It is allowed for the board of directors to appoint persons 
other than board members, whether shareholders or otherwise, provided that the 
chairmen of the committees mentioned are independent directors.770 In addition, each 
committee, within the scope of its powers, can seek assistance from any specialists or 
experts, whether internal or external, provided that this is included in the minutes of the 
committee meeting.771 However, the new CGR prevents the chairman of the board from 
being the chairman of any of the committees mentioned in the CGR.772 Furthermore, 
with the exception of members of the committee, no member of the board or the 
executive management may attend the meetings of a committee without an invitation 
from that committee to listen their opinions or advice.773 Nevertheless, the new CGR 
requires the chairmen of each committee to attend the AGM to answer shareholders' 
questions.774 
According to the last published report of the CMA in Saudi Arabia, the independent 
members in audit committees accounted for 41.5% of total audit committees’ seats in 
listed firms. Data also show that non-executive members represented 18% and almost 
40.5% of audit committees’ membership was formed from non-board members. 
Likewise, the committees of nomination and remuneration in listed companies was 
where independent, non-executive and non-board members accounted for the greatest 
number of seats with 93% of total seats, whereas executive members occupied only 7% 
of total seats.775 
 
5.4.1   Audit Committee  
It is argued that the importance of the audit committee has been increasingly recognised 
after a series of successive financial collapses. It became one of the primary 
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mechanisms of good corporate governance as it assists the board of directors to carry 
out its obligations and facilitates the oversight function of internal and external auditing 
and accounting.776 
Unlike the old Saudi law of companies, which did not provide any specific provisions 
about a company’s committees, the new Law of Companies 2015 allocates a separate 
section containing four articles that set out the provisions of the audit committee. It 
stipulates that the audit committee shall be formed by a resolution from the AGM and 
must comprise between three to five members, provided that none of them belongs to 
the executive board members. The resolution shall also define its jurisdictions and 
duties, standards of its work and remuneration of its members.777 The report of this 
committee has the same requirement as the reports of directors and auditor, and the 
financial statements. They must be approved at the AGM and have copies filed at the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Capital Market Authority (CMA) for listed 
companies.778 Moreover, sufficient copies of this report must be made available for 
shareholders at the company’s main headquarters at least ten days before the date of the 
AGM.779 
The new Saudi CGR provides several provisions that give the audit committee further 
independence. It prevents the chairman of the board and any other person who works 
in or has worked in the company's finance department, or in the executive management 
or for the company’s external auditor during the preceding two years from being a 
member of the audit committee.780 Moreover, the new CGR requires that one of its 
members be specialised in finance and accounting.781 The last point will make the 
committee more likely to discharge its duties, which are crucial, it is also more 
compatible with the UK Corporate Governance Code and global standards.782 
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The audit committee is concerned with monitoring the company's business. Therefore, 
it has the right to access the company’s records and documents as well as to request any 
clarification or statement from the members of the board of directors or executive 
management. It may also request that the board of directors call an AGM if it is faced 
with hindrances from the board of directors or executives as well as if the company has 
suffered from substantial damage or losses.783  
The audit committee must convene at least four meetings per financial year and must 
also meet periodically with the company's external and internal auditors.784 The audit 
committee shall review and give its opinion about the effectiveness and the integrity of 
the financial statements, the accounting policies of the company, reports and notes 
provided by the auditor. It shall also prepare an annual report on its view of the 
adequacy of the internal control system in the company including the activities of such 
committee and decisions have taken within its competence.785 The audit committee has 
the initial responsibility to make recommendations to the board for appointment, 
reappointment, dismissal and the remuneration of external auditors in order to prepare 
them to be approved by the shareholders at the AGM.786  
According to the new Saudi legislation, the audit committee is no longer considered 
merely a board committee like the other committees that are formed and controlled by 
the board of directors. The new Saudi CGR goes further, stipulating that: 
"If a conflict arises between the recommendations of the audit committee and 
the Board resolutions, or if the Board refuses to put the committee's 
recommendations into action as to appointing or dismissal the company's 
external auditor or determining its remuneration, assessing its performance or 
appointing the internal auditor, the Board’s report shall include the committee's 
recommendations and justifications, and the reasons for not following such 
recommendations".787 
The provisions mentioned above may give the audit committee a stronger position and 
further independence, in particular, over appointing and removing the members of such 
a committee by the AGM. This can be considered a pivotal addition in the new Saudi 
Law of Companies which, to some extent, may enable the audit committee to play a 
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partial role like a supervisory board in the two-tier model which consists of the non-
executives exclusively and aims to monitor the management board of executives.  
In comparison, the UK Corporate Governance Code gives the board of directors the job 
of forming the audit committee. Moreover, it does not prevent the company chairman 
from being a member of the audit committee; it only prevents him from chairing said 
committee. Nonetheless, this provision only applies to smaller companies.788 
Alzeban and Sawan argue that there are four characteristics of the audit committee that 
ensure a high quality of performance, higher implementation of the audit committee 
recommendations and more effective risk management. Such characteristics are: 
greater independence than other committees, a higher level of expertise of its members 
in its working scope, a greater number of members and a greater frequency of 
meetings.789 
 
5.4.2    The Nomination and Remuneration Committees  
The new Saudi CGR requires the board of directors to form two committees for 
nomination and remuneration functions that shall not involve executive directors. 
However, it allows a company to combine the remuneration and the nomination 
committees into one committee790 as had been required in the old CGR.791 There are 
two main roles for these committees: nominating the potential directors for the 
upcoming period and laying down the policies and standards related to performance. 
And also, they are responsible for organising the remunerations of the board members 
and senior executives.792 It is evident that these two functions are not related to each 
other and they may have different requirements and different members’ skills to achieve 
their goals and focus on their specific duties. Hence, both the UK Code and OECD 
Principles deal with these two functions separately through allocating two independent 
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committees to be named the “Nomination Committee” and the “Remuneration 
Committee”.793 
The regulations for the remuneration and nomination committees including their 
running, duties and rules for selecting their members, the terms of their membership 
and their remunerations shall be issued at the AGM, as per the board’s 
recommendation.794  Issuing such regulations from a higher authority gives these 
committees and their powers further protection from being restricted by the board and 
executive directors, and it is more compatible with the Saudi context where the power 
of shareholders needs to be maximised. In contrast, the UK Code and OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance do not require the AGM’s approval for defining their role and 
the authorities delegated to them by the board of directors, as long as they have been 
disclosed and are available.795 This may be more consistent with the ultimate 
responsibility of the board for the activities of these committees and for appointing their 
members. However, the UK Code provides additional conditions and details that may 
support the independence of the nomination committee. It requires the majority 
members and the chair of such a committee to also be independent. Furthermore, it 
prevents the chairman from chairing the committee if the committee is dealing with the 
appointment of a successor to the chairman.796 
The nomination committee plays a significant role in gathering human resources data 
about senior management in order to nominate the potential directors to be appointed 
at the AGM.797 It is recommended that the number of names presented to the AGM be 
greater than the number of available seats in order to give the AGM the flexibility 
required to select the board members from among those nominees.798  This function has 
a long-term influence that is either positive or negative over the company, which 
necessitates a careful consideration to put in place the policies and standards needed. 
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794 Articles 60/b, 64/b of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
795 Section b/2.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. And see, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD 
Publishing, Principles II/ c-4, at 22-23. 
796 Section b/2.1 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
797 Article 68 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
798 Article 66/b of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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Therefore, the Saudi CGR gives this committee a crucial responsibility to prepare an 
annual description and review that covers all skills, capabilities, qualifications and the 
time required for the membership of the board of directors.799 However, the board of 
directors has the ultimate responsibility for laying down explicit policies, standards and 
procedures for the membership of the board of directors, which must be approved by 
the general meeting of shareholders.800 
An annual internal evaluation needs to be carried out by such a committee to discharge 
its role effectively. In doing so, it should review the structure of the board of directors, 
determine the strengths and weaknesses in the board of directors and ensure the 
continuance of the independence of the independent board members and the absence of 
any conflicts of interest. Moreover, it needs to provide appropriate recommendations 
on all these aspects.801 
This committee has a vital role to minimise the time and efforts and facilitate the 
procedures of the AGM to elect a balanced and qualified board. It improves the 
selection and the searching process through fully disclosing the experience and 
background of candidate members to be elected in accordance with their abilities and 
suitability for the company.802  
 
5.4.3   Evaluation of the Board of Directors and its Committees   
Self-evaluation is a significant means of ensuring good performance and 
implementation of internal and external laws and policies. It requires a high degree of 
transparency, openness, honesty and agreement on goals from every director, 
committee and support staff. Much time and effort needs to be taken, such as 
interviewing directors, talking with auditors and institutional investors and collecting 
accurate data, as well as analysing attendance records and minutes of board meetings 
and its committee. The roles and contributions of each individual director should be 
recorded in a personal profile, which should also include all relevant information such 
                                                          
799 Ibid, article 65. And see Section b/2.2 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
800 Article 22/3 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
801 Article 65 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
802 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
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as experience, education, professional background and interpersonal abilities and skills 
which brought about his appointment.803 
The UK Code provides useful points for assessing the board of directors’ performance, 
its committees and its individual members to be recorded in an annual formal and 
rigorous report. This evaluation should include the extent that the board works together 
as a unit and any factor that has an impact on its effectiveness.804 Moreover, the senior 
independent director should command the non-executive directors to evaluate the 
performance of the chairman without ignoring the views of executive directors.805 The 
Code also requires the board of directors to arrange for the chairmen of the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees to be known and available at the AGM to 
receive shareholders' questions.806 Beyond that, the UK Code stipulates that "evaluation 
of the board of FTSE 350 companies should be externally facilitated at least every three 
years. The external facilitator should be identified in the annual report and a statement 
made as to whether they have any other connection with the company".807  
According to the UK Code, this evaluation is not only for the purposes of inclusion in 
the annual report so that it is available for shareholders and considered by the AGM but 
is also to be used immediately by the chairman to improve board performance. The UK 
Code stipulates that "the chairman should act on the results of the performance 
evaluation by recognising the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of the board 
and, where appropriate, proposing new members be appointed to the board or seeking 
the resignation of directors".808 
Generally, the board of directors as a whole is a body that is responsible for initiating 
the board evaluation and ensuring compliance with corporate governance legislations 
and internal regulations and policies. Such assessment relies on a chairman and his core 
competencies as he is a person who leads its exercise and plays the key role in taking 
the initiative and encouraging actors to have a positive interaction with the evaluation 
processes. He is also able to delegate this function to the chairman of the board 
                                                          
803 Tricker, B. (2015). Corporate Governance Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd ed). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, at 439, 444, 449. 
804 Section b/6 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 2016. 
805 Ibid, section b/6.3. 
806 Ibid, section e/2.3. 
807 Ibid, section b/6.2. 
808 Ibid, section b/6. 
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nomination committee.809 This fact does not prevent the hiring of some professional 
non-competitor bodies or individuals who may play a significant role in independent 
assessment. This could be provided by a firm specialising in board appraisal, institutes 
of directors and consultancies, a  past chairman, an experienced independent consultant 
and superior chairman or director from the board of another firm.810 
In the Saudi context, the matter of assessment is still dealt with in a limited manner by 
disclosing information and providing reports even though a new CGR was issued in 
2017. Saudi law requires the board of directors to provide an annual report to the AGM 
about its actions and the company’s affairs. It also requires a statement to be given 
about the number of board meetings and the aggregate number of attendance of each 
board member as well as the board’s recommendation on this issue.811 Moreover, the 
report must give a brief description of the main committees, including their names, 
jurisdictions, duties, names of their chairmen and members.812 Likewise, the audit  
committee shall provide an annual report about its activities, findings, decisions and its 
view about the company business within its competence.813 There are also some 
assessment tasks related to the board business and its members that have been given to 
the audit and nomination committees, such as reviewing the structure of the board of 
directors, skills required for board membership and determining the points of strength 
and weakness in the board of directors.814 Moreover, a listed company must disclose 
any punishment that has been imposed on it, any risks facing the company and any 
material differences in the operational results compared to the preceding year's results. 
The names of the companies of which any board member is a manager or a board 
member must also be disclosed.815   
It should be noted here that the assessment of the board of directors and its committees 
has received special attention in the new Saudi CGR issued in 2017, which features a 
part dedicated to supporting and assessing the board of directors and covers many points 
                                                          
809 Tricker, B. (2015). Corporate Governance Principles, Policies and Practices (3rd ed). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, at 438, 448, 449. 
810 Ibid, at 439, 449. 
811 Article 76/4, 5 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
812 Article 90/6 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
813 Ibid, article 91. 
814 Article 103 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And see article 65 of the 
Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
815 Article 90/3, 9, 17, 20 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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mentioned above. However, all these provisions for assessment come as guiding 
articles, which means that they are not technically legislation and do not resolve the 
need to improve the corporate governance in the Saudi context in this regard.  The new 
CGR stipulates that: 
"the board shall develop, based on the proposal of the nomination committee, 
the necessary mechanisms to annually assess the performance of the Board, its 
members and committees and the executive management using key 
performance indicators linked to the extent to which the strategic objectives of 
the Company have been achieved, the quality of the risk management and the 
efficiency of the internal control systems, among others, provided that 
weaknesses and strengths shall be identified and a solution shall be proposed 
for the same in the best interests of the Company".816 
These procedures should cover individual assessments of the board members and be 
disclosed to all parties concerned in the assessment as well as attempting to improve 
the performance of the board through nominating competent professional staff able to 
improve the performance of the board or any other methods available.817 Moreover, a 
periodic assessment of the performance of the chairman of the board should be carried 
out by non-executive directors. They should consider the opinions of the executive 
directors and the chairman of the board should not be present while the matter is being 
discussed.818 The new CGR also recommends that the board of directors receive an 
assessment of its own performance from a competent third party every three years.819 
 
  
                                                          
816 Article 41/a of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
817 Article 41/b, c, d of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
818 Article 41/f of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
819 Article 41/e of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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5.5   The Company Auditor 
5.5.1   The Company Auditor in Saudi Law 
External audit is a vital mechanism of good corporate governance that protects the 
rights of shareholders and stakeholders, and at the same time helps its leaders not to 
commit mistakes. According to Saudi law, the company must have one auditor or more, 
who must be appointed by the AGM from the observers authorised to work in Saudi 
Arabia. The AGM shall also determine their remuneration and their work tenure which 
can be repeated provided that the total duration does not exceed five consecutive years. 
The auditor can be changed by the AGM at any time without prejudice to their right for 
compensation if the change occurred at an improper time or for an unacceptable 
reason.820  
In order to carry out his duties, the auditor has the right to access the company's books, 
records, data and other documents all the time and to request further explanations. The 
board chairman must facilitate the work of the auditor. Otherwise, the difficulties faced 
shall be recorded by the auditor in his report submitted to the board of directors. If this 
is not resolved by the board, he must request a general assembly to be convened to 
consider this matter.821 Moreover, the law requires the auditor to attend the AGM, 
receive the shareholders’ queries and answer their questions in light of company 
interests.822  
The board of directors must submit their annual report which must include the financial 
position and the statements of the firm to the auditor at least 45 days before the AGM.823 
Likewise, the auditor must prepare his report, in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards, and submit it to the AGM to be read in the meeting before ratifying 
the financial statements and the report of the board of directors. This report must cover 
three main subjects: his opinion on the extent of the integrity of the financial statements 
and accounts of the company, violations of the provisions of law or the internal bylaws 
provisions of the company; and the attitude of the company administration in enabling 
                                                          
820  Article 133/1 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
821  Ibid, article 134. 
822  Ibid, article 96.  
823  Ibid, 126/2. 
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him to obtain the information needed.824 Jurisdiction authorities, such as the Ministry 
of Commerce and Capital Market Authority, must also receive copies of the auditor’s 
report.825  
The auditor is also responsible for preparing a special report when the board chairman 
informs the AGM about any transactions and contracts in which a director has a 
personal interest.826 Moreover, he must immediately inform the chairman when 
company losses amount to half of its capital.827 He also has the right to request to call 
for an AGM or EGM to be convened and call them himself after 30 days if the board 
has not responded to his request.828 The duties and responsibilities of the auditor cover 
all financial matters that the company may face including capital increasing or capital 
reduction and liquidation of the company.829  
To ensure the independence of the auditor, Saudi law prevents the auditor from 
participating in the foundation of the company, board membership and from doing any 
technical, administrative or consultative work for the company. This includes being a 
relative to fourth class or a partner to one who occupied these functions.830 Moreover, 
the law gives the shareholders who represent at least 5% of the capital the right to ask 
the Jurisdiction authority to order an inspection of the company if they had found 
anything suspicious in the acts of the auditor or the members of the board of directors.831 
With the law, the auditor can be asked for compensation for damage that occurs to the 
company, the shareholders or others because of errors made by him in the performance 
of his work or if he broadcasted to others the secrets of the company.832 In addition, 
there are also strict sanctions against convicted auditors which may reach a fine of SR5 
million and 5 years’ imprisonment.833 
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It will be recalled that the work of the auditor is linked with the functions of the audit 
committee which has the task of reviewing the firm's financial statements, the internal 
control system and the accounting policies. It is also responsible to review the notes of 
the auditor and pursue the implementation of the corrective measures about them, as 
well as provide their own report about all of these matters to the AGM.834 Beyond that, 
the audit committee is the body that recommends the individuals appointed, dismissals 
and the remuneration of the auditor. Moreover, it shall meet with the auditor 
periodically, review his plans and its activities and verify his independence.835 
There are, in fact, overlapping responsibilities between the auditor and the board of 
directors and its committees, which should be integrated to ensure the integrity of the 
financial and accounting procedures. Hence, there is an increasing need for cooperation 
and interactions among the four components of corporate governance: board of 
directors, management, internal audit and external audit.  Moreover, it is important for 
them to coordinate the linkages of internal and external audit to enhance the 
effectiveness of the auditing function and the reliability of financial reports.836 This may 
also reduce the cost and time of audit work and yield useful information for all parties 
of corporate governance. It should be taken into account that the nature of the linkages 
between audit mechanisms are significantly affected by environmental factors, legal 
system and the techniques and approaches used, which are inadequate in developing 
countries.837  
 
5.5.2   Company Auditor in English Law and Global Standards  
A parallel approach can be found in English law, but with more detail. The UK 
Companies Act 2006 provides detailed provisions about disclosure of the terms of an 
auditor appointment, his services and his report, fixed remuneration, and the right to 
                                                          
834 Article 104 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
835 Articles 55/c-1, 57 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
836 Mihret, Dessalegn Getie, and Admassu, Mengistu Amare. (2011). Reliance of External Auditors on 
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837 Ibid, at 68. 
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remove him and resign as well as the matter of voiding the provisions protecting 
auditors from liability.838 
In the English context, for example under Caparo Industries plc. v. Dickman, there is 
no liability for the company auditor that would arise in respect of any negligent 
misstatement as long as there is no special relationship or assumption of 
responsibility.839 Therefore, there is no duty of care from the auditor that would be owed 
to potential investors with regard to their investment decisions since the necessary 
degree of proximity between the parties is absent.840 The Saudi new Law of Companies 
2015, in contrast, states that the external auditor "shall be liable to compensate the 
Company, the shareholders or third parties for the damages resulting from errors it 
commits in the course of its engagement."841 
Appointing the directors and the company’s auditors is the main role of shareholders in 
governance to ensure that an appropriate governance structure is in place.842 Therefore, 
the UK Code of Corporate Governance 2016 emphasises the duty of the directors and 
the audit committee to maintain an appropriate relationship with the auditor. This is to 
ensure the independence and objectivity of the external auditor as well as the 
effectiveness of the audit process in accordance with relevant professional and 
regulatory requirements.843 
The audit committee should explain in the annual report how auditor objectivity and 
independence are safeguarded and disclose the length of tenure of the current auditor 
and when the last tenure occurred, as well as any non-audit services provided by the 
external auditor.844 Moreover, the committee should provide a description of the 
approach taken to assessing the effectiveness of the external audit and recommending 
the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor.845 Thus, such a 
                                                          
838 Sections 489-532 of the Companies Act 2006. 
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committee should hold the primary and ultimate responsibility in this recommendation 
function which needs to be accepted by the board of directors. If it does not accept it 
then it should explain in the annual report why it takes a different position.846 This rule 
gives the audit committee further power and independence over its duties, something 
adopted by the Saudi new CGR issued in 2017.847 
The OECD Principles provide some measures to improve the independence of the 
auditor and to promote their loyalty to the firm to exercise due professional care rather 
than anyone else who may interact with their work. These measures can be summarised 
by the points below: 
- The auditor should work under a framework of principles that remove him from 
threats to his independence, such as self-interest, self-review, familiarity, 
advocacy and intimidation. This may be done by a combination of policies and 
procedures that include prohibitions, restrictions and disclosures.848 
- Restricting or banning non-audit works that the auditor may undertake for his 
audit client because such services might significantly impair their 
independence. Furthermore, due to the disclosure of payments that the external 
auditor has received, any skewed incentives that resulted from non-audit 
services may be addressed. A tighter regulatory approach can be adopted to deal 
with this issue through setting a fixed percentage of non-audit income that can 
be gained from a certain client.849 Brandon indicates that there is a negative 
effect on judgments and decisions of the external auditor when he provides 
consulting services to the firm and such services may not help improve the 
functioning of the audit committee.850  
- Limiting the auditor’s work tenure and the mechanism of compulsory rotation 
of auditors are useful ways to support auditor independence.851 
                                                          
846 Ibid section c/3.7 
847 Article 56 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
848 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
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- Ensuring the competence of the audit profession and promoting compliance 
with its standards and other relevant laws and regulations may create a great 
opportunity to exercise due professional care. This can be achieved by making 
the auditor subject to the discipline of an oversight body of auditors which 
regulate its membership through an adequate charter based on quality of 
implementation and ethical standards. Such a situation allows a company to 
examine the auditors before appointing them as their qualifications and 
experiences have been registered and confirmed.852 
 
It should be noted that external auditors play a pivotal role in a weak governance 
environment where legal institutions, the quality of law enforcement and the investor 
protection laws are inadequate.853 However, the company can independently improve 
their own governance through selecting a high-quality auditor who is particularly keen 
to protect his reputation as the cost of hiding misconduct is very high for him. This can 
also be done through adopting many other means that ensure improved transparency 
and high disclosure quality.854 
Maximising firm-level governance will assist the company to counterbalance the 
weaknesses in the country’s legislation or in its enforcement. Moreover, employing a 
high-quality auditor may mitigate the negative impact of the lack of accounting 
information caused by a weak legal system. They may also fulfil a strong governance 
function in such environments.855 
  
                                                          
852 Ibid. 
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5.6   Stakeholders 
5.6.1   Determination of Stakeholders 
The term ‘stakeholder’ can be defined as “any person who has an interest in the 
company, such as shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, 
community”.856 In other words, it covers “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives”.857 This includes any 
types of relationships that need to be considered by managers such as business partners, 
employees and the parties mentioned above, who deserve to obtain any kind of benefit 
and avoid risks as they can also affect the firm, whether in processes or outcomes.858 
They all form part of the whole picture of the company by representing a different part 
such as a firm’s capital, its infrastructure, human capital commitments or providing a 
different level of services to it.859 The board of directors has two levels of duties towards 
them: a contractual and a moral duty to ensure the long-term success.860 
This research aims to discuss listed companies, which have dispersed ownership and 
generally have large capital and labour inputs as well as a wide impact on different 
external parties and sectors. The particular nature of the listed company raises the 
importance of finding a balance between liability, control and ownership to create 
integrated relationships between key actors in the light of the major purpose of the 
company. Therefore, it is difficult to consider all the interests of a variety of levels of 
stakeholders who have a stake or interest in a firm.861 Hence, the discussion in this 
chapter will focus on the key groups of stakeholders and their main interests provided 
that there is no conflict with each other. 
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As discussed earlier, shareholders have an asset specificity, and therefore, they have 
fundamental rights such as disposition with respect to shares, a share of the distributable 
profits, attending the AGM and voting on its decisions, supervision of the board of 
directors’ activities and filling in responsibility claims against board members.862 
However, this does not qualify them to control the firm on their own or to acquire 
special consideration over all other stakeholders who may be more involved and 
affected by the firm's risks,863 particularly when taking into account the ability of 
shareholders to sell their shares at any time.864 The firm is not only its capital but also 
includes complicated assets that should be considered such as intellectual rights, moral 
rights, secrets and employees’ experiences, and its power and role in a society, which 
may impact the local environment, the quality of life and surrounding industries.  
It should be noted that dealing with the interests of different parties and the diversity of 
a firm's priorities is not a zero-sum game.865 Therefore, creating value for all parties 
assists the company to broaden capabilities and cooperation in its activities and to 
reduce the probability of any kind of conflict.866 It also drives the company to improve 
the management, business environment and relationships for the long-term success.867 
Moreover, these actors can play a useful role in facilitating good corporate governance 
and enhancing internal control mechanisms.868 
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5.6.2   The Relationship with Stakeholders in Saudi Law Compared to English 
Law and Global Standards 
Starting from the importance of taking into account the interests of stakeholders 
mentioned above, the first part of the Corporate Governance Regulations in Saudi 
Arabia clearly refers to this aim. It introduces itself as a regulation that provides rules 
and standards to ensure the protection of the rights of both shareholders and 
stakeholders in joint stock companies listed in the exchange, as well as to ensure the 
management's compliance with the best governance practices.869  
In addition, Saudi CGR provides a guiding article that requires the board of directors to 
establish written policies regulating the relationship with stakeholders in order to 
protect their respective rights and maintain good relationships with each other, as well 
as regulating the company’s social contributions. This policy should cover mechanisms 
for indemnifying the stakeholders, settlement of complaints or disputes with them, 
protecting the confidentiality of information related to them and dealing with any case 
that contravenes their rights under the law and their respective contracts. In addition, 
the board of directors should regulate the relationship of the company’s executives and 
employees with stakeholders through setting out a code of conduct that is compatible 
with proper professional and ethical standards. The board should also supervise this 
code and lay down appropriate procedures that ensure good compliance.870 
Unlike the above guiding provisions provided by the new Saudi CGR 2017 and the new 
Saudi Law of Companies 2015, which is silent on this matter, section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 provides a clear and strong formulation to take into account the 
interests of stakeholders and compel directors to consider the company’s stakeholders. 
It stipulates that 
“a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would 
be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to: … 
the interests of the company’s employees, … the need to foster the company’s 
business relationships with suppliers, customers and others, … the impact of the 
company’s operations on the community and the environment”.871 
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It is difficult to deny that the new Saudi CGR features a specific section for stakeholders 
including several articles that would regulate conflicts of interest between all parties 
and ensure the protection of stakeholders’ rights.872 However, there is a significant 
difference between merely protecting the rights of all parties and considering those 
parties as the vital actors who play a part in building the company's success. 
In a similar manner, the OECD Principles cover six aspects that impact on corporate 
governance. One of these principles is the role of stakeholders including individual 
employees in corporate governance.873 According to this principle, the framework of 
corporate governance should recognise, respect, protect and consider the rights of 
stakeholders under the law and their respective contracts. Stakeholders should be 
encouraged to take part in creating and developing wealth, jobs and sustainable 
enterprises through active cooperation with the corporation. In order to do so, they and 
their representative bodies should be eligible to gain relevant, sufficient and reliable 
information in a timely and regular way. The company should also ensure that they can 
communicate freely without fear of losing their rights when they express their concerns 
about unethical or illegal practices to the board of directors.874 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from most legal scholars, judges and legal 
systems is that the interests of various stakeholders and the need to create a fair balance 
in controlling the firm in the light of its general interests are now recognised.875 
 
5.6.3   Employees   
5.6.3.1   Employees in the Saudi Context 
Employees can be considered as one of the most important stakeholders as they impact 
greatly on the company and vice versa. Despite the fact that the products and the value 
of the company rely, to great extent, on employees’ level of practice, they are the 
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weaker party in terms of the ability to claim their rights or complain against the 
company. This is particularly the case in developing countries where employees may 
have their rights compromised for doing so and there are no effective civil institutions 
to support them. The logical solution, therefore, is for them to receive further protection 
from the board of directors and the rules of corporate governance. 
The modern company is not only physical and financial assets owned by shareholders 
but is also composed of portable knowledge productions owned by employees. They 
are the human capital of the company and provide time, skills, ideas and experiences,876 
as well as their role in creating innovations and keeping the secrets of the company. 
Moreover, they bear the risks as shareholders and, like them, are certainly affected by 
management decisions but have fewer opportunities for survival. Thus, the role of 
employees deserves to be appreciated and they should be entitled to payment in 
exchange for bearing risks.877 
The relationship between the board of directors and employees needs further attention 
in the Saudi context due to the particular nature of the political, legal and economic 
environment in Saudi Arabia that was discussed in detail in chapter three. The Saudi 
political and legal environment does not support the democratic principles and 
institution-building that successful corporate governance depends on. There is also a 
lack of institution-building that might help in raising the confidence of judicial recourse, 
disclosure levels and rights protection. This is very different to developed countries 
such as England where there are independent and strong trade unions.878 This situation 
needs to be considered by regulations related to corporate governance and the rules that 
control internal management. 
The Saudi economy has two major characteristics that create challenges for employees 
and the labour environment. The first is that the current Saudi economy is dominated 
by the public sector which also owns a high percentage of the majority of blue chip 
companies listed on the market. Consequently, the majority of the national labour force 
in Saudi Arabia works in the government sector, which creates serious problems for the 
                                                          
876 Fontrodona, J., and Sison, A. (2006). The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: 
A Critique from Philosophical Anthropology. Journal of Business Ethics, 66(1), at 36-37. 
877 Ibid. 
878 Cernat, L. (2004). The emerging European corporate governance model: Anglo-Saxon, Continental, 
or still the century of diversity?. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(1), at 150, 152. 
213 
 
government. These include whether that is in terms of cost of expenditure (over 50% 
of the budget) or in terms of the unemployment rate for the national labour force (which 
has reached 11.5%).879 The government has sought to solve this problem by 
encouraging the corporate sector to take on the national labour force as much as 
possible. This requires appropriate legal rules and incentives that encourage the national 
labour force to work in companies and also ensure their rights' protection and their 
contribution to national development goals. The second challenge is the new Saudi 
vision which has sought to make rapid structural reforms to the Saudi economy. It 
announced two main mechanisms for doing so: directing 95% of the new national 
labour force to the private sector, and setting up a privatisation programme that aims to 
involve most government functions, public agencies and state-owned companies.880 
This also necessitates a review of the relationship of the corporate sector with the 
national employees and the relevant rule of corporate governance. 
 
5.6.3.2   Improving the Role of Employees in the Saudi Context 
Saudi corporations are not subject to any legal enforcement or compliance that gives 
employees a right to participate in strategic management decisions or to have any 
representative form. However, no system of corporate governance can operate in 
isolation from the effect of companies' actions on the wider groups of various 
stakeholders, especially employees. Therefore, it is important to review the Saudi 
system of corporate governance in order to protect the rights of employees and activate 
their role in good corporate governance.  
There are several ways and international practices that can be applied through the board 
of directors in the Saudi context. One of the most effective ways is the scheme of 
participatory management; this involves labour and employee involvement in strategic 
management decisions. This can be borrowed from the continental European tradition 
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of corporate governance where employees in firms of a certain size have the right to 
elect some members of the supervisory body or directors. Such a scheme has been 
adopted by Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden, and to some extent Finland 
and France. Likewise, in German law, corporations that have more than 2000 
employees must make up half of the supervisory board of employee representatives and 
one third of them in firms with between 500 and 2000 employees.881 
It may be objected that the domination of representatives of major shareholders over 
the board of directors is common, even in Germany where employees have the greater 
representation in the board.882 Moreover, the duty of the board of directors that requires 
directors to act in a way that promotes the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole including the interests of the company’s employees, should be 
seen hierarchically. In other words, the interests of the company’s shareholders are to 
be regarded more highly than those of its employees.883 However, the goal of 
employees’ representatives, in fact, is not to dominate the board but to give their 
perspectives, assist the board in reaching the right decision and highlight their concerns 
so that they are taken into account, which may affect the company in the long-term. 
Another useful practice is to give employees a role in corporate governance in an 
advisory capacity on certain issues as suggested by the supervisory body. This is one 
of the means of creating employee participation in decision-making without the 
negative impact on shareholder influence.884      
There is another practical way to enhance the participation of employees in corporate 
governance, which is by encouraging various vehicle types of employee stock 
ownership. This could be stock or employee pension funds, which may maximise the 
role of labour entities such as trade unions and works councils and encourage further 
involvement in corporate governance.885 Owning shares gives employees an 
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opportunity to be represented in the AGM and also influence its decisions including 
electing directors. It is also the case that they have more expertise in company affairs 
and are more interested in attending meetings than any other group of minority 
shareholders. 
OECD Principles provide another suggestion to deal with this case, and is one that has 
been adopted by many countries. They establish safe-harbours and facilitate the 
procedures to receive complaints of employees and their representatives confidentially 
through direct access to an independent board member. This method has often been 
supported and encouraged by laws or principles and sometimes been assigned to the 
audit committee or an ethics committee as the contact point. In addition, the internal 
auditor can play this role provided that direct access to the board is maintained. This 
function can also be done through modern communication channels. This is also 
important for company reputation, the potential risks and the financial position, which 
are significantly affected by unethical or illegal behaviour of corporate executives 
including abuse in transactions with employees. Therefore, taking the concerns of 
employees and other stakeholders into account is part of internal controls that maximise 
the advantage of the company and its shareholders’ interests.886  
The new Saudi CGR issued in 2017 partly deals with the role of employees in the matter 
of providing comments and reporting non-compliant practices. It requires the audit 
committee to find a way that enables employees to confidentially provide their 
observations related to any inaccuracies in the company's reports and to adopt 
appropriate follow-up procedures with the board.887 The board of directors should also 
develop policies and facilitate procedures that can be followed by stakeholders for 
submitting complaints or reporting any violations against the board. This is because the 
conduct and practices of senior management affect these parties and others, so they 
should be able to voice their concerns. Confidentiality can be ensured by facilitating 
direct contact with an independent member of the audit committee as well as allocating 
a telephone number, an email address, an employee or a specialised committee to 
receive and address stakeholders’ complaints or reports.888 However, all of these 
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procedures aim to protect the interests of stakeholders including employees and to 
tackle their complaints and comments without giving them a serious opportunity to 
contribute to decision-making.  
It can be argued that the Saudi legislature has not yet aimed to give employees any legal 
support entitling them to participate in strategic management decisions or to have any 
form of representation. Unlike the majority of articles in the new CGR, which are 
mandatory, it includes some guiding articles such as those that recommend that a 
company set up programmes for developing and incentivising the participation and 
performance of its employees. These programmes should include forming committees 
to hear employees' opinions about issues that are subject to important decisions and 
establishing a scheme to grant its employees a stake in company profits or shares and 
setting up a separate fund for pension programmes.889 
 
It should be noted here that this issue has also been the topic of extensive debate in 
England. A public consultation has been launched in the UK to discuss measures and 
options for giving more of a voice to employees and customers in the boardroom. The 
UK government launched a review of corporate governance in November 2016. This 
Green Paper asks for views and provides some options on executive pay; giving more 
of a voice to employees, customers and suppliers in large private businesses. It also 
welcomes other suggestions to help address the challenges of corporate governance. 
The aim of this is to strengthen the UK’s corporate governance framework and to 
deliver an economy that works for everyone, as well as building on current strengths 
and encouraging companies to do business in the UK.890 
The Green Paper provides some suggestions within a unitary board system that could 
improve the link between the boardroom and the workforce and other stakeholders.891 
These include the establishment of one or more stakeholder advisory panels, which 
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could be invited to full board meetings or to board committees to offer input on relevant 
issues. Appointing designated non-executive directors as formal representatives for 
employees and other stakeholders is another option that could articulate the specific 
perspectives of stakeholders and bring their concerns to the boardroom.892 Moreover, 
the paper states that there should be higher expectations for large companies to engage 
with employees and other stakeholders and to have flexibility to tailor their 
communication channels to. This could have gone further by appointing individual 
stakeholder representatives to company boards.893 
The role of stakeholders is also emphasised in the Third Report of Session 2016–17 of 
the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee. It recommends the promotion 
of more effective measures that give more of a voice to stakeholders in long-term 
decision making.894 The report recommends that companies in the UK should be 
required to facilitate the engagement of stakeholders by selecting the appropriate means 
and to report on the steps they have taken.895 It provides a number of options that can 
raise the contribution of the stakeholders: 
- Requiring the board of directors to prepare specific and accurate reports that 
explain how they have dealt with all different stakeholder interests including 
their impact in financial decisions.896 The report recommends that the Financial 
Reporting Council revise the UK Corporate Governance Code to include a 
section that requires companies to provide annual reports detailing how they are 
engaging with stakeholders.897 
- Encouraging firms to communicate digitally with stakeholders throughout the 
year.898 
- Giving employees the right to be represented on the board of directors to bring 
a different perspective to the board as well as being represented on remuneration 
committees to ensure commitment to fair pay.899 
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- Establishing stakeholder advisory panels to establish a formal framework for 
the board of directors to obtain the views of stakeholders, including employees. 
This has the potential to create a useful forum to produce a meaningful dialogue 
to assist a company in developing its policies and strategy as well as in alerting 
it to potential problems and tackling them.900 
 
5.7   Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the possibility of reforming Saudi law in terms of the roles and 
relationships of the board of directors with the main actors in light of corporate 
governance in English law and global standards. The research provided several 
suggestions to reform Saudi legislation in this area which can be summarised by the 
following points:  
• A company, especially a listed company, is not merely an amalgam of physical and 
financial assets but also relies on multiple factors of production which are 
dependent on each other, such as money, time, skills, ideas and experiences that 
deserve to be appreciated equally. This leads to a comprehensive view of the 
different actors who own a firm, including capital, management and labour, and 
who are all entitled to a rent in exchange for bearing risks. Moreover, these actors 
can play a useful role in facilitating good corporate governance and enhancing 
internal control mechanisms. There is a significant difference between merely 
protecting the rights of all parties and considering those parties as actors who play 
a vital part in building the company's success. 
• There is a need to increase the efficiency of the AGM as it is an essential firewall 
and a useful tool for shareholders to practise their rights and protect their interests 
in the Saudi context. In order to achieve this, the board of directors should boost 
efficient communication by facilitating attendance of shareholders, obtaining 
information and allowing questions and debates. This can also be done by activating 
the exercise of voting rights, whether in person or by proxy, which assists the 
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company to monitor the managers effectively and to pass well-informed 
resolutions.  
• The chapter recommends that the company should take into consideration the 
shareholders' local culture when communication technology is used. Hence, 
adopting both methods – physical and electronic – for holding the AGM may 
prevent the board of directors from avoiding face-to-face dialogue and direct 
accountability, as well as over-controlling the meeting and ignoring questions that 
are being asked. 
• It is important for the Saudi context for measures to be adopted to improve the 
independence of the board members, its committees and the company auditor, and 
to give their powers further protection from being restricted by the chairman of the 
board or executive directors. Moreover, the measures should facilitate accessing the 
information required and promoting the loyalty of these actors to the firm to 
exercise due professional care rather than anyone else who may interact with their 
work. This may be done by a combination of policies and procedures that include 
prohibitions, restrictions and disclosures. 
• It is important to review the Saudi system of corporate governance in order to 
protect the rights of employees and activate their role in good corporate governance. 
Employees can be considered one of the most important stakeholders as they impact 
greatly on the company and vice versa. They are the weaker party in terms of the 
ability to claim their rights or complain about the company, and they are deeply 
affected by board decisions but have fewer opportunities for survival. This is 
particularly the case in Saudi Arabia where employees may have their rights 
compromised and there are no effective civil institutions to support them. This is 
equally the case because of the characteristics of the current economy. The future 
announced plan creates serious challenges for employees and the labour 



















6.1   Introduction 
This research has reviewed the legislation relating to the board of directors in listed 
companies under the corporate governance system in Saudi Arabia and the extent to 
which such legislation affects its composition and relationships with the main parties 
in the company. In seeking to achieve the stated research aims, this thesis has used a 
comparative study with both English law and global standards and assessed Saudi 
legislation’s compatibility with them in this respect. This has been conducted in a 
manner that matches the particularity of the legal and economic environment and the 
nature of listed companies and supervisory bodies in Saudi Arabia.  
 
6.2   The Research Question Addressed 
The main question of this research was: "To what extent is it possible to reform the 
legislation related to the board of directors in listed companies in Saudi Arabia in the 
light of English law and global standards, taking into account the local political, 
economic and legal environments which significantly impact the board of directors?".  
The developing nature of the political, economic, judicial and legal environment in 
Saudi Arabia negatively impact on corporate governance in listed companies. 
Moreover, as in other developing countries, there is a shortage of independent media, 
strategies for combating corruption, civil institutions and democratic principles that 
successful corporate governance depends on.901 This situation draws attention to the 
importance of internal entities of corporate governance and the centrality of the role of 
the board of directors in safeguarding the interests of different shareholders and 
stakeholders. Hence, the research used English law and global standards to study the 
options for reforming Saudi legislation related to the board of directors, which would 
allow it to meet the standards of corporate governance and achieve their purpose.  
The objective of this research was firstly to clarify the Saudi environment that impacts 
on the board of directors and to identify loopholes and flaws in Saudi law that relate to 
the composition of the board of directors and its role and relationships with the main 
                                                          
901 See chapter three, section entitled “The political and legal environment in Saudi Arabia”. 
222 
 
actors. Then, the intention was to make some recommendations and suggest some 
solutions that would contribute to enriching the respective laws by suggesting more 
details, flexibility or enforceability, thus reforming and developing them.  
 
The research answered the main question by discussing the sub-questions determined 
in the introduction of this research in light of English law and global standards. It dealt 
with the pivotal factors of the Saudi environment affecting the board of directors and 
its composition and relationships in the Saudi context. These sub-questions include: 
• What are the concepts and principles of corporate governance that affect the board 
of directors? What are the theories and models that explain the relationship between 
the board of directors and the company? To what extent are these theories and 
models compatible with those in Saudi Arabia and able to achieve the objectives of 
corporate governance in the Saudi context? 
To answer these questions, the research discussed the importance, concepts and major 
principles of corporate governance. Moreover, it explored the major corporate 
governance theories which affect the role of the board of directors such as agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and so on. This was in order to assist 
understanding of the role of the board of directors and its relationships with 
shareholders, stakeholders and the company as a whole. It then went on to explore the 
most prominent models of corporate governance used worldwide that affect the role of 
the board of directors and to describe the main characteristics of each of them. The 
research discussed to what extent these theories and models are compatible with those 
in Saudi Arabia and able to achieve the objectives of corporate governance in the Saudi 
context.902 The thesis also discussed comparative law and legal transplantation and the 
importance of considering the local environment when evaluating transplanted rules 
and finding useful rules and solutions from other systems.903 
• To what extent are Saudi political, legal and economic environments compatible 
with the requirements that affect the role of the boards of directors in discharging 
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their duties and the success of corporate governance in light of English law and 
global standards? 
The thesis highlighted the unique environment in Saudi Arabia in terms of the political, 
legal and judicial aspects, which have some anomalous characteristics and create 
challenges in corporate governance which significantly influence the role and 
relationships of the board of directors in listed companies. This is especially the case 
with judicial authority.904 Moreover, the research clarified the structure of the Saudi 
economy and listed companies, as well as the major features of the recent trend set out 
in Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030 which is towards rapid privatisation.905 The thesis 
discussed the impacts of these environments and trends on the corporate sector and the 
practices of corporate governance, and provided some suggestions that may help in 
tackling some problems which have arisen from such an environment. The thesis has 
also defined the major features of the new Saudi Law of Companies, issued in 2015, 
and the new Corporate Governance Regulation, which recently issued in 2017. The 
thesis has dealt with all of the relevant changes in the new law and regulation. It has 
also clarified the extent of the improvement in corporate governance resulting from 
them as well as clarifying those aspects related to the thesis that require further reform. 
• To what extent are the composition of the board of directors in Saudi Arabia and its 
types of membership compatible with English law and global standards of corporate 
governance? Which international experiences in this regard are more appropriate to 
the Saudi context and capable of achieving the objectives of corporate governance 
in it? 
The thesis discussed this in depth and provided a number of suggestions to reform Saudi 
law related to the composition of the board of directors in light of English law and 
global standards. This includes the appointment of the board of directors and its tenure, 
as well as its structure, types and size. Moreover, it studied the most common, 
traditional models of boards of directors, which are the one-tier system and the two-tier 
system, to discover their main features that may be appropriate to the Saudi context and 
capable of facilitating the mechanisms of corporate governance needed. It also 
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discussed the diversity of board membership and the role of executive, non-executive, 
dependent and independent directors. The provision of shadow directors received 
substantial attention as did female representation on boards of directors.906 
• How can Saudi law be reformed in terms of the roles and relationships of the board 
of directors with the main actors in light of corporate governance in English law 
and global standards? 
The research provided several suggestions to reform Saudi legislation in this area. It 
discussed the relationship of the board of directors with shareholders, the role of the 
Annual General Meeting in this regard and the great importance of the AGM in the 
Saudi context. The relationship of board of directors with its meetings and members 
was the subject of wide debate in the thesis, including the boundary of its powers, 
information needed, and the effective contribution and remuneration of board members 
and top executives. The research also discussed the committees of the board of 
directors, such as audit committee and nomination and remuneration committee, as well 
as evaluating the performance of the board of directors and its committees. Moreover, 
there were two sections, dealing firstly with the role and relationships of the board of 
directors with the company’s auditor and secondly with the role and relationship with 
stakeholders especially employees who should have a further consideration in the Saudi 
context compared to global standards and practices.907 
In this final stage of the study, it is contended that the research questions have been 
answered and the fundamental issues in the thesis have been clarified.  
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6.3   The Research’s Contribution 
Corporate governance is in its infancy in Saudi Arabia, where the first legislation 
dealing with this issue was published in 2006. Despite several studies that have 
discussed corporate governance in Saudi Arabia, there have not been enough of these 
in this area. This study dealt with corporate governance through four key aspects: board 
of directors, listed companies, Saudi environments and English law and global 
standards. It started with the Saudi legal, political and economic environments in order 
to study the corporate governance needs in listed companies that related to the board of 
directors compared with the corporate governance in England and global standards. To 
the best of my knowledge, no study has discussed this issue from this perspective within 
the scope and targets of this research. 
Moreover, this research is one of the first studies to comment on the new Law of 
Companies published in Saudi Arabia on 4 December 2015 and which superseded the 
1965 law on the subject. This new law provides many different provisions related to 
corporate governance, and it is designed to meet the contemporary needs of the 
company sector and create a motivating environment for companies to increase their 
contribution to the national economy. It also tackles the shortcomings of the obsolete 
law and the dispersed decrees that tried to amend it.    
Discussion on the new direction found in the Saudi Vision for 2030 issued in 2016, 
when this thesis was well underway, is another contribution of this study. This 
governmental initiative can be considered a major, historical turning point that could 
have a substantial impact on the diversification of the economy, the culture of work and 
corporate governance practices. It aims to maximise the role of the private sector, 
increase economic liberalisation and create a comprehensive privatisation 
programme.908 This research discussed the vision in light of the essential characteristics 
of the current economy and corporate sector and provided some legal suggestions to 
deal with challenges that may arise from this trend related to the thesis scope. 
It is worth noting that on the 13th of February 2017, when this thesis was in its final 
stages, a new version of the Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) was introduced 
                                                          
908 See the official website of Saudi Arabia’s Vision for 2030, at 45, available at: 
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in Saudi Arabia. The new regulation has a massively higher number of articles than the 
superseded one. It has changed many provisions, which has impacted on numerous 
points that had been discussed by this thesis. Several rules had been criticised and some 
amendments and solutions had been suggested in this thesis which were subsequently 
tackled by the new CGR. However, the thesis dealt with all relevant changes and the 
shortcomings addressed by the new regulation. It also clarified the extent of the 
improvement in corporate governance that resulted from the new regulation and those 
aspects related to the thesis that require further reform. 
Several amendments have been suggested to improve the relevant legislation in Saudi 
Arabia, and the research has also provided some possible solutions for a number of 
specific problems existing in the Saudi context.909  
                                                          
909 See section 6.5 “The Main Recommendations for Reform”. 
227 
 
6.4   Summary of the Findings   
6.4.1   Theories and Models of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia  
There are numerous corporate governance theories and models which arise from 
different theoretical perspectives, whether they be political, cultural, ethical, social, 
institutional or economic. Some of them seek to serve particular aspects of corporate 
governance while others may be formed as a result of a reaction to and the tackling of 
some problems and needs in corporate governance. Each of the theories has its relative 
merits and some have feasible elements that can be applied to contribute to governance 
improvements in different environments and circumstances.910 Therefore, studying the 
main theories is essential to understand the concepts and principles of corporate 
governance, the particular nature of a joint stock company and the role of the board of 
directors. This is in addition to understanding the boundaries of the relationships 
between various groups in a firm and the importance of finding a comprehensive 
balance between liability, control and ownership. 
Both English and Saudi legislation deem the firm (not its shareholders) to be the 
principal and the board of directors as autonomous fiduciaries and mediating hierarchs 
who act on behalf of the interests of the whole corporation. They also recognise various 
stakeholders as team members who have claims, needs and rights.911 Hence, the board 
of directors and the firm have a unique relationship which can never be described as an 
agent-principal relationship between the board and shareholders exclusively.912  
Despite the fact that there is worldwide agreement on some fundamental principles of 
corporate governance, this have never removed the crucial differences between the 
most famous systems, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European ones. These 
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are based on a different host of institutional, legal and cultural barriers firmly rooted in 
the two doctrines.913    
The model adopted in Saudi Arabia is much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model and more 
in harmony with its general theory as it aims to generate a fair return for shareholders. 
Like this model, Saudi legislators adopted the unitary board of directors and do not 
provide the option of a two-tier model. The Saudi system also does not support the 
bank-oriented system which creates long-term dominant ownership. Furthermore, there 
are no regulations that support any form of employee representation or participation in 
decision-making. However, this system supposes that there exists a legal infrastructure 
with strict regulations on integrity of disclosure, advanced capital markets with 
institutional settings and a well-functioning stock market.914 These requirements may 
therefore be difficult to replicate in a developing country such as Saudi Arabia. 
By contrast, like the Continental European model in Germany and France, the Saudi 
legal system, including the corporate governance system, is based on civil law. It also 
contains numerous rules that protect and regulate rights and interests of stakeholder 
groups, as well as providing some limitations on CEO power. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon 
model, the legal and economic environments in Saudi Arabia to some extent boost the 
state’s role, ownership and control over the corporate sector. The government in Saudi 
Arabia dominates most labour and financial services as well as business sectors. The 
structure of many large joint stock companies is dominated by state ownership. This 
environment to some extent boosts the state’s role and control over the corporate 
sector.915 Some of the principles of the Continental European model may, therefore, be 
useful in developing corporate governance in the Saudi context. 
Listed companies which have dispersed ownership and generally impact on different 
internal and external parties need good governance to ensure that they are being run 
well and their managers are responsible and accountable. This points to the importance 
of the constant review of the theories, models, principles, practices and processes of 
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corporate governance according to the real needs and culture in each country, as well 
as continual changes of the internal and the external environments.916 Thus, there is no 
need to search for the best theory or system to imitate blindly. Instead, the real need is 
to introduce significant legal protection for investors and achieve the firm's goals 
successfully.917 Furthermore, it is important to develop the internal mechanisms and 
external regulatory environment and state agencies to combat corruption.918  
6.4.2   The New Law of Companies in Saudi Arabia 
On 4th December 2015, the new Law of Companies was published in Saudi Arabia, 
which superseded the previous law issued in 1965 and gave existing companies a one-
year time limit to comply with its new rules.919 This law was designed to meet the 
contemporary needs of the company sector and create a motivating legal environment 
for them to increase their contribution to the national economy. It also tackles the 
shortcomings of the obsolete law and the dispersed decrees that tried to amend it. The 
new law removes several barriers and restrictions to the growth of the company sector. 
It also includes numerous rules that enhance the good practices of corporate 
governance. On the one hand, the new law reduces the costs and the procedures for the 
establishment of a firm. For instance, it minimises the statutory reserve capital and the 
capital required for establishing a public company. Also, the number of members 
required to set up a joint stock company has been reduced.920 According to this law, a 
single person who meets certain conditions can set up a company.921 Moreover, the new 
law gives modern communications technology a vital role as it allows companies to 
maximise shareholder participation by holding the meetings of general assemblies via 
modern means of communication. The website of the Ministry of Commerce becomes 
adequate on its own for a firm to advertise itself and publish its Memorandum of 
                                                          
916 Abdullah, H., and Valentine, B. (2009). Fundamental and Ethics Theories of Corporate Governance. 
Euro Journals Publishing, Middle Eastern Finance and Economics, Issue 4, at 88,94. available at 
http://www.eurojournals.com/MEFE.htm, accessed on 12/3/2015. 
917  Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52(2), 
at 739. Available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x/full, 
accessed on 12/3/2015. 
918 Pettet, B., Lowry, J., and Reisberg, A. (2009). Pettet's Company Law; Company and Capital Markets 
Law (3rd ed.). New York: Pearson Longman, at 137. 
919 Articles 224- 226 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
920 Ibid article 54.   
921 Ibid article 55. 
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Association electronically. Those simplified rules may encourage Saudi businessmen 
to modify their institutions to shape firms and to encourage family companies, which 
receive greater attention in the new law, to become joint stock companies.922 
On the other hand, the new law provides some simplifications to shareholder 
participation and further protection of their rights. It makes several principles of 
corporate governance compulsory rather than remaining optional or being considered 
soft law. For example, it prevents the position of the chairman of the board of directors 
and any other executive position in the company from being combined.923 Moreover, it 
forces companies to adopt a cumulative election method in appointing members of the 
board of directors. It also gives any shareholder the right to attend an AGM regardless 
of the number of shares he holds924 rather than at least 20 shares required by the 
previous law.925 The new law minimises the loss ratio of capital of a company which 
necessitates an extraordinary meeting of the shareholders within a prescribed time 
period to solve the problem or the company will be dissolved by force of law. This rate 
of loss was 75% of the capital whereas it is only 50% in the new law926, which is 
consistent with the case in the UK.927 There are also strict sanctions of imprisonment 
and fines stipulated by the new law which act as a strong warning to the board of 
directors or any company parties not to breach the provisions of this law or provide 
false data and so on.928 
The tendency toward further streamlining the company sector can be observed in the 
new Law of Companies as it removes several barriers and reduces the costs and 
procedures previously imposed on companies. For example, according to the new law, 
the percentage of shareholder representation in the AGM must reach one quarter or 
more of the company’s capital value to be valid. If the percentage is lower, the law 
gives the company the right to convene another AGM within a month, regardless of the 
percentage of shareholders represented then. In addition, this alternative meeting can 
be held only one hour after the essential AGM provided that this alternative meeting 
has been mentioned in the statement of calling and the company constitution allows this 
                                                          
922 Ibid article 13, 86/3. 
923 Ibid article 81. 
924 Ibid, article 86/1. 
925 See the previous Law of Companies 1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, article 88. 
926 Ibid article 95, 150. And article 86/3 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
927 See section 656(1) of the Companies Act 2006. 
928 Articles 211, 218 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
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action.929 This is unlike the old law which stipulated that the meeting may not be valid 
if attended by shareholders representing less than one half of the company’s capital. If 
that was the case, the alternative meeting could not be held on the same day.930 
 
On the subject of the board of directors, there is a tendency to expand the power of the 
board of directors in the new Saudi Law of Companies 2015 and to remove obstacles 
that may prevent the board from fulfilling its duties. Hence, unlike the old Saudi Law 
of Companies, the new law allows the board to contract loans whatever their tenures 
and release the debtors of the company from their liabilities. Furthermore, the board of 
directors becomes eligible to sell or mortgage the real property or the place of business 
of the firm. The board of directors no longer needs upfront permission to do these 
actions from the AGM or company's constitution, as long as they did not provide any 
specific provisions in this regard.931 Beyond that, the new Saudi law binds the company 
to all the acts performed by the board of directors even if these acts are outside the 
limits of its competence, except if the beneficiary party is acting mala fide.932  
It is worth noting that this broad power of the board of directors needs to receive further 
consideration from the shareholders and the principal investors given that they still have 
the right to prevent or provide some restrictions to these powers. They can make some 
of the above actions be subject to their approval at the general meeting. Moreover, they 
can require the board to call an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) to amend the 
articles of association and add some rules that restrict the powers of the board.933   
To facilitate the fulfilment of the duties of the board of directors, the new Saudi law 
allows the board of directors to adopt resolutions by submitting them to the directors 
individually as long as there is no request in writing from any director asking to convene 
the board to deliberate on such resolutions.934 It also allows a company to insert in its 
constitution the authority for a director who cannot attend a meeting to ask another 
director to vote/act on his behalf.935 
                                                          
929 Ibid, article 93. 
930 See the previous Law of Companies1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, article 91. 
931 Article 75/2 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. See the old Law of 
Companies1965 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, article 73. 
932 Article 77 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
933 Ibid, articles 75/2, 88, 90. 
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Even though the new Saudi Law of Companies gives the board of directors extensive 
powers to achieve the company's objectives,936 it provides detailed rules to ensure that 
there are no abuses or any personal gain for a director whether directly or indirectly 
from the transactions or contracts made on the company’s account.937 The CGR requires 
the company to clarify the responsibilities of the board of directors in the articles of 
association. Furthermore, it provides many details about those duties and 
responsibilities.938 
Unlike the old Saudi law of companies which did not provide any specific provisions 
about a company’s committees, the new Law of Companies 2015 allocates a separate 
chapter includes four articles that regulate the provisions of the audit committee. It 
stipulates that the audit committee must be formed by the AGM from non-executive 
board members which also defines its jurisdictions and duties, standards of its work and 
remuneration of its members.939 The report of this committee has the same requirement 
as the reports of directors and auditor, and the financial statements.940 
This may give the audit committee a stronger position and further independence, in 
particular over appointing and removing the members of such a committee by the 
AGM. This can be considered a critical addition to the new Saudi Law of Companies 
as, to some extent, it may enable the audit committee to play a partial role, like a 
supervisory board in the two-tier model which consists of non-executives exclusively 
and aims to monitor the management board.  
6.4.3   The New Corporate Governance Regulations in Saudi Arabia 
On the 13th of February 2017, the new Corporate Governance Regulation (CGR) was 
published in Saudi Arabia, superseding the previous regulation issued in 2006. 
Numerous provisions have been changed, many shortcomings tackled and copious 
details provided. The key changes and characteristics of the new CGR can be 
summarised as follows: 
                                                          
936 Ibid, article 75. 
937 Ibid, articles 71,72,73. 
938 Articles 21 to 31 of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
939 Article 104 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
940 Ibid, article 128. 
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- The new CGR has been issued to respond to the changes in the new Saudi Law 
of Companies 2015 by providing a number of details and explanations for the 
provisions of the new Law of Companies. Unlike the old CGR which is not 
harmonised with the new law and is in conflict with some of its provisions.941     
- Unlike the previous CGR, which comes under the approach of "comply or 
explain" for all listed companies,942 the provisions of the new CGR are 
compulsory for all listed companies, except a small number of guidance 
articles.943  
- The number of parts and rules in the new CGR massively exceeds the number 
in the old version. There are twelve parts in the new CGR containing 98 articles, 
containing copious details compared to only 5 parts, including 19 articles in the 
old one. 
- The new CGR provides some forms and schedules for disclosing remunerations 
and obliges listed companies to prepare their remuneration documents 
accordingly.944 
This new CGR can be considered a quantum leap in corporate governance legislation 
in Saudi Arabia, which will improve corporate governance practices and contribute 
towards meeting the standards of good corporate governance.  However, the thesis has 
mentioned several points that need to be covered by the new CGR and has provided 
numerous suggestions to improve its rules. One of the key reforms that may enhance 
the benefits of new CGR would be to make some of its guidance articles compulsory 
or at least that they come under the principle of comply or explain. 
 
6.4.4   Key Environmental Factors that Affected Corporate Governance in 
Saudi Arabia 
The research found that the board of directors is greatly affected by political, legal and 
judicial systems, and the cultural environment, as well as the prominent characteristics 
                                                          
941 Many of relevant new provisions are discussed in the chapters four and five of this thesis. 
942 Article 1/c of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2006 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A number 
of articles from the old CGR had become mandatory by way of various decrees from the Capital Market 
Authority. 
943 Article 1/c of the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
944 Ibid, article 93/b. See also the forms and schedules at 69. 
234 
 
of the capital market and the relations between the government and corporate sector. It 
highlighted that the Saudi environment has three main factors that significantly affect 
the corporate governance and the board of directors, especially in listed companies: the 
state authority, the structure of the Saudi economy and the new trend in the Saudi Vision 
for 2030. 
First, the state apparatus, in general, consists of judicial, executive and regulatory 
authorities but there is no separation between them in Saudi Arabia 945 as they are all 
held by the Council of Ministers which is presided over by the king. In other words, the 
king is the final authority for all these bodies.946 Legislation is issued through royal 
decree or the decree of the Council of Ministers which is presided over by the king. 
There is also broad power for a minister in issuing bylaws and legal decrees in their 
ministry and interpreting legislation. The judicial authority and its administrative affairs 
are managed by the Minister of Justice. Moreover, the semi-parliament members are 
appointed by the king, not through public elections. Beyond that, the listed companies 
fall under the supervision of the Capital Market Authority which has its own jurisdiction 
and is not subject to the jurisdiction of commercial courts.947 
The second factor is the structure of the Saudi economy which relies on oil and many 
petrochemical products that are controlled or run by a limited number of state-owned 
companies.948 The public sector and government expenditure has been the main engine 
for the economy and has dominated most economic activities,949 including the company 
sector which depends on government tenders or on providing services to it.950 This 
situation has created several problems in the governance of the public sector and in the 
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948 Ministry of Finance of Saudi Arabia, (2015). Ministry of Finance statement about the national budget 
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949 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, (2016). Financial Stability Report 2016, at 7, 43. available at 
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unemployment rate for the national labour force which reached 11.5%.951 Moreover, 
the ownership and control of Saudi listed companies appears to be highly concentrated 
in the state and its founding families. The ten biggest companies of the Saudi market 
represent almost half of the Saudi market value. The ownership of these companies is 
concentrated in the hands of the government.952 Governmental institutions are among 
the major shareholders of more than 30% of listed companies,953 and 39% of the Saudi 
stock market is accounted for by only three governmental organisations.954 
The third factor is the Saudi Vision for 2030 which was issued in 2016 by the new king 
who wished to follow a different agenda and put in place a new leadership group. This 
could be considered a major historical turning point that may have a broad impact on 
the diversification of the economy, the culture of work and corporate governance 
practices. Its target is to maximise the role of the private sector in the long-term and 
increase economic liberalisation.955 
There is a strong trend to create a comprehensive privatisation programme that involves 
most public agencies and state-owned companies in order to slash government waste, 
increase the rate of transparency and counter corruption. Moreover, there is a real push 
to solve the current governmental problem of unemployment by raising the rate of 
nongovernment jobs in the private sector to employ the majority of the national labour 
force.956 When this Vision is linked to the current legal and political environment, it 
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raises concerns about the ability to move forward in those programmes safely in this 
situation whilst maintaining the rights of shareholders and stakeholders and ensuring 
the success and diversification of the economy, as well as solving employment 
problems.957 
 
6.4.5   The Relationship with the Main Actors under Corporate Governance 
A company is not merely an amalgam of physical and financial assets, but is also 
composed of its human capital which own the portable knowledge productions. They 
may be affected more than shareholders by management decisions as they have less 
opportunities for survival through merely selling their shares.958 The modern company, 
especially a listed company, relies on multiple factors of production which are 
dependent on each other, such as money, time, skills, ideas and experiences that deserve 
to be appreciated equally. This leads to a comprehensive view of the different actors 
who own a firm, including capital, management and labour, and who are all entitled to 
a rent in exchange for bearing risks.  
It should be noted that dealing with the interests of different parties and the diversity of 
a firm's priorities is not a zero-sum game.959 Therefore, creating value for all parties 
assists the company to broaden capabilities and cooperation in its activities and to 
reduce the probability of any kind of conflict.960 It also drives the company to improve 
the management, business environment and relationships for long-term success.961 
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Moreover, these actors can play a useful role in facilitating good corporate governance 
and enhancing internal control mechanisms.962 
The UK Companies Act 2006 takes a broad view when determining the board's duty to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. It 
stipulates that this must consider the interests of the company’s employees; the 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others; the community and the environment 
that may be impacted by the company’s operations; the company's reputation for 
following high standards of business conduct; and the fairness between members of the 
company.963 There is a significant difference between merely protecting the rights of 
all parties and considering those parties as actors who play a vital part in building the 
company's success. 
In a similar manner, the OECD Principles emphasises that the framework of corporate 
governance should involve stakeholders in creating and developing wealth, jobs and 
sustainable enterprises through active cooperation with the corporation. In order to do 
so, they and their representative bodies should be eligible to gain relevant, sufficient 
and reliable information in a timely and regular fashion. The company should also 
ensure that they can communicate freely without fear of losing their rights when they 
express their concerns about unethical or illegal practices to the board of directors.964 
 
6.4.6   The Authority Responsible for Disputes of Listed Companies in Saudi 
Arabia 
One of the most important issues studied by this research is the competent authority 
responsible for disputes of listed companies in Saudi Arabia, which works outside the 
jurisdiction of the commercial courts. This also applies to the appeals panel of these 
disputes. The listed companies in Saudi Arabia are subject to the CMA and the 
jurisdiction of the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) 
                                                          
962 Goergen, M. (2010). Corporate governance and complexity theory [electronic resource]. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, at 4-5. 
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964 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
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established by the CMA which also has the authority to issue regulations and rules.965 
The law gives the CMA the power to determine wrongful acts, investigate disputes, 
subpoena witnesses, order the production of evidence and file a lawsuit before the 
CRSD which is established by the CMA.966 This means that the CMA in some cases 
plays the roles of legislator, claimant, inspector, jury and judge at the same time. 
It should be noted that the Saudi law does not deem the members of these committees 
to be judges and considers their resolutions to be administrative decisions rather than 
judicial verdicts.967 This is the case despite the fact that the CRSD and the appeals panel 
are carrying out judicial functions and they have the full authority to punish anyone 
violating the law with fines, imprisonment, suspension of trade, seizure of property, 
travel bans and so on, according to the set conditions.968 However, this does not mean 
that they have the legal qualifications and independence which the members of the 
judicial authority have. 
The unusual factors above may create an atmosphere of uncertainty about the credibility 
of litigation in the Saudi capital market. These may have serious negative effects not 
only on Saudi companies and the relationships with their board members but also on 
attracting foreign investors. Such a situation goes against the current strong trend 
towards privatisation and maximising the role of the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia, 
which needs to improve regulations, the judicial system, the environment of the market 
economy and measures of protection for the rights of all parties. 
This thesis pointed to the reason for this unacceptable situation. It arose from long-term 
disagreements between politicians and scholars of Shari'ah about enacting laws and their 
codification and about dealing with the needs of civil society in the modern state. This 
has resulted in a number of rules being borrowed from transnational law which conflict 
with Shari'ah teachings such as those on the stock market and banking sector. These in 
fact conflict with the Judicial Law and the applicable main legislations in Saudi Arabia 
that emphasise the role of Shari'ah. The research also suggested some solutions to deal 
with this dilemma.969 
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6.5   The Main Recommendations for Reform 
The internal corporate structure including the board of directors is one of the central 
aspects that needs to be considered when reviewing the corporate governance system 
in the Saudi context. The board of directors is the most important internal corporate 
institution for representing shareholders and coordinating the interactions within 
company boundaries, for regulating the relationships between the different 
constituencies and for enacting bylaws and corporate policies. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to consider the composition, roles and key relationships of the board of 
directors carefully when reviewing corporate governance legislation.   
The research has found several useful rules in England legislation and global standards 
which may assist in reforming Saudi legislation related to the board of directors.  The 
research, therefore, provides a number of suggestions in this regard that can be found 
in the relevant chapters in the thesis. These suggestions can be summarised and divided 
into the points below. 
 
6.5.1   The Composition of the Board of Directors 
▪ There are some provisions in Saudi law in this area that need to be reviewed, such 
as those relating to the board size, conditions and the tenure of directorships. There 
are some details and differences in England where the different circumstances of 
firms are considered and a distinction is made between large and small companies. 
This distinction may be useful for the Saudi context.970 
 
▪ It is recommended that Saudi law should be more flexible, similar to some European 
countries, in allowing the adoption of either of the two models of the board of 
directors, the unitary system and the two-tier system, in order to give firms an 
opportunity to select which one is more suitable for their needs and circumstances. 
Adopting the two-tier model is considered a typical option or solution for numerous 
specific situations such as state-owned firms and the process of privatisation, family 
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light of English law. 
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companies, large multinational corporations with several branches and in mergers 
between two companies. Moreover, because this model maximises the role of the 
board of directors, it may seem more beneficial in developing countries where many 
obstacles prevent the shareholders’ associations from playing their role.971 
 
▪ Saudi law places all the ultimate responsibilities on the board of directors972 and has 
not provided any legislation to deal with shadow directorships. Therefore, the 
research strongly recommends adding proper rules to Saudi legislation to deal with 
shadow directors to prevent them from interfering. This will keep pace with 
increased global legislative developments and best practices of international 
corporate governance, as well as to maximise the firms' economic benefits through 
improving corporate management. There is an urgent need for such legislation, 
especially in developing countries where a culture of participation, transparency 
and accountability is lacking in many respects. Moreover, the political structure in 
some of these countries creates the perfect environment for shadow director 
practices where class divisions persist, and power, money and influence are 
concentrated in the hands of certain groups in society.973 
 
6.5.2   The State Authorities and Legal Environment in Saudi Arabia 
▪ It is strongly recommended that Saudi Arabia should develop its legal and economic 
environments and judicial systems to meet the needs of modern capital markets and 
the corporate sector. This relates in particular to the Vision for 2030 issued in 2016 
which aims to maximise the role of the private sector, increase economic 
liberalisation and create a comprehensive privatisation programme.974 In order to 
achieve the desired results, slash government waste and counter corruption, the 
vision needs to meet global standards of directorship and ensure good practices of 
corporate governance principles. Most principles of good corporate governance are 
                                                          
971 See chapter four, section entitled “The types of boards of directors in light of the Saudi context”. 
972 Article 78 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And see article 21/b of 
the Corporate Governance Regulations 2017 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
973 See chapter four, section entitled “The shadow directorship in Saudi Arabian law”. 
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http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/node, accessed on 18/8/2016. 
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built on three supreme values: accountability, transparency and probity, which 
represent some of the essential concepts of a democratic system.975 Therefore, the 
use of corporate governance mechanisms may pay considerable dividends in 
democratic countries compared to undemocratic ones. 
 
▪ Both politicians and Islamic scholars should work together to end the stalemate 
between them which has brought into being several administrative committees that 
have a judicial jurisdiction. They should create an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
find a solution that ensures that all kinds of disputes including securities disputes 
will be covered by the structure of judicial authority. The research suggests that this 
problem can be solved by two methods. 
First, policy-makers could recognise and comply with the law they have enacted that 
emphasises that all legislation must be formulated in accordance with the principles and 
the sources of Shari‘ah.976 The law also imposes on the courts the exclusive application 
of the provisions of Islamic Shari‘ah.977 On the other hand, Shari'ah scholars could be 
more proactive and respond to the requirements of development and economic needs, 
and also be more harmonised with the global commercial system and international 
agreements. Moreover, improving judicial authority, qualifying programmes, 
curriculums and judges’ competence so that they are qualified and have sufficient 
experience to deal with the cases filed before semi-judicial committees is another area 
that needs to be looked at. This solution is more appropriate considering the recent trend 
clearly stipulated by the Saudi law issued in 2007, which gives commercial courts 
jurisdiction over all authorities of the commercial judiciary and aims to abolish the 
current administrative judicial committees over time.978 
The second way is to improve these semi-judicial committees, transforming them into 
authentic courts with all their powers, authority and independence. The existence of 
these semi-judicial committees that are run in the same location and legal environment 
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points to a problem with names and not actual practice. Therefore, the problem can be 
solved by these committees having the same characteristics and procedures of the courts 
regardless of the name they are given. It is should be noted by both politicians and 
Islamic scholars that the unfairness, abuse and neglect of rights that may arise from the 
current situation of vesting some judicial functions on administrative committees are in 
much greater conflict with both Shari'ah teachings and the Basic Law of Governance.979 
 
6.5.3   The Relationship of the Board of Directors with the Main Actors   
▪ There is a need to increase the efficiency of the AGM as it is an essential firewall 
and a useful tool for shareholders to practise their rights and protect their interests. 
In order to achieve this, certain things need to be in place in the AGM. The first is 
efficient communication which could be boosted by facilitating attendance of 
shareholders, obtaining information and allowing questions and debates. The 
second is effective exercise of voting rights whether in person or by proxy, which 
determines the fate of the management team. These will assist the company to 
monitor the managers effectively and to pass well-informed resolutions,980 
especially in Saudi listed companies where ownership and control are highly 
concentrated in the State and its founding families.981 This includes simplifying 
accessing the information related to the issues that will be discussed in the AGM 
and allowing questions to be received in advance of the AGM.982  
 
▪ The new Saudi law allows the AGM to be held through modern means of 
communication.983 The research recommends that the company should take into 
consideration the shareholders' local culture and the extent that communication 
technology is used. Hence, adopting both methods – physical and electronic – for 
holding the AGM may prevent the board of directors from avoiding face-to-face 
                                                          
979 See chapter three, section entitled “The judicial authorities related to the company sector, suggested 
reform”. 
980 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 765- 767. 
981 The World Bank, February 2009, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Country 
Assessment, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, p1, 4. 
982 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles II/ c-3, at 23. 
983 Article 86/3 of the Law of Companies 2015 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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dialogue and direct accountability as well as over-controlling the meeting and 
ignoring questions that are being asked.984 
 
▪ It is important for the Saudi context to adopt measures to improve the independence 
of the board members, its committees and the company auditor, and to give their 
powers further protection from being restricted by the chairman of the board or 
executive directors. Moreover, the measures should facilitate accessing to the 
information required and promote the loyalty of these actors to the firm to exercise 
due professional care rather than anyone else who may interact with their work. 
However, they should work under a framework of principles that safeguard them 
from threats to independence such as self-interest, self-review, familiarity, 
advocacy and intimidation. This may be done by a combination of policies and 
procedures that include prohibitions, restrictions and disclosures.985 
 
▪ Self-evaluation, which should be done by the board of directors, is a significant 
means of ensuring good performance and implementation of internal and external 
laws and policies. It requires a high degree of transparency, openness, honesty and 
agreement on goals from every director, committee and support staff. Much time 
and effort needs to be taken, such as interviewing directors, talking with auditors 
and institutional investors and collecting accurate data, as well as analysing 
attendance records and minutes of board meetings and its committees. The roles 
and contributions of each individual director should be recorded in a personal 
profile which should also include all relevant information such as experience, 
education, professional background and interpersonal abilities and skills which 
brought about his appointment.986 This fact does not prevent the hiring of some 
professional non-competitor bodies or individuals who may play a significant role 
in independent assessment. This could be provided by a firm specialising in board 
appraisal, institutes of directors and consultancies, a past chairman, an experienced 
                                                          
984 Samat, N. and Ali, H. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ Meeting in the Globalised and 
Interconnected Business Environment. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 172, at 768. 
985 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles V/c, at 47. 
986 Tricker, B. (2015). Corporate governance principles, policies and practices (3rd ed). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 439, 444, 449. 
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independent consultant and superior chairman or director from the board of another 
firm.987 
 
▪ Employees can be considered as one of the most important stakeholders as they 
impact greatly on the company and vice versa. They are the weaker party in terms 
of the ability to claim their rights or complain about the company, and they are 
deeply affected by board decisions but have fewer opportunities for survival. This 
is particularly the case in Saudi Arabia where employees may have their rights 
compromised and there are no effective civil institutions to support them. 
Moreover, the characteristics of the current economy and the future announced plan 
create serious challenges for employees and the labour environment, as well as the 
government. Therefore, it is important to review the Saudi system of corporate 
governance in order to protect the rights of employees and activate their role in good 
corporate governance. 
The research discusses several solutions that can be borrowed from the continental 
European tradition of corporate governance where employees in firms of a certain size 
have the right to elect some members of the board of directors.988 Another useful 
practice is to give employees a role in corporate governance in an advisory capacity on 
certain issues as suggested by the board of directors. Encouraging various vehicle types 
of employee stock ownership may maximise the role of labour entities and gives 
employees an opportunity to be represented in the AGM and also influence its decisions 
including on electing directors.989 Improving the procedures to receive complaints of 
employees and their representatives confidentially through direct access to an 
independent board member, the audit committee or an ethics committee as the contact 
point would also be a major improvement. This function could also be done through 
modern communication channels.990 
 
                                                          
987 Ibid. 
988 Goergen, M., Manjon, M., and Renneboog, C. (2008). Is the German system of corporate governance 
converging towards the Anglo-American model?. Journal of Management and Governance, 12(1), at 50. 
989 Weil, G., and Manges, L. (2002). Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to 
the European Union and its Member States, European Commission, Final report and Annexes, Weil, 
Gotshal and Manges, at 32-34. 
990 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2015). G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, Principles IV/e, at 39. 
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6.6   Possibilities for Further Research   
Corporate governance in the Saudi context has many different aspects that need to be 
tackled by critical studies, including the role of the board of directors. Given its limited 
size and timescale, this research was unable to cover some important issues related to 
the board of directors of Saudi listed companies. There are also other issues partly 
discussed by this research which need further study to improve corporate governance 
in the Saudi context. 
Some of these are related to the relationship of the board of directors with the CEO and 
internal company bylaws of corporate governance, as well the relationship with 
profitable and non-profitable entities and international observing bodies of corporate 
governance. Measures that ensure the quality of law enforcement constitute another 
aspect that needs to be studied alongside provisions related to breaches of corporate 
governance rules, negligence and abuse.  
Challenges that may arise from the strong trend towards privatisation in Saudi Arabia 
and the role of the board of directors in this context are the other significant topics that 
need to be considered in depth by further studies in the light of corporate governance 
standards. A good privatisation programme could play an important role in improving 
corporate governance and contribute to re-evaluating of a number of significant issues, 
such as standards of transparency, probity, accountability and the culture of 
directorship. However, there is a need to improve regulations, the judicial system, the 
environment of the market economy and measures of protection for the rights of all 
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